【摘要】：國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司在我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中扮演著非常重要的角色,但同時(shí)也因?yàn)槠涮厥獾墓蓹?quán)結(jié)構(gòu),通常被認(rèn)為公司治理機(jī)制失效而備受質(zhì)疑。對(duì)國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司而言,無(wú)論從法律規(guī)定還是實(shí)際情況看,其董事會(huì)的權(quán)力都大于一般公司的董事會(huì)。在“強(qiáng)董事會(huì)”的公司內(nèi)部權(quán)力配置模式下,國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司董事會(huì)所享有的公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理決策權(quán)大于一般公司,加強(qiáng)對(duì)董事會(huì)監(jiān)督成為國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司的重大課題。審計(jì)以其獨(dú)立性和權(quán)威性,成為一種重要的經(jīng)濟(jì)監(jiān)督方式,在公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督中具有重要地位。國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和股東特殊性,決定了在股東對(duì)董事的監(jiān)督過(guò)程中,審計(jì)監(jiān)督毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)具有非常重要的地位。但實(shí)踐中,國(guó)家審計(jì)、社會(huì)審計(jì)和公司內(nèi)部審計(jì)等都對(duì)董事約束不足。鑒于國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督非比尋常的重要性、以及中國(guó)公司機(jī)構(gòu)的特性,從公司機(jī)構(gòu)之間權(quán)力制衡角度考慮,按照公司法原理,這個(gè)任務(wù)當(dāng)然應(yīng)當(dāng)由國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)事會(huì)來(lái)承擔(dān),但同時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)事會(huì)的各項(xiàng)權(quán)力。 本文分為引言、正文和結(jié)論三部分。 引言部分主要闡述了文獻(xiàn)綜述、選題意義、文章主要觀點(diǎn)、研究方法和創(chuàng)新之處。文獻(xiàn)綜述表明現(xiàn)有研究對(duì)“對(duì)董事審計(jì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制”的研究缺失,而本文意在闡述國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司特殊治理結(jié)構(gòu)和現(xiàn)有監(jiān)督力量不足的基礎(chǔ)上,論證國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司中應(yīng)當(dāng)由監(jiān)事會(huì)承擔(dān)對(duì)董事的審計(jì)監(jiān)督任務(wù),具有理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 正文部分分為六部分進(jìn)行論述。 第一部分主要論證內(nèi)部審計(jì)監(jiān)督在國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司董事監(jiān)督中的重要地位。一方面從公司法理論分析國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的缺陷,說(shuō)明內(nèi)部監(jiān)督在國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司中的重要性;另一方面國(guó)家審計(jì)、出資人審計(jì)、社會(huì)審計(jì)都缺乏對(duì)董事審計(jì)約束,而內(nèi)部審計(jì)由于具有信息優(yōu)勢(shì)、機(jī)構(gòu)優(yōu)勢(shì)以及較高的獨(dú)立性和權(quán)威性,在董事審計(jì)監(jiān)督中具有重要地位。 第二部分論述了國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司現(xiàn)行內(nèi)部審計(jì)制度存在的問(wèn)題。在現(xiàn)行審計(jì)制度中,單一的審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)不能適應(yīng)國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司多層次代理關(guān)系的監(jiān)督需求,出資人與董事之間的代理關(guān)系沒(méi)有受到審計(jì)約束。相關(guān)的法律法規(guī)在董事約束方面則存在空白,未能有效彌補(bǔ)現(xiàn)行審計(jì)制度的缺陷。而實(shí)踐中雖然在董事會(huì)試點(diǎn)企業(yè)中,內(nèi)部審計(jì)職權(quán)實(shí)際上已經(jīng)開(kāi)始在現(xiàn)行內(nèi)部審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)、監(jiān)事會(huì)、董事會(huì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)之間進(jìn)行劃分,但仍未明確監(jiān)事會(huì)是否有權(quán)對(duì)董事進(jìn)行審計(jì)監(jiān)督。 第三部分探析了國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)事會(huì)對(duì)董事審計(jì)監(jiān)督的合理性:由公司內(nèi)部專門(mén)履行監(jiān)督職責(zé)的監(jiān)事會(huì)代為履行對(duì)董事的審計(jì)監(jiān)督職責(zé)符合公司法理;同時(shí),立法例和司法實(shí)踐也表明監(jiān)事會(huì)享有審計(jì)職權(quán)是監(jiān)事會(huì)制度的發(fā)展趨勢(shì);并且監(jiān)事會(huì)可以實(shí)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事對(duì)董事進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的功能;此外,建議制度和報(bào)告制度等也成為監(jiān)事會(huì)行使審計(jì)監(jiān)督職能的有利條件。 第四部分具體闡述國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)事會(huì)對(duì)董事審計(jì)監(jiān)督的制度設(shè)計(jì),具體包括審計(jì)主體、審計(jì)對(duì)象、審計(jì)職責(zé)、審計(jì)內(nèi)容、實(shí)施審計(jì)的時(shí)間、審計(jì)結(jié)果的應(yīng)用、審計(jì)責(zé)任等內(nèi)容。 第五部分闡述了監(jiān)事會(huì)有效行使審計(jì)監(jiān)督權(quán)的配套措施。首先,由于審計(jì)職權(quán)一旦怠于行使或者濫用,都會(huì)給公司造成損失,所以應(yīng)當(dāng)予以適當(dāng)監(jiān)督和限制,主要監(jiān)督主體為出資人和被審計(jì)人。其次,監(jiān)事會(huì)審計(jì)監(jiān)督功能的有效發(fā)揮有賴于監(jiān)事會(huì)其他制度的加強(qiáng)和改進(jìn),主要包括對(duì)監(jiān)事的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制、完善監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議制度、完善監(jiān)事任職制度、完善監(jiān)事會(huì)的監(jiān)督手段等。 結(jié)論部分重申本文的基本論證思路和觀點(diǎn)。
[Abstract]:The state-owned company plays a very important role in our country's economic life, but also because of its special equity structure, it is often regarded as the failure of corporate governance mechanism. For wholly state-owned companies, the powers of the board of directors are more than the board of directors of the general company, whether from the legal provisions or in the practical situation. At "Strong Board of Directors" Under the internal power configuration mode of the company, the decision-making power of the company's management and management enjoyed by the board of directors of the wholly state-owned company is larger than that of the general company, and the supervision of the board of directors becomes a major task of the wholly state-owned company. Audit, in its independence and authority, becomes an important way of economic supervision and plays an important role in internal oversight of the company. The ownership structure and shareholder particularity of the wholly state-owned company determines that the audit supervision has a very important position in the supervision of the directors. But in practice, the state audit, social auditing and internal audit of the company are insufficient for directors. Given the importance of internal oversight of wholly state-owned companies and the characteristics of China's corporate institutions, this task should, of course, be borne by the board of supervisors of wholly state-owned companies in accordance with the principles of the Company Law, in accordance with the principles of the Company Law. At the same time, the powers of the board of supervisors should be strengthened. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction part mainly expounds the literature review, the significance of the topic selection, the main point of the article, and the research method. Office of Innovation. Literature Review Form A Review of the Existing Study on the Audit of Directors On the basis of analyzing the special governance structure of the wholly state-owned company and the deficiency of the existing supervision power, the author proves that the state-owned wholly-owned company should bear the audit supervision task of the director by the board of supervisors, and it has the theory. and practical significance. The body part is divided into two parts: The first part mainly proves that the internal audit supervision is in the state-owned enterprise. On the one hand, it analyzes the defect of state-owned company's governance structure from the theory of corporation law, illustrates the importance of internal oversight in wholly state-owned company, and on the other hand, the state audit, investor audit and social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director, and the internal audit, the investor's audit and the social auditing lack the audit constraint to the director. The Department of Audit has the advantages of information, institutional advantages and higher independence and authority. The second part discusses the state-owned enterprise. In the current audit system, a single audit institution can not adapt to the supervision requirement, investor and director of the multi-level agency relationship of the state-owned company. The inter-agency relationship is not subject to audit constraints. The relevant laws and regulations are blank in terms of directors' constraints, not In practice, the internal audit authority has actually started to be divided among the current internal audit institutions, the board of supervisors and the board of directors' audit committees. The third part discusses the rationality of the board of supervisors of the state-owned wholly state-owned company to supervise the audit supervision of the directors: the board of supervisors who is dedicated to the supervision and duties within the company performs the audit supervision on behalf of the board of supervisors. In the meantime, the legislative example and the judicial practice also show that the board of supervisors has the audit function as the development trend of the board of supervisors; and the board of supervisors can realize the functions of independent directors to supervise the directors; besides, the proposed system and reporting system are also The fourth part describes the system design of the board of supervisors of the wholly state-owned company on the audit supervision of the directors, including the audit main body, the audit object, the audit responsibility, the audit content and the implementation audit. The time of the count, the application of the audit results, the audit responsibility, etc. The fifth part expounds the supporting measures of the board of supervisors to exercise the right to supervise the audit effectively. First, as the audit authority is idle in the exercise or abuse, it will cause loss to the company, so it should be given. Secondly, the effective exertion of the audit supervision function of the board of supervisors depends on the strengthening and improvement of the other system of the board of supervisors, mainly including the incentive and restraint mechanism of supervisors, and perfecting the meeting of the board of supervisors. System, Perfect Supervisor's Appointment System, Perfect Supervision of Board of Supervisors
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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