WTO框架下跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-24 04:17
【摘要】：作為世界貿(mào)易組織（the World Trade Organization，下文簡(jiǎn)稱“WTO”）烏拉圭回合多邊貿(mào)易談判的成果之一，跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制被首次明確地引入WTO爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制。在談判之初，以美國(guó)為首的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家為在WTO所有成員范圍內(nèi)對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)建立起最低保護(hù)限度的國(guó)際協(xié)定，主張引入跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制以迫使發(fā)展中國(guó)家履行保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的義務(wù)。但WTO的實(shí)踐證明跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制已然成為發(fā)展中國(guó)家迫使發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家履行爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)構(gòu)(Dispute Settlement Body,下文簡(jiǎn)稱“DSB”)裁決或建議的有力武器。 迄今為止，WTO關(guān)于跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)授的判例僅有三例：厄瓜多爾訴歐共體香蕉案、安提瓜訴美國(guó)博彩案和巴西訴美國(guó)棉花案。這些案件的共性在于：均是授權(quán)發(fā)展中國(guó)家對(duì)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家實(shí)施跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)；均是針對(duì)貨物貿(mào)易或服務(wù)貿(mào)易的爭(zhēng)端授權(quán)發(fā)展中國(guó)家在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域?qū)嵤﹫?bào)復(fù)；獲得報(bào)復(fù)授權(quán)的發(fā)展中國(guó)家無一例外地沒有真正意義上實(shí)施報(bào)復(fù)措施，反而將其作為談判籌碼；在DSB做出跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)授權(quán)后，作為敗訴方的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家均一改借故拖延不履行DSB裁決的態(tài)度，積極協(xié)商促成爭(zhēng)端解決的方案。顯然，跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制是發(fā)展中國(guó)家的可用武器，同時(shí)發(fā)展中國(guó)家懼怕實(shí)施跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)措施的顧慮暴露出跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的缺陷，，如跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制本身存在的制度缺陷，發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力等客觀因素。故，本文在梳理跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的形成過程、發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀、適用條件、原則和程序的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合判例，剖析跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的缺陷和困境，力求為發(fā)展中國(guó)家如何運(yùn)用好跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)這把雙刃劍提供合理可行的法律建議。 本文分為五部分： 第一部分采用歷史分析的方法，梳理跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的形成過程和發(fā)展?fàn)顩r。對(duì)WTO關(guān)于跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)授權(quán)三個(gè)判例進(jìn)行了研究和評(píng)論。 第二部分采用文本分析的方法，結(jié)合《關(guān)于爭(zhēng)端解決規(guī)則和程序的諒解》（TheDispute Settlement Understanding下文簡(jiǎn)稱“DSU”）第22.3條條文的規(guī)定，分析跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的內(nèi)容和適用。指出跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的形式條件和實(shí)質(zhì)條件，并結(jié)合案例重點(diǎn)分析了實(shí)質(zhì)條件之“可行性”“有效性”和“情況足夠嚴(yán)重”。指出DSU給發(fā)展中國(guó)家在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域適用報(bào)復(fù)措施留下了法律空間的同時(shí)并未就相關(guān)適用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作出規(guī)定的缺陷，須在今后的判例中逐步完善，并盡早達(dá)成談判合意。 第三部分主要采用實(shí)證分析的方法，結(jié)合DSB三個(gè)判例的裁決，具體論述了跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的缺陷和困境，即形式上的不公允性、實(shí)質(zhì)條件審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的模糊性、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)水平難以控制、發(fā)展中國(guó)家實(shí)施跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)的高成本性等。 第四部分針對(duì)第三部分提出的困境，從制度層面提出對(duì)跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的完善建議。 第五部分從三個(gè)方面為發(fā)展中國(guó)家合理運(yùn)用跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制提出應(yīng)對(duì)之策。明晰跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制的利弊，跨協(xié)議報(bào)復(fù)機(jī)制在發(fā)展中國(guó)家具有可行性是首先應(yīng)有的態(tài)度；合理選擇相關(guān)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)種類進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)是控制報(bào)復(fù)水平的可行之舉；積極參與國(guó)際談判，力求早日達(dá)成國(guó)際一致意見是最終歸宿。
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1
本文編號(hào)：2484551
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1
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