本文選題：補(bǔ)貼利益　切入點(diǎn)：利益接受者　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：“利益”是《SCM協(xié)定》規(guī)定的補(bǔ)貼定義中兩個(gè)不同的法律要素之一。作為補(bǔ)貼定義的核心要素,“利益”與“財(cái)政資助”一起被用來認(rèn)定補(bǔ)貼是否存在。如果財(cái)政資助的接受者獲得了比從市場(chǎng)上能夠獲得的更有利的條件,就產(chǎn)生了《SCM協(xié)定》第1.1條意義上的“利益”�！袄妗辈⒎浅橄蟮母拍�,它隱含著某種比較,比較的側(cè)重點(diǎn)在于利益的接受者而不是授予財(cái)政資助的機(jī)關(guān)。利益必須由接受者或受益者能夠接受或者受益,并使得接受者處于比沒有接受財(cái)政資助之前“更好”的地位,而確定接受者是否比它本來應(yīng)處于的更有利的情況的適當(dāng)依據(jù)是“市場(chǎng)”。作為解釋第1.1(b)條“利益”的有關(guān)上下文,《SCM協(xié)定》第14條規(guī)定的市場(chǎng)基準(zhǔn)是判斷利益的接受者是否因?yàn)樨?cái)政資助而獲得較市場(chǎng)上更為有利的條件的準(zhǔn)則。在認(rèn)定補(bǔ)貼利益存在與否時(shí),提供國(guó)或購買國(guó)市場(chǎng)中的私營(yíng)價(jià)格是調(diào)查機(jī)關(guān)必須使用主要基準(zhǔn)。但是如果市場(chǎng)上的私營(yíng)價(jià)格由于政府所扮演的占優(yōu)勢(shì)的角色而被扭曲,調(diào)查主管機(jī)關(guān)可以使用提供國(guó)或購買國(guó)私營(yíng)價(jià)格以外的替代基準(zhǔn)以確定財(cái)政資助的條件是否優(yōu)于市場(chǎng)條件。不過,在反補(bǔ)貼調(diào)查中,替代基準(zhǔn)往往很容易被調(diào)查主管機(jī)關(guān)濫用而成為一個(gè)核心的爭(zhēng)議問題,尤其是如何判斷替代基準(zhǔn)可以取代主要基準(zhǔn),以及如何選定具體的替代基準(zhǔn)等問題,至今仍然沒有明確的答案。至于補(bǔ)貼的利益?zhèn)鬟f問題,《SCM協(xié)定》并沒有對(duì)此作出明確規(guī)定,對(duì)于補(bǔ)貼利益是否以及在何等程度上傳遞至交易后或私有化后的產(chǎn)品或企業(yè),缺乏一致的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。實(shí)踐中,補(bǔ)貼利益的確可能經(jīng)由常規(guī)交易和公平市場(chǎng)價(jià)格而消除,但并非當(dāng)然自動(dòng)消除,必須視個(gè)案情況認(rèn)定補(bǔ)貼利益是否己實(shí)際上被傳遞。我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)目前仍然是以國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)為主,政府在市場(chǎng)上往往扮演重要角色,國(guó)有企業(yè)和國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行廣泛參與經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng),導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)基準(zhǔn)很可能被認(rèn)定受到扭曲而適用國(guó)外的替代基準(zhǔn),因而在應(yīng)對(duì)外國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品反補(bǔ)貼調(diào)查中處于非常不利的地位。但是,對(duì)于上訴機(jī)構(gòu)在適用和解釋《SCM協(xié)定》第14條時(shí)關(guān)于替代基準(zhǔn)所得出的結(jié)論,尤其是《入世議定書》第15(b)條,要從根本上改變難度比較大。不過,在某些具體方面應(yīng)該仍然可以采取一些應(yīng)對(duì)措施或者提出自己的合理主張,將替代基準(zhǔn)被濫用的可能性和不利影響限制在最低限度。此外,我國(guó)應(yīng)盡快在《反補(bǔ)貼條例》及其配套規(guī)章中對(duì)上游補(bǔ)貼問題作出規(guī)定,盡早填補(bǔ)法律漏洞,使調(diào)查主管機(jī)關(guān)在反補(bǔ)貼調(diào)查中有法可依。
[Abstract]:"interest" is one of the two different legal elements in the definition of subsidy under the SCM Agreement. As the core element of the definition of subsidy, "interest" is used together with "financial assistance" to determine whether a subsidy exists. The recipient of the aid received more favourable conditions than could be obtained from the market, "interest" in the sense of Article 1. 1 of the SCM Agreement. "interest" is not an abstract concept. It implies some comparison. The focus of the comparison is on the recipient of the benefit rather than on the organ that grants the financial assistance. The benefit must be accepted or benefited by the recipient or the beneficiary and put the recipient in a "better" position than before the recipient does not receive the financial assistance. The appropriate basis for determining whether the recipient is in a better position than it should be is the "market". As a relevant context for interpreting Article 1.1 / b) "interest", the market benchmark set out in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement is the next step in determining the interest. Criteria for whether the recipient obtains more favourable conditions than in the market as a result of financial assistance. In determining whether a subsidy benefit exists or not, Private prices in the market of the supplier or buyer are the primary benchmark that the investigating agency must use. But if the private price in the market is distorted by the dominant role of the Government, The investigating authority may use alternative benchmarks other than private prices in the country of supply or the State of purchase to determine whether the conditions for financial support are superior to market conditions... however, in countervailing investigations, Alternative benchmarks are often vulnerable to abuse by investigative authorities as a core issue of controversy, in particular how to determine whether alternative benchmarks can replace the main benchmarks and how to select specific alternative benchmarks, There is still no clear answer. As for the question of the transfer of benefits from subsidies, the SCM Agreement does not specify whether and to what extent the benefits of subsidies are passed on to post-transaction or privatized products or enterprises. Lack of a consistent standard of judgment. In practice, subsidy benefits may indeed be eliminated through conventional trading and fair market prices, but not automatically, of course. Depending on the individual case, we must determine whether the subsidy benefits have actually been transferred. At present, our economy is still dominated by the state-owned economy, the government often plays an important role in the market, and state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks are extensively involved in economic activities. Market benchmarks are likely to be found distorted to apply foreign alternative benchmarks and are therefore at a very disadvantage in responding to foreign countervailing investigations on Chinese exports. The conclusions reached by the appellate bodies when applying and interpreting Article 14 of the SCM Agreement on alternative benchmarks, in particular Article 15B of the Protocol on accession to the WTO, are more difficult to fundamentally change. There should still be specific areas where some response measures or legitimate claims can be made to minimize the possibility and adverse effects of the abuse of alternative benchmarks... in addition, As soon as possible, China should make provision for the upstream subsidy in the "countervailing regulations" and its supporting regulations, fill the legal loophole as soon as possible, so that the investigating authorities can abide by the law in the countervailing investigation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D996.1

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