我國董事表決權(quán)排除制度研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-14 09:52
【摘要】：董事表決權(quán)排除制度是確保董事決議公平的一項(xiàng)重要法律制度。《公司法》第124條規(guī)定：董事與董事會(huì)所決議事項(xiàng)所涉及的企業(yè)有關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系的,該董事不得就此事項(xiàng)行使表決權(quán),從而標(biāo)志著董事表決權(quán)排除制度在我國的確立。將董事表決權(quán)排除制度寫入法條中,無疑是在立法層面對(duì)董事權(quán)利的極大完善和發(fā)展,也是加快我國經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的重大舉措。這一制度對(duì)于避免董事濫用公司權(quán)利、篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)、優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、保護(hù)中小股東利益等方面均有十分積極的作用。但就我國董事表決權(quán)排除制度的現(xiàn)有規(guī)定來看,在適用范圍、申請(qǐng)與認(rèn)定、救濟(jì)方式等諸多方面還存在著許多的不足與缺陷。為使董事表決權(quán)排除制度更好地在實(shí)踐中進(jìn)行運(yùn)用,本文試圖通過對(duì)董事表決權(quán)排除制度進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)的研究并提出一些富有針對(duì)性和操作性的具體建議。 本文共分五部分。 第一部分,首先從董事表決權(quán)的內(nèi)涵入手,對(duì)董事表決權(quán)排除的內(nèi)涵進(jìn)行了詮釋,并從適用主體、適用情形、共益性、適用強(qiáng)制性、暫時(shí)性和表決效力的待定性等幾個(gè)方面對(duì)其特征展開分析,進(jìn)而著重闡明了董事表決權(quán)排除制度的法律價(jià)值和法理依據(jù)。 第二部分,在總結(jié)、梳理我國董事表決權(quán)排除制度發(fā)展歷程的基礎(chǔ)上,從適用范圍、決定主體、“關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系”的界定、申請(qǐng)條件、救濟(jì)方式等不同角度系統(tǒng)分析了我國在這一制度上的缺陷和不足,從而為下文展開討論奠定必要的理論基礎(chǔ)。 第三部分,結(jié)合我國今后公司法可能采取開放式公司與封閉式公司分類模式的趨勢(shì),提出應(yīng)將董事表決權(quán)排除制度擴(kuò)大適用于封閉式公司,尤其是家族式企業(yè)和國有企業(yè),并主張借鑒國外先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系進(jìn)行合理的判定,提出應(yīng)采取具體列舉和一般概括相結(jié)合的方式對(duì)適用條件予以合理的界定：即在對(duì)自我交易、篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)、提供擔(dān)保等常見情形進(jìn)行列舉規(guī)定的同時(shí),加入兜底條款,作為判斷是否排除董事表決權(quán)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 第四部分,試圖在董事表決權(quán)排除制度的申請(qǐng)條件和認(rèn)定程序上提出具有可操作性的建議,認(rèn)為只要決議事項(xiàng)對(duì)公司或利益相關(guān)者的利益造成或可能造成侵害,公司以及利益相關(guān)者均可以對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)董事的表決權(quán)提出排除的申請(qǐng),并由董事會(huì)作為認(rèn)定董事表決權(quán)是否應(yīng)予排除的主體。在具體實(shí)施程序上則從通知、審查到公示等諸方面都提出了自己的見解。 第五部分,在救濟(jì)機(jī)制構(gòu)建方面,筆者認(rèn)為,應(yīng)針對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)董事的表決權(quán)未排除以及錯(cuò)誤排除了與決議事項(xiàng)無關(guān)的董事表決權(quán)兩種情況,分別采取不同的處理方式,并構(gòu)建與當(dāng)事人地位相契合的舉證責(zé)任制度,以健全董事表決權(quán)排除的法律救濟(jì)機(jī)制,充分保護(hù)董事及相關(guān)利益者的合法權(quán)益。
[Abstract]:The system of exclusion of directors' voting rights is an important legal system to ensure the fairness of directors' resolutions. Article 124 of the Company Law stipulates that a director shall not exercise his voting rights on a matter in which a director has a related relationship with an enterprise involved in the matter decided by the board of directors. This marks the establishment of the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights in our country. It is undoubtedly a great improvement and development of directors' rights on the legislative level to write the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights into the articles of law. It is also an important measure to speed up the reform of China's economic system. This system plays an active role in avoiding directors abusing company rights usurping corporate opportunities optimizing corporate governance structure protecting the interests of minority shareholders and so on. However, there are still many deficiencies and defects in the scope of application, application and confirmation, relief methods and so on. In view of the existing provisions of the exclusion system of directors' voting rights in our country, there are still many shortcomings and defects. In order to make directors' voting right exclusion system be better applied in practice, this paper attempts to make a systematic study of directors' voting right exclusion system and puts forward some specific suggestions which are full of pertinence and maneuverability. This paper is divided into five parts. The first part, starting with the connotation of directors' voting rights, explains the connotation of directors' voting rights exclusion, and explains the connotation of directors' voting rights exclusion. This paper analyzes the characteristics of temporary and pending voting effect, and expounds the legal value and legal basis of the exclusion system of directors' voting rights. The second part, on the basis of summing up and combing the developing course of the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights, determines the subject, the definition of "related relationship", and the conditions of application from the scope of application. This paper systematically analyzes the defects and deficiencies in this system from different angles, such as relief methods, and thus lays the necessary theoretical foundation for the discussion below. The third part, combined with the trend that the company law of our country may adopt the classification mode of open company and closed company in the future, put forward that the exclusion system of directors' voting rights should be extended to the closed company, especially the family enterprise and the state-owned enterprise. It also advocates to use the advanced experience of foreign countries for reference to judge the relation reasonably, and puts forward that we should adopt concrete enumeration and general generalization to define the applicable conditions reasonably: namely, to usurp the opportunity of the company in self-dealing. While providing security and other common cases to list and stipulate, add the bottom clause as the criterion to judge whether to exclude the director's voting rights. In the fourth part, the author tries to put forward operable suggestions on the application condition and the cognizance procedure of the directors' voting right exclusion system, and holds that as long as the resolution matters cause or may cause infringement to the interests of the company or the stakeholders, Both the company and the stakeholders can apply for the exclusion of the voting rights of the associated directors, and the board of directors shall be the main body to determine whether the voting rights of the directors should be excluded. In the specific implementation procedures from the notification, review, publicity and other aspects of their own views. In the fifth part, in the aspect of the relief mechanism construction, the author thinks that the voting rights of the associated directors should be dealt with in different ways in view of the fact that the voting rights of the associated directors are not excluded and that the voting rights of the directors who have nothing to do with the resolution matters are excluded. In order to perfect the legal relief mechanism of the exclusion of directors' voting rights and fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of directors and related interests, the system of burden of proof is established in accordance with the status of the parties.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91
本文編號(hào)：2242367
[Abstract]:The system of exclusion of directors' voting rights is an important legal system to ensure the fairness of directors' resolutions. Article 124 of the Company Law stipulates that a director shall not exercise his voting rights on a matter in which a director has a related relationship with an enterprise involved in the matter decided by the board of directors. This marks the establishment of the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights in our country. It is undoubtedly a great improvement and development of directors' rights on the legislative level to write the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights into the articles of law. It is also an important measure to speed up the reform of China's economic system. This system plays an active role in avoiding directors abusing company rights usurping corporate opportunities optimizing corporate governance structure protecting the interests of minority shareholders and so on. However, there are still many deficiencies and defects in the scope of application, application and confirmation, relief methods and so on. In view of the existing provisions of the exclusion system of directors' voting rights in our country, there are still many shortcomings and defects. In order to make directors' voting right exclusion system be better applied in practice, this paper attempts to make a systematic study of directors' voting right exclusion system and puts forward some specific suggestions which are full of pertinence and maneuverability. This paper is divided into five parts. The first part, starting with the connotation of directors' voting rights, explains the connotation of directors' voting rights exclusion, and explains the connotation of directors' voting rights exclusion. This paper analyzes the characteristics of temporary and pending voting effect, and expounds the legal value and legal basis of the exclusion system of directors' voting rights. The second part, on the basis of summing up and combing the developing course of the system of exclusion of directors' voting rights, determines the subject, the definition of "related relationship", and the conditions of application from the scope of application. This paper systematically analyzes the defects and deficiencies in this system from different angles, such as relief methods, and thus lays the necessary theoretical foundation for the discussion below. The third part, combined with the trend that the company law of our country may adopt the classification mode of open company and closed company in the future, put forward that the exclusion system of directors' voting rights should be extended to the closed company, especially the family enterprise and the state-owned enterprise. It also advocates to use the advanced experience of foreign countries for reference to judge the relation reasonably, and puts forward that we should adopt concrete enumeration and general generalization to define the applicable conditions reasonably: namely, to usurp the opportunity of the company in self-dealing. While providing security and other common cases to list and stipulate, add the bottom clause as the criterion to judge whether to exclude the director's voting rights. In the fourth part, the author tries to put forward operable suggestions on the application condition and the cognizance procedure of the directors' voting right exclusion system, and holds that as long as the resolution matters cause or may cause infringement to the interests of the company or the stakeholders, Both the company and the stakeholders can apply for the exclusion of the voting rights of the associated directors, and the board of directors shall be the main body to determine whether the voting rights of the directors should be excluded. In the specific implementation procedures from the notification, review, publicity and other aspects of their own views. In the fifth part, in the aspect of the relief mechanism construction, the author thinks that the voting rights of the associated directors should be dealt with in different ways in view of the fact that the voting rights of the associated directors are not excluded and that the voting rights of the directors who have nothing to do with the resolution matters are excluded. In order to perfect the legal relief mechanism of the exclusion of directors' voting rights and fully protect the legitimate rights and interests of directors and related interests, the system of burden of proof is established in accordance with the status of the parties.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91
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