【摘要】：國際貨幣基金組織作為布雷頓森林體系的遺物，在國際貨幣體系幾經(jīng)嬗變之后，仍在維持國際貨幣體系穩(wěn)定方面起著基石作用。然而，IMF在最近幾次危機救援中的表現(xiàn)導致國際社會對其信心大減，次貸危機的爆發(fā)更是暴露出了IMF的制度困境，尤其是投票制度、貸款條件性制度和匯率制度這三大制度亟需革新，以完成新時代賦予它的使命。在后次貸危機時期，IMF的發(fā)展趨勢如何，成了國際社會關(guān)注的焦點。 本文以“后次貸危機時期IMF發(fā)展趨勢的法律分析”為標題，著眼于IMF投票制度、貸款條件性制度和匯率監(jiān)督制度的探討。全文共分五章展開論述： 第一章是IMF的嬗變及其制度困境。第一節(jié)簡要介紹了IMF的誕生及演變。二戰(zhàn)后建立的布雷頓森林體系無法擺脫“特里芬難題”，在20世紀70年代瓦解。作為布雷頓森林體系的遺產(chǎn)，，IMF在現(xiàn)行的牙買加體系之下艱難地維持著“有限秩序”。第二節(jié)通過剖析美國次貸危機的法律原因，揭示出現(xiàn)行的國際金融監(jiān)管制度無法適應(yīng)當前的國際經(jīng)濟形勢和國際金融交易現(xiàn)狀。次貸危機暴露出IMF的制度缺陷，為了走出制度困局，IMF亟需進行改革，尤其應(yīng)致力于投票制度、貸款條件性制度和匯率監(jiān)督制度這三大制度架構(gòu)的完善。 第二章是IMF投票制度發(fā)展趨勢的法律分析。第一節(jié)概括介紹了IMF投票制度架構(gòu)，IMF實行以份額為基礎(chǔ)的加權(quán)投票制度。第二節(jié)分析了IMF投票制度的法律缺陷，主要有兩點。一是由于基本投票權(quán)被稀釋以及份額計算公式不合理，導致份額分配嚴重失衡，投票權(quán)分配制度有失平等；二是集中表決方式使份額大國享有了否決權(quán)，IMF決議的國際法效力遭質(zhì)疑。第三節(jié)闡述了IMF投票制度的改革，提出了明確規(guī)定基本投票權(quán)占比、調(diào)整份額計算公式、設(shè)立份額自動調(diào)整機制和雙重多數(shù)表決方式四種改革方案。 第三章是IMF貸款條件性制度發(fā)展趨勢的法律分析。第一節(jié)概括介紹了IMF貸款條件性制度構(gòu)架。在信用部分的借款，借款國需要以接受IMF制定的國內(nèi)政策改革方案為條件提取款項。第二節(jié)分析了IMF貸款條件性制度的法律缺陷，主要有三點。一是貸款條件過于嚴苛和寬泛，有侵犯成員國經(jīng)濟主權(quán)之嫌。二是貸款條件過于僵化，IMF對所有借款國都千篇一律地附加“提高利率緊縮財政”的政策條件。三是IMF的貸款所附加的政策條件對借款國的宏觀經(jīng)濟和私人資本回流收效甚微。第三節(jié)闡述了IMF貸款條件性制度的改革，提出了變更貸款條件設(shè)定主體、變更貸款條件內(nèi)容、加強貸款的針對性和梅爾策規(guī)則四種方案。 第四章是IMF匯率監(jiān)督制度發(fā)展趨勢的法律分析。第一節(jié)概括介紹了IMF匯率監(jiān)督制度構(gòu)架，主要法律淵源是《IMF協(xié)定》第四條和《對成員國政策雙邊監(jiān)督的決定》。第二節(jié)分析了IMF匯率監(jiān)督制度的法律缺陷，對兩大法律淵源的法律缺陷分別加以探析�！禝MF協(xié)定》第四條規(guī)定過于原則、缺乏可操作性；磋商是IMF實行監(jiān)督職能的手段，磋商結(jié)論具有敏感性�！秾Τ蓡T國政策雙邊監(jiān)督的決定》有三點法律缺陷。一是擴大了監(jiān)督范圍，可能侵犯成員國的經(jīng)濟主權(quán)；二是對“匯率操縱”界定不清，給IMF留下了自由裁量的空間；三是匯率監(jiān)督有失公允，過多地維護發(fā)達國家的利益。第三節(jié)闡述了IMF匯率監(jiān)督制度的改革，提出了增設(shè)監(jiān)督機構(gòu)以制約理事會、董事會權(quán)力，明確“匯率操縱”主觀意圖以限制IMF自由裁量權(quán)，加強對國際儲備貨幣國匯率的監(jiān)督三種改革方案。 第五章是余論，綜述了國際社會對IMF發(fā)展趨勢的其他觀點。本章分三節(jié)介紹并評述了各界人士對IMF以及國際金融秩序今后改革方向的建議。第一節(jié)從國際貨幣體制改革的層面，介紹評析了重建布雷頓森林體系、實行貨幣二重化和創(chuàng)立超主權(quán)儲備貨幣三種改革方案。第二節(jié)從IMF機構(gòu)存廢的層面，介紹評析了取消IMF、構(gòu)建新的國際金融機構(gòu)和對IMF增資以擴充IMF三種改革方案。第三節(jié)從危機治理的層面，介紹評析了對外國短期資本征稅、實施資金保留計劃和維持現(xiàn)狀政策三種改革方案。
[Abstract]:As a relic of the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund has played a cornerstone in the maintenance of the stability of the international monetary system, following the changes in the international monetary system. However, the IMF's performance in recent crisis rescue has caused the international community to decrease its confidence, and the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis has exposed the institutional dilemma of the IMF, especially the voting system, the loan conditionality system and the exchange rate system, which are in urgent need of innovation, To fulfil the mission of the new era. In the post-loan crisis, the development trend of the IMF is the focus of the international community's attention. The paper takes the "The Legal Analysis of the Development Trend of the International Monetary Fund in the Post-Loan Crisis" as the title, and looks at the IMF voting system, the loan conditionality system and the exchange rate supervision system. The full text is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the evolution of the IMF and its system The first section briefly introduces the birth of the International Monetary Fund and the evolution of the Bretton Woods system, which was established after the Second World War, could not get rid of the "Triffin's puzzle", in the 1970s The IMF, as the legacy of the Bretton Woods system, has struggled to keep the "final order" The policy conditions of the IMF. Third, the policy conditions attached to the IMF's loan are the macroeconomic and private capital of the borrower The third section explains the reform of the IMF loan conditionality system, puts forward the main body of changing the loan condition, changes the content of the loan, and strengthens the pertinence of the loan and the Mel. The fourth part is the IMF's exchange rate supervision system. The first section provides an overview of the framework of the IMF's exchange rate supervision system, the main legal source of which is the International Monetary Fund Agreement> Article 4 and <. The second section analyses the legal defects of the IMF's exchange rate supervision system and the law of the two main legal sources The law defects are analyzed separately. Article 4 of the IMF is too principle and lacks the operability; the consultation is the means of the IMF to carry out the supervision function. The conclusions of the consultations are sensitive. The first is to expand the scope of the supervision and may encroach on the economic sovereignty of the member states; the second is to clear the "limited order", leaving the IMF with a free-cut space; and third, the exchange rate supervision is unfair and too much. In the third section, the reform of the IMF's exchange rate supervision system is described, and an additional monitoring body is put forward to restrict the Council, the power of the board of directors, and to clearly increase the subjective intention of the interest rate tightening fiscal "to limit the discretion of the IMF and to strengthen the exchange rate of the international reserve currency. The fifth chapter is the residual theory, and the international community's understanding of I Other views of the development trend of MF. This chapter introduces and comments on the International Monetary Fund and the international finance The first section, from the level of the international monetary system reform, introduced the reestablishment of the Bretton Woods system, the implementation of the second-order and the creation of the super-master. The second section, from the level of the IMF's institutional memory, presents an assessment of the cancellation of the IMF, the construction of new international financial institutions and the replenishment of the IMF. The third section, from the level of crisis management, introduces the assessment of the tax on foreign short-term capital, the implementation of the capital reserve plan and the dimension.
【學位授予單位】：華東政法大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D996

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