【摘要】：本文以有限責(zé)任公司股東的優(yōu)先購買權(quán)作為研究對象,綜合運(yùn)用比較研究、實(shí)證分析研究和法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析的方法,對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的法定立法模式與約定立法模式進(jìn)行了深入的思考、比較和分析,嘗試從法理基礎(chǔ)、公司法理論以及法經(jīng)濟(jì)分析三個(gè)視角論證對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)采取約定立法模式優(yōu)于法定立法模式。 第一章在界定有限責(zé)任公司股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的概念并對世界上采取不同立法模式的立法例略作介紹分析的基礎(chǔ)上,指出約定股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)與法定股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的區(qū)別在于權(quán)利產(chǎn)生的來源不同,當(dāng)權(quán)利產(chǎn)生于股東之間的合意時(shí)即屬于約定股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán),在該種立法模式下,若無事前約定,則股東不享有優(yōu)先購買權(quán);當(dāng)權(quán)利是由法律賦予時(shí),即使可以通過約定排除,仍屬于法定優(yōu)先購買權(quán)�；诖�,我國公司法對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)采取的是法定立法模式。 第二章從法理基礎(chǔ)層面對分別支持兩種立法模式的理念進(jìn)行了比較分析。對于支持法定立法模式的秩序價(jià)值理念和期待權(quán)理論,筆者認(rèn)為,秩序在公司環(huán)境中的意義不在于穩(wěn)固和一成不變,其含義應(yīng)為外部有競爭充分、平等的市場環(huán)境以及內(nèi)部有完善的機(jī)制、持續(xù)的經(jīng)營;而期待權(quán)理論在股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)方面應(yīng)體現(xiàn)為股東的期待而非法律的期待。通常,立法對市場進(jìn)行干預(yù)的正當(dāng)理由包括阻止平等交易遭受威脅與提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率:在有限責(zé)任公司股東對外轉(zhuǎn)讓股權(quán)的情形,其他股東并未遭受交易層面的威脅,相反,其可能依法定權(quán)利加入交易倒是對另外兩方的交易造成了威脅。對效率的分析統(tǒng)一歸入本文第四章。在市場未出現(xiàn)失靈的情況下,應(yīng)當(dāng)是意思自治的天下,即使股東通過約定設(shè)定了優(yōu)先購買權(quán)達(dá)成與法定模式下同樣的結(jié)果,形成的限制也是其行使自由意志的結(jié)果。從立法方法的角度看,采取事前視角由立法賦予股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán),將可能妨礙股東按其偏好的方式安排公司事務(wù),出現(xiàn)立法初衷難實(shí)現(xiàn)的尷尬。 第三章分析公司法相關(guān)理論,重點(diǎn)是“人合性”理論究竟支持優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的法定立法模式還是約定立法模式。支持法定立法模式的學(xué)者通常認(rèn)為人合性與閉鎖性相關(guān)聯(lián),維持股東間的緊密關(guān)系是人合性的必然要求。筆者認(rèn)為從動(dòng)態(tài)的角度觀察,依據(jù)信任傳遞假設(shè)理論,股東關(guān)系的緊密程度并非千篇一律,也并非一成不變。通過與合伙這一典型的人合性組織以及股份公司這一典型的資合性組織的對比,筆者認(rèn)為人合性的內(nèi)涵不在于股東間緊密關(guān)系的維持,而在于對公司事務(wù)及相互間關(guān)系的高度自治,因此,約定立法模式更為合理。此外,通過分析,筆者認(rèn)為約定模式比法定模式更有利于實(shí)現(xiàn)相關(guān)主體的利益平衡,而其他若干支持法定模式的理由也是站不住腳的。 第四章運(yùn)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)分析的工具,從產(chǎn)權(quán)配置、信息對稱與交易費(fèi)用三個(gè)方面對比兩種立法模式下經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的高低。法定模式傾向于將股權(quán)配置給公司既有股東,約定模式下股權(quán)有可能配置給所有的潛在購買者,這與充分的市場可以實(shí)現(xiàn)資源最優(yōu)配置的理念相符。信息不對稱本身并不能成為立法干預(yù)的理由,否則交易一方以未預(yù)知為由破壞原有安排的可能性將打破法律的穩(wěn)定。況且,在股權(quán)對外轉(zhuǎn)讓的場合,可能產(chǎn)生的信息不對稱的情形中遭受不利益的均不是其他股東。股權(quán)對外轉(zhuǎn)讓時(shí),作為出讓人的股東已具有將股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓給公司外部人的潛在傾向,因此,為規(guī)避抑制這種傾向的法定立法模式,可能會產(chǎn)生額外的交易費(fèi)用。 第五章首先簡要回顧了我國公司法規(guī)就有限責(zé)任公司股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的立法歷史并對現(xiàn)行條文進(jìn)行了分析,指出在法定立法模式下出現(xiàn)的問題,如法定股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)法律性質(zhì)難以確定,產(chǎn)生額外交易費(fèi)用的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),同意權(quán)與法定優(yōu)先權(quán)并存帶來的制度不確定性,條文表述不清易出現(xiàn)糾紛等。因此,需要對現(xiàn)行立法進(jìn)行修改。 第六章在前述基礎(chǔ)上提出建立我國公司法股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)約定模式的建議,可簡單概括為,在有限責(zé)任公司股權(quán)對外轉(zhuǎn)讓時(shí),若股東事前未對股權(quán)對外轉(zhuǎn)讓約定限制,則出讓股權(quán)股東外的其他股東不享有優(yōu)先購買權(quán);股東可以通過章程或其他協(xié)議的形式約定對股權(quán)的優(yōu)先購買權(quán)及其具體內(nèi)容;當(dāng)股東約定優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的條款不明或出現(xiàn)遺漏時(shí),現(xiàn)行公司法相關(guān)規(guī)定的內(nèi)容可以作為補(bǔ)充條款適用之。最后,筆者對理論和實(shí)務(wù)上與股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)有關(guān)的未決問題在約定立法模式下進(jìn)行了探討。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company as the research object, and makes an in-depth consideration, comparison and analysis of the legal legislative mode of the shareholders' pre-emption right and the agreed legislative mode by using the comparative research, the empirical analysis and the method of the analysis of the law economics. In this paper, the author tries to prove that the legislative model of the preemptive right of the shareholders is superior to the legal legislative mode from the legal basis, the company law theory and the law and economic analysis. In the first chapter, on the basis of defining the concept of the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company and introducing the legislative examples of different legislative models in the world, it is pointed out that the difference between the preemptive right and the legal shareholder's preemptive right is the source of the right generation. In other words, when the rights arise between the shareholders, they belong to the pre-emption right of the agreed shareholders. In such a legislative mode, if there is no prior agreement, the shareholders do not have the preemptive right; when the right is given by the law, the shareholders still belong to the legal priority if they can be excluded from the agreement On the basis of this, the Company Law of China is the legal legislation to the shareholders' preemptive right The second chapter is from the base of the legal theory to the idea of supporting the two kinds of legislative models, respectively. The author holds that the meaning of order in the company's environment is not firm and unchangeable, and its meaning should be that there is a sufficient and equal market environment and a perfect mechanism. The continued operation; and the expectation right theory should be embodied as the shareholder's expectation and not in the shareholder's pre-emption right The expectations of the law. In general, the legitimate right of the legislation to intervene in the market includes the prevention of the threat of the equal transaction and the improvement of the economic efficiency: in the case of a limited liability company's external transfer of the equity, the other shareholders are not subject to the transaction level The threat is, on the other hand, that it is possible to set the right to join the transaction in accordance with the law and to deal with the other two parties resulting in a threat. The analysis of efficiency is included in a uniform manner. The fourth chapter, in the absence of a failure in the market, should be the world of self-government, even if the shareholders agree to set the preemptive right to achieve the same result in the legal mode, the restriction of formation is also the freedom to exercise. The result of will is from the point of view of the legislative method, the pre-emptive right of the shareholders to adopt the prior angle of view, which may prevent the shareholders from arranging the company affairs in the way of their preference, and the difficulty of making the legislation The third chapter analyzes the relevant theories of the company law, and focuses on whether the 鈥渉uman-to-human鈥，

本文編號：2380145