【摘要】：現(xiàn)有公司法律體系中存在多種保護(hù)債權(quán)人利益的制度措施,如公司資本制度、公司事務(wù)公開制度、公司法人格否認(rèn)制度以及破產(chǎn)清算制度等等。不可否認(rèn),這些制度對債權(quán)人保護(hù)起到了積極作用。但這些制度無一例外的具有被動(dòng)性和事后性的特點(diǎn),從而使其在債權(quán)人保護(hù)方面具有相當(dāng)?shù)木窒扌�。也正是由于這些局限性使債權(quán)人在目前我國公司法制下處于不利地位,如果不能適當(dāng)調(diào)整債權(quán)人在整個(gè)公司制度中的利益格局,必將使其在與公司的業(yè)務(wù)往來中顧慮重重,從而消減公司作為市場經(jīng)濟(jì)重要主體的功能。 要想使債權(quán)人利益得到有效保護(hù),就必須改變將其排除在公司治理主體之外的觀念,使其主動(dòng)的參與到公司治理當(dāng)中,讓其意志能夠在公司體制中得以表達(dá)。而要使債權(quán)人參與到公司治理當(dāng)中,就必須賦予其特定身份,使其以此為依托行使相應(yīng)職權(quán)。本文以為,債權(quán)人以外部監(jiān)事身份參與治理是一個(gè)理想的選擇。一方面,監(jiān)事會(huì)因缺乏獨(dú)立性和專業(yè)性而普遍虛化;另一方面,為了實(shí)現(xiàn)對債權(quán)人利益的保護(hù),需要其參與到公司治理當(dāng)中,而作為監(jiān)督者身份參與治理應(yīng)是對其合理的定位。兩者正是在此基礎(chǔ)上達(dá)成了某種契合。 本文正是沿著上述脈絡(luò)展開探討的。 第一章在揭示了公司債權(quán)人保護(hù)的意義和現(xiàn)有保護(hù)制度的不足以及產(chǎn)生根源的基礎(chǔ)上,得出了要想根本上改變債權(quán)人在公司制度中的弱勢地位就必須使其以主體身份參與到公司治理當(dāng)中; 第二章在第一章得出債權(quán)人不應(yīng)游離于公司治理之外這一結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,從利益相關(guān)者理論出發(fā),探討了債權(quán)人參與公司治理的理論基礎(chǔ)和各國的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn),為其參與公司治理尋求可行性; 第三章在第二章得出公司債權(quán)人具有參與公司治理的可行性的結(jié)論之后,探討了債權(quán)人應(yīng)選擇外部監(jiān)事這一路徑參與到公司治理當(dāng)中,并進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)論證; 第四章分析了以債權(quán)人身份出任外部監(jiān)事的具體程序和職責(zé),試圖構(gòu)建一套外部監(jiān)事路徑下的債權(quán)人參與公司治理新模式,以期達(dá)到保護(hù)債權(quán)人的目的。 在結(jié)論當(dāng)中,對全文給予回顧和總結(jié),并對論文的局限和未能解決的問題進(jìn)行了說明。 此外,債權(quán)人是一個(gè)類概念,由于本人學(xué)識(shí)和精力所限,本文僅就銀行債權(quán)人這一特定類型進(jìn)行探討,在此特別說明。
[Abstract]:There are a variety of measures to protect the interests of creditors in the existing corporate legal system, such as corporate capital system, corporate affairs disclosure system, corporate personality denial system and bankruptcy liquidation system, and so on. Undeniably, these systems have played a positive role in the protection of creditors. However, these systems have the characteristics of passivity and hindsight without exception, which makes them limited in the protection of creditors. It is precisely because of these limitations that creditors are in a disadvantageous position under the current corporate legal system of our country. If the benefit pattern of creditors in the whole company system cannot be properly adjusted, it will certainly make them worry a lot in their business dealings with the company. In order to reduce the company as an important part of the market economy function. In order to protect the interests of creditors effectively, we must change the idea of excluding them from the main body of corporate governance, so that they can actively participate in the corporate governance, so that their will can be expressed in the corporate system. In order to make creditors participate in corporate governance, they must be given a specific identity and exercise their functions and powers based on it. This paper believes that creditor participation in governance as an external supervisor is an ideal choice. On the one hand, the board of supervisors is generally fictitious because of its lack of independence and professionalism; on the other hand, in order to protect the interests of creditors, it needs them to participate in corporate governance, and participation in governance as a supervisor should be its reasonable position. It is on this basis that the two reached a certain agreement. This paper is just along the above-mentioned context of the discussion. The first chapter reveals the significance of the protection of corporate creditors, the deficiencies of the existing protection system and the root causes. It is concluded that in order to fundamentally change the weak position of creditors in the corporate system, we must make them participate in the corporate governance as the main body; the second chapter in the first chapter concludes that creditors should not dissociate from corporate governance. On the basis of this conclusion, Based on stakeholder theory, this paper discusses the theoretical basis of creditor participation in corporate governance and the practical experience of various countries. In chapter three, after the conclusion that the company creditor has the feasibility of participating in corporate governance, the author discusses that the creditor should choose the path of external supervisor to participate in the corporate governance, the third chapter draws the conclusion that the creditor has the feasibility of participating in the corporate governance, and discusses that the creditor should choose the path of external supervisor to participate in the corporate governance. The fourth chapter analyzes the procedure and responsibility of taking the position of creditor as external supervisor, and tries to build a new model of creditor participating in corporate governance under the path of external supervisor. In order to achieve the purpose of protecting creditors. In the conclusion, the author reviews and summarizes the full text, and explains the limitations of the paper and the problems that can not be solved. In addition, the creditor is a kind of concept. Due to the limitation of my knowledge and energy, this paper only discusses this particular type of bank creditor, which is specially explained here.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D912.29

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 孔維國;我國一人公司現(xiàn)狀及法律治理研究[D];廣西師范大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：2147721