發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-11 10:31

【摘要】：補(bǔ)貼是世貿(mào)組織成員實(shí)施產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的重要工具之一。若受補(bǔ)貼產(chǎn)品給其他成員利益造成不利影響，補(bǔ)貼爭端將不可避免地產(chǎn)生。入世以來，，涉及中國的補(bǔ)貼案件有9起�？梢灶A(yù)見，隨著中國產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的不斷調(diào)整，涉及中國的補(bǔ)貼爭端會(huì)不斷增加。補(bǔ)貼爭端具有與其他爭端不同的特殊性。世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則規(guī)定解決補(bǔ)貼爭端不僅應(yīng)適用解決一般爭端的程序，而且還應(yīng)適用專門針對(duì)補(bǔ)貼爭端的特殊與附加程序。本文重點(diǎn)闡述解決補(bǔ)貼爭端中的特殊程序，也一并探討了適用于補(bǔ)貼爭端的一般程序。本文共分為引言、正文和結(jié)語三個(gè)部分，正文共有五章。 第一章為補(bǔ)貼爭端產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析。本章指出補(bǔ)貼爭端的產(chǎn)生有著深刻的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)背景。一成員采取補(bǔ)貼措施有時(shí)是出于國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的戰(zhàn)略考量，有時(shí)迫于民主政治的選票壓力或受到利益集團(tuán)的軟硬兼施。因補(bǔ)貼措施而利益受損的其他成員自然要奮起反擊，維護(hù)國家利益以及自身的政治利益，否則可能會(huì)引起國內(nèi)選民和利益集團(tuán)的不滿，危及其政治前途。 第二章為補(bǔ)貼爭端解決機(jī)制中的磋商程序。本章首先從國際公法的角度介紹了與磋商程序近似的談判程序，進(jìn)而闡述了適用于一般爭端案件的世貿(mào)組織爭端解決機(jī)制中的磋商程序，最后詳細(xì)分析了針對(duì)補(bǔ)貼爭端案件磋商程序中的特殊性規(guī)定以及專家組和上訴機(jī)構(gòu)在實(shí)踐中作出的與此有關(guān)的解釋。 第三章為補(bǔ)貼爭端解決機(jī)制中的審理程序。該章是文章的重點(diǎn)，共分為五節(jié)。本章闡述了補(bǔ)貼爭端的加速程序、常設(shè)專家小組程序規(guī)則、搜集嚴(yán)重侵害信息程序等補(bǔ)貼爭端中的特殊程序與補(bǔ)貼爭端密切相關(guān)的專家組的設(shè)立要件與職權(quán)范圍以及補(bǔ)貼爭端的舉證責(zé)任。 第四章為補(bǔ)貼爭端解決機(jī)制中的執(zhí)行措施。本章分析了一般爭端中的撤銷或修改不當(dāng)措施、補(bǔ)償以及報(bào)復(fù)措施等執(zhí)行措施。以此為基礎(chǔ)，本章著重探討了補(bǔ)貼爭端中撤銷補(bǔ)貼與反措施兩種主要的執(zhí)行措施。 第五章為補(bǔ)貼爭端解決程序中的中國實(shí)踐。本章主要深入分析了中國—影響汽車進(jìn)口零部件措施案和中國—涉及風(fēng)力發(fā)電設(shè)備措施案中各爭端當(dāng)事方的舉證責(zé)任，并檢討中國產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的合法性，總結(jié)中國參與補(bǔ)貼爭端解決程序的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。
[Abstract]:Subsidies are one of the important tools for WTO members to implement industrial policies. If subsidized products adversely affect the interests of other members, subsidy disputes will inevitably arise. Since China's entry into the WTO, there have been nine subsidy cases involving China. Predictably, as China's industrial policy continues to adjust, China's subsidy disputes will continue to increase. Subsidy disputes are different from other disputes. WTO rules stipulate that the settlement of subsidy disputes shall be governed not only by the procedures for the settlement of general disputes, but also by special and additional procedures specifically for subsidy disputes. This paper focuses on the special procedures in the settlement of subsidy disputes, as well as the general procedures applicable to subsidy disputes. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The first chapter is the economic analysis of subsidy disputes. This chapter points out that the existence of subsidy dispute has a profound political and economic background. A member's subsidies are sometimes based on national economic strategic considerations, sometimes under pressure from democratic votes or by interest groups. It is natural for other members who suffer from subsidy measures to fight back and defend their national interests and their own political interests, otherwise they may cause dissatisfaction among domestic voters and interest groups and endanger their political future. The second chapter is the consultation procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter first introduces the negotiation procedure similar to the consultation procedure from the perspective of public international law, and then expounds the consultation procedure in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism applicable to general dispute cases. Finally, the particularity of the consultation procedure in the case of subsidy dispute is analyzed in detail, as well as the explanations of the panel of experts and the appellate body in practice. The third chapter is the trial procedure in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter is the focus of the article, a total of five sections. This chapter sets out the accelerated procedures for subsidy disputes, the rules of procedure of the standing expert Group, The establishment elements and terms of reference of the panel of experts, which are closely related to the subsidy dispute, and the burden of proof of the subsidy dispute. The fourth chapter is the implementation measures in the subsidy dispute settlement mechanism. This chapter analyzes the enforcement measures of revocation or modification of improper measures, compensation and retaliatory measures in general disputes. On this basis, this chapter focuses on the two main enforcement measures in subsidy disputes: withdrawal of subsidies and countermeasures. The fifth chapter is the practice of China in the procedure of subsidy dispute settlement. This chapter mainly analyzes the burden of proof of the parties to the dispute in the case of China-measures affecting imported parts of Automobile and China-involving measures for Wind Power Generation equipment, and reviews the legality of China's industrial policy. Summarize the experience and lessons of China's participation in the subsidy dispute settlement procedure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1

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