WTO框架下跨協(xié)議報復機制研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-05-24 04:17
【摘要】：作為世界貿(mào)易組織（the World Trade Organization，下文簡稱“WTO”）烏拉圭回合多邊貿(mào)易談判的成果之一，跨協(xié)議報復機制被首次明確地引入WTO爭端解決機制。在談判之初，以美國為首的發(fā)達國家為在WTO所有成員范圍內(nèi)對知識產(chǎn)權建立起最低保護限度的國際協(xié)定，主張引入跨協(xié)議報復機制以迫使發(fā)展中國家履行保護知識產(chǎn)權的義務。但WTO的實踐證明跨協(xié)議報復機制已然成為發(fā)展中國家迫使發(fā)達國家履行爭端解決機構(Dispute Settlement Body,下文簡稱“DSB”)裁決或建議的有力武器。 迄今為止，WTO關于跨協(xié)議報復授的判例僅有三例：厄瓜多爾訴歐共體香蕉案、安提瓜訴美國博彩案和巴西訴美國棉花案。這些案件的共性在于：均是授權發(fā)展中國家對發(fā)達國家實施跨協(xié)議報復；均是針對貨物貿(mào)易或服務貿(mào)易的爭端授權發(fā)展中國家在知識產(chǎn)權領域?qū)嵤﹫髲�；獲得報復授權的發(fā)展中國家無一例外地沒有真正意義上實施報復措施，反而將其作為談判籌碼；在DSB做出跨協(xié)議報復授權后，作為敗訴方的發(fā)達國家均一改借故拖延不履行DSB裁決的態(tài)度，積極協(xié)商促成爭端解決的方案。顯然，跨協(xié)議報復機制是發(fā)展中國家的可用武器，同時發(fā)展中國家懼怕實施跨協(xié)議報復措施的顧慮暴露出跨協(xié)議報復機制的缺陷，，如跨協(xié)議報復機制本身存在的制度缺陷，發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟實力等客觀因素。故，本文在梳理跨協(xié)議報復機制的形成過程、發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀、適用條件、原則和程序的基礎上，結(jié)合判例，剖析跨協(xié)議報復機制的缺陷和困境，力求為發(fā)展中國家如何運用好跨協(xié)議報復這把雙刃劍提供合理可行的法律建議。 本文分為五部分： 第一部分采用歷史分析的方法，梳理跨協(xié)議報復機制的形成過程和發(fā)展狀況。對WTO關于跨協(xié)議報復授權三個判例進行了研究和評論。 第二部分采用文本分析的方法，結(jié)合《關于爭端解決規(guī)則和程序的諒解》（TheDispute Settlement Understanding下文簡稱“DSU”）第22.3條條文的規(guī)定，分析跨協(xié)議報復機制的內(nèi)容和適用。指出跨協(xié)議報復機制的形式條件和實質(zhì)條件，并結(jié)合案例重點分析了實質(zhì)條件之“可行性”“有效性”和“情況足夠嚴重”。指出DSU給發(fā)展中國家在知識產(chǎn)權領域適用報復措施留下了法律空間的同時并未就相關適用標準作出規(guī)定的缺陷，須在今后的判例中逐步完善，并盡早達成談判合意。 第三部分主要采用實證分析的方法，結(jié)合DSB三個判例的裁決，具體論述了跨協(xié)議報復機制的缺陷和困境，即形式上的不公允性、實質(zhì)條件審查標準的模糊性、知識產(chǎn)權領域內(nèi)跨協(xié)議報復水平難以控制、發(fā)展中國家實施跨協(xié)議報復的高成本性等。 第四部分針對第三部分提出的困境，從制度層面提出對跨協(xié)議報復機制的完善建議。 第五部分從三個方面為發(fā)展中國家合理運用跨協(xié)議報復機制提出應對之策。明晰跨協(xié)議報復機制的利弊，跨協(xié)議報復機制在發(fā)展中國家具有可行性是首先應有的態(tài)度；合理選擇相關知識產(chǎn)權種類進行報復是控制報復水平的可行之舉；積極參與國際談判，力求早日達成國際一致意見是最終歸宿。
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996.1
本文編號：2484551
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【學位授予單位】：西南政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996.1
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