【摘要】：公司股東地位與公司理論和實(shí)踐的發(fā)展相伴而行。我國2006年修訂的破產(chǎn)法吸納了破產(chǎn)重整制度,但沒有對股東地位形成根本性的沖擊,這是因?yàn)樵谥卣陂g,股東仍享有公司最終控制權(quán),表現(xiàn)在股東大會(huì)繼續(xù)存在并可以對公司章程進(jìn)行修改,選換董事、監(jiān)事、高級(jí)管理人員以及對增資減資等重大事項(xiàng)作決定。從重整制度的基礎(chǔ)和功能價(jià)值來看,股東掌控了巨大的營運(yùn)價(jià)值決定其成為拯救困境公司的最為關(guān)鍵的力量。重整制度采用的管理人中心主義的架構(gòu)模式并不排斥股東地位。重整期間股東依然享有股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓的自由。重整制度與股東地位的獲得與喪失與重整的關(guān)聯(lián)不大。因此,破產(chǎn)重整制度并沒有真正的撼動(dòng)股東的公司所有地位。 基于這一地位,股東在重整程序中擁有了諸多具體而豐富的權(quán)利,如重整申請權(quán)、重整計(jì)劃制定和參與權(quán)、重整計(jì)劃農(nóng)決權(quán)以及重整監(jiān)督權(quán)等等。這些權(quán)利在實(shí)際操作過程中,仍有亟待完善之處：如債務(wù)人申請重整時(shí)是否需股東大會(huì)決議；立法規(guī)定持股10%的股東可以申請重整并末區(qū)分表決權(quán)股與非表決權(quán)股；在股東參與重整計(jì)劃制訂與表決方面股東組并非必設(shè)組,以及模糊的表決規(guī)則顯然與股東的公司所有地位不匹配,因此,股東在重整中的權(quán)利在法律技術(shù)層而需進(jìn)一步研究、落實(shí)。 當(dāng)然,陷入重整意味著公司處于特殊時(shí)期,在債權(quán)優(yōu)先性和重整價(jià)值目標(biāo)指導(dǎo)下,股東地位受到了一定的限制,表現(xiàn)為股東權(quán)益的不確定,董事、監(jiān)事和高級(jí)管理人員等特定股東的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓、股東的股利分配請求權(quán)受到限制。重整期間,股東分期繳納出資權(quán)也受期限的限制,以及股東訴訟權(quán)將遇到“自動(dòng)中止理論”。 與權(quán)利相對應(yīng)的是義務(wù),股東在擁有一系列權(quán)利的同時(shí)亦要承擔(dān)相應(yīng)的義務(wù),在重整中,股東必須履行出資與維持資本的義務(wù),不能干預(yù)重整討劃的執(zhí)行,遵守破產(chǎn)法、公司法、證券法等法律法規(guī)以及公司章程,由此構(gòu)筑了股東在重整制度中的權(quán)利義務(wù)體系。
[Abstract]:The status of corporate shareholders goes hand in hand with the development of corporate theory and practice. The bankruptcy law revised in 2006 absorbs the bankruptcy reorganization system, but it does not have a fundamental impact on the status of shareholders. This is because during the period of reorganization, shareholders still enjoy the ultimate control of the company. This is manifested in the continued existence of the shareholders' general meeting and the possibility of amending the company's articles of association, selecting and replacing directors, supervisors, senior management personnel, and making decisions on major matters such as capital increase and capital reduction. From the perspective of the basis and function value of the reorganization system, the shareholders control the huge operating value to decide that it becomes the most critical force to rescue the troubled company. The structural mode of manager-centrism adopted by reorganization system does not exclude shareholder status. During the period of reorganization, shareholders still enjoy the freedom of equity transfer. Reorganization system and shareholder status gain and lose have little relation with reorganization. Therefore, the bankruptcy reorganization system does not really shake the shareholders of all the status of the company. Based on this status, the shareholders have many specific and rich rights in the reorganization process, such as the right to apply for reorganization, the right to make and participate in the reorganization plan, the right to restructure the plan and the right of supervision, and so on. These rights still need to be perfected in practice: whether the debtor needs a resolution of the shareholders' general meeting when applying for reorganization, the legislation stipulates that shareholders holding 10% shares can apply for reorganization and do not distinguish between voting shares and non-voting shares; The shareholders' participation in the formulation and voting of the reorganization plan is not necessarily divided into groups, and the vague voting rules clearly do not match all the status of the shareholders' company. Therefore, the rights of the shareholders in the reorganization need to be further studied at the legal and technical level. Implementation Of course, falling into reorganization means that the company is in a special period. Under the guidance of the priority of creditor's rights and the goal of the value of reorganization, the position of shareholders is restricted to a certain extent, which is manifested by the uncertainty of shareholders' rights and interests, the directors, The shareholders' right to claim dividend distribution is restricted by the transfer of shareholders' shares by supervisors and senior managers. During the period of reorganization, the shareholder's right to contribute by instalments is also limited by the time limit, and the shareholder's litigation right will meet with "the theory of automatic suspension". Corresponding to rights are obligations, shareholders have a series of rights at the same time have to bear the corresponding obligations, in restructuring, shareholders must perform the obligation to contribute and maintain capital, can not interfere with the reorganization of the execution, comply with the bankruptcy law, The company law, securities law and articles of association constitute the system of shareholders' rights and obligations in the reorganization system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中央民族大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.92

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