公司小股東利益保護(hù)之強(qiáng)制盈余分配之訴研究
[Abstract]:Earnings allocation is one of the objectives of shareholder investment companies. Especially for minority shareholders who don't have real power, earnings allocation is almost the only way to get a return on investment. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company Law, the company must not only have the necessary conditions for the allocation of earnings, but also must be decided by the shareholders' meeting. In other words, shareholders will not make a resolution on the allocation of earnings, shareholders' right to allocate earnings is only a right of expectation, and cannot be implemented. In practice, the company's major shareholders control shareholders' meeting, when the company has the conditions to allocate earnings, excessive withdrawal of arbitrary provident funds, or acting as executives of the company, through the shareholders' meeting resolution to pay high bonuses to the company executives in the form of rich private pockets. Damage to the interests of minority shareholders. At the same time, as a daily decision-making of a company, the court usually takes a non-interference attitude, which also leads to a lack of access to appeal to minority shareholders. The author believes that in order to protect the minority shareholders' right to allocate earnings, the public power should intervene properly whether the company distributes the earnings or not. It is the most effective way to entrust the minority shareholders with the right of compulsory surplus distribution. This article will start with the causes, the value, the nature of litigation, the current judicial practice, the practical feasibility of introducing the litigation of compulsory surplus distribution, the procedural problems in the concrete application and the way of court handling. Explore effective ways to protect minority shareholders' right to allocate earnings.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號(hào)】:D922.291.91
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