我國光伏上網電價政策在WTO反補貼協定下的合規(guī)性研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-12-15 00:41
【摘要】：為支持光伏電的發(fā)展,我國自2013年起開始實施光伏上網電價政策。上網電價政策分為中央和地方兩個層級,既包括人大制定的法律,也包括各級政府出臺的地方性文件。從內容上看,該政策主要包括三部分內容:一是要求電網企業(yè)按照中央政府制定的標桿電價保價收購光伏電;二是要求電網企業(yè)按照中央政府的規(guī)定保量收購光伏電;三是允許地方政府對光伏電給予地方補貼。雖然該政策在福利經濟學的"外部性"理論下具有一定合理性,且有利于光伏電的發(fā)展,但因其具有政府干預市場的性質,故其仍受到WTO《補貼與反補貼措施協議》("SCM協定")的規(guī)制。本文旨在結合SCM規(guī)則及有關專家組和上訴機構報告,分析我國現行光伏上網電價政策在SCM協定下的合規(guī)性。SCM協定規(guī)定了兩種補貼類型,即可訴性補貼和禁止性補貼。構成可訴性補貼的措施需滿足以下三個條件:1)該措施屬于政府或公共機構提供的財政資助;2)該措施給予相關受眾以利益;3)該措施需具有專向性。構成禁止性補貼的措施除需滿足以上條件外,還需滿足"視出口實績?yōu)闂l件而給予補貼"或"使適用國產貨物而非進口貨物的情況為條件而給予補貼"這一條件。筆者認為,我國大部分地區(qū)實施的上網電價政策符合以上三個條件,屬于可訴性補貼。第一,負責執(zhí)行上網電價政策的電網企業(yè)因受到政府的"有意義控制"而屬于"公共機構",而其購買光伏電的行為屬于SCM第1.1(a)(1)條中"政府購買商品"這一類型的"財政資助"。第二,光伏上網電價政策使光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)獲得利益。根據WTO上訴機構在"加拿大-可再生能源"案中的觀點,判斷是否獲益應在相關產品市場中選擇比較基準。由于光伏電在供給側和需求側都不能被傳統(tǒng)能源所發(fā)的電所替代,因此在分析是否獲益時,相關產品市場應為"光伏電市場",而比較基準則應為光伏電市場上的招標電價。通過對比光伏招標電價和光伏標桿電價,發(fā)現大部分地區(qū)的招標電價低于標桿電價,符合"給予利益"的要件要求。第三,光伏上網電價政策具有專向性,因為其僅適用于光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)。除此之外,部分地方政府根據上網電價政策給予光伏發(fā)電企業(yè)的地方性補貼構成禁止性補貼,因其要求只有使用本地光伏設備達到一定比例的企業(yè)才可以獲得其補貼。根據以上分析可知,我國現行光伏上網電價政策之所以可以被認定為補貼,主要原因在于政府標桿電價高于招標電價。而之所以會出現這種情況,很大程度是因為我國目前的光伏發(fā)電技術還未完全成熟,仍處于發(fā)展階段而尚未達到規(guī)模經濟效應。如果斷然降低標桿電價,雖符合了 SCM的規(guī)則,但不利于我國光伏產業(yè)的長遠發(fā)展。此種狀況體現了 SCM協定與可再生能源發(fā)展之間存在的潛在沖突。學界提出了三種化解該沖突的方案:一是通過談判恢復并修改不可訴補貼;二是將GATT第20條適用于SCM協定;三是適用演進性思路對SCM協定進行解釋。筆者認為,第三種方案是目前為止最可行的解決方案。
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【學位授予單位】：北京外國語大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D996.1
本文編號：2379619
[Abstract]:In order to support the development of photovoltaic power, China has started to implement the PV grid price policy since 2013. The on-line electricity price policy is divided into two levels: central and local, including both the laws of the people's congresses and local documents issued by the governments at all levels. From the content, the policy mainly includes three parts: one is to ask the power grid enterprise to buy the photovoltaic power according to the benchmark price of the benchmark price set by the central government, and 2 is to ask the power grid enterprise to purchase the photovoltaic power according to the regulations of the central government; The third is to allow local governments to grant local subsidies to photovoltaic electricity. Although the policy has a certain rationality under the "Externality" of welfare economics and is beneficial to the development of the photovoltaic power, it is still subject to the regulation of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement") because of the nature of the government intervention market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the compliance of the current price policy of PV in China under the SCM agreement in combination with the SCM rules and the report of the expert group and the Appellate Body. The SCM agreement provides for two types of subsidies, which can be sued for sexual and prohibitive subsidies. the measures to form a actionable subsidy should meet the following three conditions: 1) the measure falls within the financial support provided by the Government or the public body; 2) the measure gives the relevant audience the benefit; 3) the measure needs to be of a special nature. In addition to meeting the above conditions, the measures to form the prohibition subsidy shall meet the requirements of the "Subsidies as a condition of the performance of the export" or the "Subsidies for conditions for the application of domestic and non-imported goods". The author holds that in most parts of our country, the electricity price policy in most parts of China is in accordance with the above three conditions, and it is a kind of actionable subsidy. First, the grid enterprise responsible for carrying out the on-line electricity price policy belongs to the "public institutions" due to the "meaningful control" of the government, and the behavior of the purchase of the photovoltaic power belongs to the "financial support" of the type "Government's purchase of goods" in the SCM (1) (a) (1). Second, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid makes the photovoltaic power generation enterprise gain the benefit. According to the view of the WTO Appellate Body in the "Canada-Renewable Energy" case, it is judged whether the benefit should select the comparative benchmark in the relevant product market. Since both the supply side and the demand side of the photovoltaic power cannot be replaced by the electricity generated by the conventional energy source, the relevant product market shall be the "photovoltaic electricity market" when the analysis is beneficial, and the comparison basis shall be the bidding price on the photovoltaic power market. By comparing the price of the PV bidding and the price of the PV, it is found that the price of the bidding in most areas is lower than that of the benchmark price, which is in accordance with the requirements of the requirements of the "give an interest to". Third, the electricity price policy of the photovoltaic grid has a special orientation, as it is only applicable to the photovoltaic power generation enterprise. In addition, some local governments, on the basis of the on-line electricity price policy, provide the local subsidies of the PV power generation enterprises to form the prohibitive subsidies, because they require the use of local photovoltaic devices to reach a certain proportion of enterprises to obtain their subsidies. According to the above analysis, the current price policy of the current photovoltaic grid in China can be recognized as the subsidy, mainly because the government's benchmark price is higher than the bidding price. This situation is due to the fact that the current photovoltaic power generation technology in our country is not fully mature yet still in the development stage and has not reached the scale economic effect. It is not conducive to the long-term development of the PV industry in China. Such a situation represents a potential conflict between the SCM agreement and the development of renewable energy. Three solutions to the conflict are proposed in the academic circle: one is to recover and modify the non-actionable subsidies through negotiation; the second is to apply the Article 20 of GATT to the SCM agreement; and the third is to explain the SCM agreement with an evolutionary approach. In the author's view, the third option is the most feasible solution so far.
【學位授予單位】：北京外國語大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D996.1
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，本文編號：2379619
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