【摘要】： 公司治理模式分為英美法系國家的一元制治理模式和大陸法系國家的二元制治理模式。前者又稱為單層委員會(huì)制,是指公司治理機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置股東大會(huì)和董事會(huì),不設(shè)監(jiān)事會(huì)。董事會(huì)既執(zhí)行業(yè)務(wù),也履行監(jiān)督業(yè)務(wù)執(zhí)行情況的職能,其中監(jiān)督業(yè)務(wù)執(zhí)行的職能是指在公司董事會(huì)內(nèi)部設(shè)置獨(dú)立董事;后者又稱雙層委員會(huì)制,指在公司內(nèi)部設(shè)置單獨(dú)監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)即監(jiān)事會(huì),董事會(huì)作為公司的業(yè)務(wù)執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)不參與監(jiān)督,而由專門設(shè)立的監(jiān)事會(huì)履行監(jiān)督職責(zé)。 隨著我國公司管理層腐敗現(xiàn)象日趨嚴(yán)重,而監(jiān)事會(huì)卻因職能缺失難以承載眾望,為了強(qiáng)化公司監(jiān)控,完善決策機(jī)制,我國于1997年引入獨(dú)立董事制度。2001年中國證監(jiān)會(huì)發(fā)布《關(guān)于在上市公司建立獨(dú)立董事制度的指導(dǎo)意見》,意見一經(jīng)頒布,學(xué)界便就我國上市公司中是否應(yīng)建立獨(dú)立董事制度一直爭論不休。2005年修訂后的新《公司法》第一百二十三條再次明確規(guī)定上市公司應(yīng)該設(shè)立獨(dú)立董事,確立了我國不同于世界其他國家的的監(jiān)督模式。本文旨在從兩種制度的起源和發(fā)展著手,結(jié)合我國實(shí)際,分析并存監(jiān)督模式間存在的矛盾,并試圖揭示沖突的原因和并存監(jiān)督模式無法克服的弱點(diǎn),并提出解決方案。 文章由以下四章組成: 第一章對現(xiàn)代公司治理中監(jiān)督模式進(jìn)行概述,本章分為兩節(jié),分別對獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行介紹,分析了兩種制度產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展的歷程,為以下章節(jié)對我國獨(dú)立董事制度和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度現(xiàn)存模式進(jìn)行評判奠定基礎(chǔ)。第二章對獨(dú)立董事制度和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度的不同價(jià)值進(jìn)行定位分析,指出其功能基本相似,但是有職能差異,得出了兩種制度各有缺陷、各有所長的結(jié)論。第三章對目前我國存在的獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度并存的立法模式進(jìn)行評判,指出獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度在我國存在的問題和原因,對兩種制度并存的模式進(jìn)行質(zhì)疑和缺陷分析,得出共存模式不可行的結(jié)論。第四章提出解決問題的思路,對監(jiān)事會(huì)和獨(dú)立董事制度進(jìn)行權(quán)限劃分,從標(biāo)本兼治的立場出發(fā),分別從“治標(biāo)”和“治本”兩個(gè)角度提出解決方案。前者是指在我國現(xiàn)存的兩種模式下,對獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度重新進(jìn)行功能定位和責(zé)任界定;后者是指建立完善的可選擇模式即獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度擇一制,以達(dá)到治理成本最小化,法律和經(jīng)濟(jì)效益最大化的目的,從而使兩種制度在不同的公司治理要求中發(fā)揮更充分的作用。 本文的目的是在質(zhì)疑獨(dú)立董事和監(jiān)事會(huì)制度并存模式的前提下,通過改進(jìn)和完善這兩種制度的監(jiān)督職能,達(dá)到各司其職、各盡所能的功效,為兩種制度擇其一的模式奠定基礎(chǔ),從而促使我國上市公司治理模式有新的發(fā)展和突破。
[Abstract]:The corporate governance model is divided into the unified governance model of common law countries and the dual governance model of civil law countries. The former is also called single-layer committee system, which refers to the establishment of shareholders' general meeting and board of directors, but no board of supervisors. The board of directors not only performs the business, but also performs the function of supervising the performance of the business, in which the function of supervising the execution of the business refers to the establishment of independent directors within the board of directors of the company; the latter, also known as the double-layer committee system, refers to the establishment of a separate supervisory body within the company, that is, the board of supervisors. The board of directors, as the business executive organ of the company, does not participate in supervision, but the specially established board of supervisors performs supervision duties. With the increasingly serious corruption in the management of companies in our country, but the board of supervisors is unable to carry the expectations because of the lack of functions, in order to strengthen corporate monitoring and improve the decision-making mechanism, China introduced the independent director system in 1997. In 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the guidance on the Establishment of Independent Director system in listed companies, which was promulgated. The academic circles have been debating whether the independent director system should be established in listed companies in China. Article 123 of the new Company Law revised in 2005 clearly stipulates that listed companies should set up independent directors, which establishes the supervision mode of our country which is different from that of other countries in the world. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the contradictions between the coexisting supervision modes from the origin and development of the two systems, and to reveal the causes of the conflicts and the insurmountable weaknesses of the coexisting supervision modes, and to put forward some solutions. The article consists of the following four chapters: the first chapter summarizes the supervision mode in modern corporate governance, this chapter is divided into two sections, respectively, the independent directors and the board of supervisors related theories are introduced, the emergence and development of the two systems are analyzed, which lays the foundation for the following chapters to judge the existing models of the independent director system and the board of supervisors system in China. The second chapter analyzes the different values of the independent director system and the board of supervisors system, points out that their functions are basically similar, but there are functional differences, and draws the conclusion that the two systems have their own defects and their own advantages. The third chapter evaluates the existing legislative mode of the coexistence of independent director and board of supervisors system in our country, points out the problems and causes of the system of independent director and board of supervisors in our country, questions and analyzes the defects of the two systems, and draws the conclusion that the coexistence mode is not feasible. The fourth chapter puts forward the idea of solving the problem, divides the powers of the board of supervisors and the independent director system, and puts forward the solutions from the two angles of "cure the symptoms" and "cure the root causes" from the standpoint of treating both the symptoms and the root causes. The former refers to the functional orientation and responsibility definition of the independent director and board of supervisors system under the existing two modes in our country, while the latter refers to the establishment of a perfect optional model, that is, the independent director and the board of supervisors system choice system, in order to minimize the governance cost and maximize the legal and economic benefits, so that the two systems can play a fuller role in different corporate governance requirements. The purpose of this paper is to lay the foundation for the mode of choosing one of the two systems by improving and perfecting the supervision function of the two systems, and laying the foundation for the two systems to choose one mode, so as to promote the new development and breakthrough of the governance mode of listed companies in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 劉丹;我國上市公司監(jiān)事會(huì)制度的完善研究[D];昆明理工大學(xué);2015年

2 李德榮;中外合資經(jīng)營企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)實(shí)問題及其對策[D];華東政法大學(xué);2014年

3 張咪;中國獨(dú)立董事制度反思[D];華東政法大學(xué);2014年

4 沙田碩;我國公司監(jiān)事會(huì)獨(dú)立性問題研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2013年

，

本文編號：2511089