塞浦路斯銀行危機救助法律問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-31 09:40
【摘要】：縱觀此次歐盟集團紓困塞浦路斯銀行危機的過程,其中存在著許多法律上的問題值得深思。在第一輪救助協(xié)議中,政府采取征收一次性存款稅的方案,不符合歐盟存款保險制度下對于儲戶財產(chǎn)利益和存款安全保護的設定；在存款稅議案遭到否決后,塞浦路斯確定終局銀行重組法案,其中對無保險儲戶強制性的“債轉(zhuǎn)股”措施不符合銀行與儲戶之間所構(gòu)成的“債”的法律關(guān)系項下其二者的權(quán)利享有和義務承擔；為了防止擠兌現(xiàn)象和資金外流的風險,塞國采取了財政緊縮和資本控制的措施,使歐元在歐盟區(qū)域內(nèi)因國籍差異而改變了其“超越國界貨幣”之法律性質(zhì)所承載的價值與功能。 歐共體作為一個特殊的超國家組織構(gòu)建了其自有的獨特的法治系統(tǒng),為了保障該體系在成員國內(nèi)切實有效的實施,通過基本條約以及歐洲法院的司法實踐賦予了歐盟法直接適用和優(yōu)先適用于各成員國的最高法律效力。在歐盟法基本權(quán)利原則保障層面上,塞浦路斯銀行危機救助的措施不僅對該國銀行儲戶及其國民的財產(chǎn)權(quán)造成了損害,對于銀行重組方案中的受損儲戶也存在平等權(quán)的侵犯,同時剝奪了存款人合理性期待的權(quán)利。另外,塞浦路斯銀行紓困事件涉及侵權(quán),其國內(nèi)銀行監(jiān)管機構(gòu)對于本國銀行風險性投資行為沒有盡到相應的監(jiān)管職責,歐盟泛歐金融監(jiān)管體系也未實現(xiàn)其對成員國金融體系上審慎監(jiān)管的作為義務。而且,國家政府和歐元區(qū)集團使用第三方的公權(quán)力涉入方式來進行塞國自籌資金的獲取,民眾受到了私有財產(chǎn)上的損失,社會公共利益在某個方面也遭到了忽視。 有侵害便有救濟,在歐盟的司法審查制度中,歐洲法院的侵權(quán)行為損害賠償之訴以及對歐盟機構(gòu)的不作為審查,加之塞浦路斯本國國內(nèi)的行政訴訟制度,能夠為在本次銀行紓困過程中的受損儲戶提供司法救濟途徑,但是由于對侵權(quán)事由的學理推論需求以及舉證責任的困難,加之監(jiān)管豁免權(quán)制度的保護,無保險儲戶在實踐操作中很難得到切實的損失彌補。通過對塞浦路斯銀行紓困事件的分析,可知在對銀行進行危機預防的時候,要加強跨國銀行法律監(jiān)管的切實實施,以此先行地防止主權(quán)債務危機對民眾利益的損害,同時在進行銀行救助的過程中,也要注重對儲戶財產(chǎn)利益及其相關(guān)權(quán)利的保障與實現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:Throughout the EU group's bail-out of Cyprus's banking crisis, there are many legal issues worth pondering. In the first round of the rescue agreement, the government adopted a one-off deposit tax, which is not in line with the European Union deposit insurance system for depositors property interests and deposit security protection. After the deposit tax bill was rejected, Cyprus decided on a final bank restructuring bill. The compulsory "debt-for-equity" measures for uninsured depositors do not conform to the rights and obligations of the banks and depositors under the legal relationship between them. In order to prevent the risk of runs and capital outflows, the country has adopted fiscal austerity and capital control measures to change the value and function of the legal nature of the "cross-border currency" in the European Union because of differences in nationality. The European Community, as a special supranational organization, has constructed its own unique rule of law system to ensure its effective implementation in member States. Through the basic treaties and the judicial practice of the European Court of Justice, the direct application and preferential application of EU law to member States are given the supreme legal effect. On the basis of the guarantee of fundamental rights principle of EU law, the measures of bank crisis rescue in Cyprus have not only damaged the property rights of bank depositors and their nationals, but also infringed on the equal rights of the injured depositors in the bank restructuring program. At the same time, it deprives depositors of the right to reasonably expect. In addition, the bail-out of Cyprus's banks involved infringement, and its domestic banking regulator did not perform its corresponding regulatory duties in respect of risky investments by banks in the country. The European Union's pan-European financial regulatory system has also failed to fulfil its obligations to prudential regulation in member countries' financial systems. Moreover, national governments and euro-zone groups have used third-party access to public power to obtain self-financing, resulting in the loss of private property and neglect of social and public interests in some ways. In the European Union's judicial review system, the European Court of Justice's suit for damages for infringement and the review of the omission of EU institutions, in addition to the domestic administrative litigation system in Cyprus, It can provide judicial relief for the injured depositors in the course of the bank rescue, but due to the need for theoretical reasoning on tort matters and the difficulty of proving the burden of proof, coupled with the protection of the system of regulatory immunity, It is difficult for uninsured depositors to make up for the loss in practice. Through the analysis of the rescue incident of Cypriot banks, we can see that in the course of crisis prevention for banks, we should strengthen the practical implementation of the legal supervision of transnational banks, so as to prevent the damage to the interests of the public caused by the sovereign debt crisis in the first place. At the same time, in the process of bank rescue, we should pay attention to the protection and realization of depositors' property interests and related rights.
【學位授予單位】：上海師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D996
本文編號：2301702
[Abstract]:Throughout the EU group's bail-out of Cyprus's banking crisis, there are many legal issues worth pondering. In the first round of the rescue agreement, the government adopted a one-off deposit tax, which is not in line with the European Union deposit insurance system for depositors property interests and deposit security protection. After the deposit tax bill was rejected, Cyprus decided on a final bank restructuring bill. The compulsory "debt-for-equity" measures for uninsured depositors do not conform to the rights and obligations of the banks and depositors under the legal relationship between them. In order to prevent the risk of runs and capital outflows, the country has adopted fiscal austerity and capital control measures to change the value and function of the legal nature of the "cross-border currency" in the European Union because of differences in nationality. The European Community, as a special supranational organization, has constructed its own unique rule of law system to ensure its effective implementation in member States. Through the basic treaties and the judicial practice of the European Court of Justice, the direct application and preferential application of EU law to member States are given the supreme legal effect. On the basis of the guarantee of fundamental rights principle of EU law, the measures of bank crisis rescue in Cyprus have not only damaged the property rights of bank depositors and their nationals, but also infringed on the equal rights of the injured depositors in the bank restructuring program. At the same time, it deprives depositors of the right to reasonably expect. In addition, the bail-out of Cyprus's banks involved infringement, and its domestic banking regulator did not perform its corresponding regulatory duties in respect of risky investments by banks in the country. The European Union's pan-European financial regulatory system has also failed to fulfil its obligations to prudential regulation in member countries' financial systems. Moreover, national governments and euro-zone groups have used third-party access to public power to obtain self-financing, resulting in the loss of private property and neglect of social and public interests in some ways. In the European Union's judicial review system, the European Court of Justice's suit for damages for infringement and the review of the omission of EU institutions, in addition to the domestic administrative litigation system in Cyprus, It can provide judicial relief for the injured depositors in the course of the bank rescue, but due to the need for theoretical reasoning on tort matters and the difficulty of proving the burden of proof, coupled with the protection of the system of regulatory immunity, It is difficult for uninsured depositors to make up for the loss in practice. Through the analysis of the rescue incident of Cypriot banks, we can see that in the course of crisis prevention for banks, we should strengthen the practical implementation of the legal supervision of transnational banks, so as to prevent the damage to the interests of the public caused by the sovereign debt crisis in the first place. At the same time, in the process of bank rescue, we should pay attention to the protection and realization of depositors' property interests and related rights.
【學位授予單位】：上海師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D996
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