股東派生訴訟原告資格制度研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-05 20:14
【摘要】：股東派生訴訟制度自產(chǎn)生以來,在保護中小股東利益、完善公司治理等方面發(fā)揮著重要作用。但是另一方面,股東代位公司提起訴訟突破了公司法人人格獨立原則和資本多數(shù)決原則的要求,給公司的正常經(jīng)營帶來了風險。如何合理確定股東派生訴訟原告的資格,就成為實現(xiàn)股東派生訴訟的制度價值、維持公司正常經(jīng)營所要解決的首要問題。我國2005年修訂的《公司法》引進了股東派生訴訟制度,只是其規(guī)定極其籠統(tǒng),可操作性差,很多方面不盡合理。本文通過比較考察的方法,深入分析國外先進的立法例,并針對我國實際情況提出完善的建議。除引言和結(jié)論外,本文分三章展開研究。 第一章介紹了界定股東派生訴訟原告范圍的主要立法模式,即“單純股東主義”和“利益相關(guān)者主義”。其中,“單純股東主義”受到較多學(xué)者的支持,同時也被世界大多數(shù)國家立法所采用。本文認為,此兩種立法模式各有所長,本身并無孰優(yōu)孰劣之分,采取何種模式取決于不同國家的不同情況。在本章中,作者將分別分析此兩種立法模式的優(yōu)缺點,并提出自己的主張。 第二章研究的是股東派生訴訟原告資格的適格條件。本文將從持股時間或期限、持股數(shù)量或比例、股東的正當性和公正性要求三方面,對世界各國先進的立法經(jīng)驗進行研究和評析。通過比較考察的方法,分析各種立法模式的優(yōu)缺點,希望能夠?qū)ν晟莆覈蓶|派生訴訟原告資格制度有所啟發(fā)。 第三章是對我國股東派生訴訟原告資格法律制度現(xiàn)狀的檢討和完善建議。我國2005年修訂的《公司法》引進了股東派生訴訟制度,在股東派生訴訟原告范圍上采取單純股東主義,并將有限責任公司股東派生訴訟提起權(quán)界定為“單獨股東權(quán)”,將股份有限公司股東派生訴訟提起權(quán)界定為“少數(shù)股東權(quán)”。本文根據(jù)我國公司法律對股東資格的界定標準,將股東分為常態(tài)下和非常態(tài)下兩種。各國關(guān)于持股時間、持股比例和原告股東的公正性要求都是在股東派生訴訟原告股東資格正常的狀態(tài)下所做的限制,所以放在常態(tài)下的適格條件一節(jié)進行研究。另外,在我國公司法實踐中,還存在著隱名股東和干股股東等公司法沒有明確規(guī)定的股東類型,本文將其稱為非常態(tài)下的股東資格,并在非常態(tài)下的適格條件一節(jié)論述其股東派生訴訟原告資格的適格條件。 本文關(guān)于股東派生訴訟原告資格制度的研究,在對國外先進制度的學(xué)習和評價的同時,更加側(cè)重于對我國現(xiàn)狀的檢討。特別在第三章對我國公司法尚未規(guī)定的隱名股東和干股股東的股東派生訴訟原告資格問題,以及瑕疵出資狀態(tài)下的股東派生訴訟原告資格問題進行研究,希望能夠?qū)ν晟莆覈墓蓶|派生訴訟原告資格制度貢獻微薄之力。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of shareholder derivative litigation system, it plays an important role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders and perfecting corporate governance. On the other hand, the shareholder subrogation company has broken through the requirements of the principle of corporate personality independence and the principle of capital majority decision, which brings risks to the normal operation of the company. How to reasonably determine the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action becomes the first problem to be solved in order to realize the institutional value of the shareholder derivative action and to maintain the normal operation of the company. The Company Law revised in 2005 has introduced the shareholder derivative litigation system, but its provisions are extremely general, the operability is poor, and many aspects are not reasonable. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advanced legislation cases in foreign countries, and puts forward some suggestions for the improvement of our country's actual situation. In addition to the introduction and conclusions, this paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the main legislative models that define the scope of the plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, that is, "pure shareholder doctrine" and "stakeholder doctrine". Among them, "pure shareholder doctrine" is supported by many scholars and adopted by most countries in the world. This paper holds that each of these two legislative models has its own advantages and disadvantages, and which model to adopt depends on the different conditions of different countries. In this chapter, the author will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the two models, and put forward his own ideas. The second chapter studies the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff. This paper will study and evaluate the advanced legislative experience of various countries in the world from three aspects: the time or duration of shareholding, the quantity or proportion of shareholding, and the requirement of equity and justice of shareholders. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of various legislative models, hoping to enlighten the improvement of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The third chapter is to review and perfect the status quo of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The revised "Company Law" in 2005 introduced the system of shareholder derivative action, adopted pure shareholder doctrine in the scope of shareholder derivative action, and defined the right of shareholder derivative action in limited liability company as "individual shareholder right". The right to initiate shareholder derivative action in a joint stock limited company is defined as "minority shareholder right". According to the definition standard of shareholder's qualification in our country's company law, this paper divides shareholder into two kinds: normal and abnormal. The time of holding shares, the proportion of shares and the equity requirements of the plaintiff shareholders are all limited under the normal qualification of the plaintiff shareholders in the shareholder derivative litigation, so the study is carried out in the section of suitable conditions under the normal conditions. In addition, in the practice of company law of our country, there are still some types of shareholders, such as dormant shareholders and dry shareholders, which are not clearly stipulated in the company law. At the same time, it discusses the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action in the section of suitable condition under abnormal condition. In this paper, the study on the qualification system of plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, while studying and evaluating the foreign advanced system, pays more attention to the review of the present situation of our country. Especially in the third chapter, the author studies the qualification of shareholder derivative action of dormant shareholder and dry stock shareholder, and the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff in the state of defective capital contribution, which has not been stipulated in the company law of our country. Hope to improve our shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff qualification system contribution meager contribution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91
本文編號：2166892
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of shareholder derivative litigation system, it plays an important role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders and perfecting corporate governance. On the other hand, the shareholder subrogation company has broken through the requirements of the principle of corporate personality independence and the principle of capital majority decision, which brings risks to the normal operation of the company. How to reasonably determine the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action becomes the first problem to be solved in order to realize the institutional value of the shareholder derivative action and to maintain the normal operation of the company. The Company Law revised in 2005 has introduced the shareholder derivative litigation system, but its provisions are extremely general, the operability is poor, and many aspects are not reasonable. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advanced legislation cases in foreign countries, and puts forward some suggestions for the improvement of our country's actual situation. In addition to the introduction and conclusions, this paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the main legislative models that define the scope of the plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, that is, "pure shareholder doctrine" and "stakeholder doctrine". Among them, "pure shareholder doctrine" is supported by many scholars and adopted by most countries in the world. This paper holds that each of these two legislative models has its own advantages and disadvantages, and which model to adopt depends on the different conditions of different countries. In this chapter, the author will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the two models, and put forward his own ideas. The second chapter studies the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff. This paper will study and evaluate the advanced legislative experience of various countries in the world from three aspects: the time or duration of shareholding, the quantity or proportion of shareholding, and the requirement of equity and justice of shareholders. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of various legislative models, hoping to enlighten the improvement of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The third chapter is to review and perfect the status quo of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The revised "Company Law" in 2005 introduced the system of shareholder derivative action, adopted pure shareholder doctrine in the scope of shareholder derivative action, and defined the right of shareholder derivative action in limited liability company as "individual shareholder right". The right to initiate shareholder derivative action in a joint stock limited company is defined as "minority shareholder right". According to the definition standard of shareholder's qualification in our country's company law, this paper divides shareholder into two kinds: normal and abnormal. The time of holding shares, the proportion of shares and the equity requirements of the plaintiff shareholders are all limited under the normal qualification of the plaintiff shareholders in the shareholder derivative litigation, so the study is carried out in the section of suitable conditions under the normal conditions. In addition, in the practice of company law of our country, there are still some types of shareholders, such as dormant shareholders and dry shareholders, which are not clearly stipulated in the company law. At the same time, it discusses the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action in the section of suitable condition under abnormal condition. In this paper, the study on the qualification system of plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, while studying and evaluating the foreign advanced system, pays more attention to the review of the present situation of our country. Especially in the third chapter, the author studies the qualification of shareholder derivative action of dormant shareholder and dry stock shareholder, and the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff in the state of defective capital contribution, which has not been stipulated in the company law of our country. Hope to improve our shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff qualification system contribution meager contribution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91
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