【摘要】：由于派出機(jī)關(guān)的特殊性,國(guó)有股監(jiān)事與一般監(jiān)事在任職資格、職權(quán)范圍以及法律責(zé)任的承擔(dān)與追究等方面都有很大的不同。對(duì)國(guó)有股監(jiān)事法律制度展開深入的研究,這不僅對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善有很大的促進(jìn)作用,而且對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的保值增值有非常重要的意義。國(guó)有股監(jiān)事一方面是由國(guó)資委派出對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的代表,另一方面又是通過國(guó)有股權(quán)進(jìn)入國(guó)有企業(yè)后的監(jiān)事會(huì)的成員,身份上的雙重性決定了其不僅要向派出機(jī)關(guān)負(fù)責(zé),還要向所有股東負(fù)責(zé),對(duì)國(guó)有控股公司和國(guó)有參股公司來說,除了國(guó)有股以外,還有其他股東。正是由于國(guó)有股監(jiān)事的雙重身份及屬性決定了國(guó)有股監(jiān)事的雙重職責(zé),因此,其不僅要履行作為監(jiān)事的一般職責(zé),還要承擔(dān)起作為國(guó)資委監(jiān)管代表的責(zé)任。特殊的監(jiān)管代表身份決定了國(guó)有股監(jiān)事享有遠(yuǎn)比一般監(jiān)事廣泛的職權(quán),如法律法規(guī)直接規(guī)定的權(quán)力,投資主體或機(jī)構(gòu)下派的權(quán)力等�！豆痉ā�、《企業(yè)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)法》、《國(guó)有企業(yè)監(jiān)事會(huì)暫行條例》等法律法規(guī)對(duì)國(guó)有股監(jiān)事的規(guī)定還有很多的不足,相關(guān)制度亟待完善。國(guó)有股監(jiān)事由國(guó)資委委派,并且常常帶有一定的行政級(jí)別,但是在實(shí)踐中,國(guó)有股監(jiān)事仍然很難形成對(duì)企業(yè)的有效監(jiān)督,這是體制弊端所造成的。由于國(guó)有股監(jiān)事只是國(guó)有資產(chǎn)代理人,并不擁有剩余索取權(quán),企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)得好壞對(duì)其自身利益沒有多大影響,在這種情況下,國(guó)有股監(jiān)事缺乏履行監(jiān)督職能的足夠動(dòng)力,這些都是我國(guó)立法亟待解決的問題。強(qiáng)化國(guó)有股監(jiān)事的職能,擴(kuò)充其職權(quán)范圍,讓國(guó)有股監(jiān)事真正地發(fā)揮實(shí)質(zhì)性的監(jiān)督作用,這是完善國(guó)有股監(jiān)事制度的應(yīng)有之義。
[Abstract]:Due to the particularity of the dispatched organs, there are great differences between the state-owned supervisors and the general supervisors in terms of their qualifications, terms of reference, and the undertaking and investigation of their legal responsibilities. The in-depth study on the legal system of state-owned stock supervisors not only promotes the improvement of the internal governance structure of state-owned enterprises, but also plays a very important role in maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets. On the one hand, the supervisors of state-owned shares are representatives sent by SASAC to supervise state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, they are members of the board of supervisors who enter state-owned enterprises through state-owned shares. The dual nature of their status determines that they should not only be responsible to the dispatched organs. Also accountable to all shareholders, for state-holding companies and state-owned companies, in addition to state-owned shares, there are other shareholders. It is precisely because of the dual status and attributes of the state-owned supervisors that the state-owned supervisors have dual responsibilities. Therefore, they should not only perform their general duties as supervisors, but also bear the responsibility of acting as the supervisory representatives of SASAC The special status of supervisory representative determines that the supervisors of state-owned shares enjoy far more powers than ordinary supervisors, such as the powers directly prescribed by laws and regulations. The laws and regulations, such as "Company Law", "Enterprise State-owned assets Law", "interim regulations on Supervisory Board of State-owned Enterprises", still have many deficiencies in the provisions of state-owned stock supervisors, and the relevant systems need to be improved. State-owned stock supervisors are appointed by SASAC, and often have a certain administrative level, but in practice, it is still very difficult for state-owned stock supervisors to form effective supervision over enterprises, which is caused by the malpractice of the system. Since the state-owned stock supervisors are only agents of state-owned assets and do not have the residual claim rights, the good or bad operation of the enterprises does not have much influence on their own interests. In this case, the state-owned stock supervisors lack sufficient motivation to perform their supervisory functions. These are the problems that our country legislates urgently to solve. It is necessary to strengthen the functions of state-owned supervisors, expand the scope of their functions, and let state-owned supervisors really play a substantial supervisory role, which is the proper meaning of perfecting the state-owned supervision system
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李維安,張亞雙;如何構(gòu)造適合國(guó)情的公司治理監(jiān)督機(jī)制——論我國(guó)監(jiān)事會(huì)的功能定位[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2002年02期

2 徐瀾波,胡鈞;日本董事、監(jiān)事制度的修改及啟示[J];法學(xué);2003年02期

3 李江濤,楊磊;國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理的“兩個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變”和委托代理鏈條的收斂性[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2003年05期

4 劉社建;國(guó)有企業(yè)監(jiān)督機(jī)制的演進(jìn)與變遷[J];上海經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年01期

5 葉映;我國(guó)監(jiān)事會(huì)功能失效及其對(duì)策[J];計(jì)劃與市場(chǎng)探索;2004年03期

6 范雪飛;;論我國(guó)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的私權(quán)利監(jiān)督[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革;2007年04期

7 蔣小俠;公司監(jiān)事法律責(zé)任制度探析[J];科技情報(bào)開發(fā)與經(jīng)濟(jì);2005年07期

8 張亞雙;監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督職能的有效發(fā)揮[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2001年01期

9 李瞻釗;對(duì)確立國(guó)有企業(yè)監(jiān)事會(huì)制度的思考——從《國(guó)有企業(yè)監(jiān)事會(huì)暫行條例》發(fā)布施行談起[J];南方經(jīng)濟(jì);2000年06期

10 張雨;;論公司董事、監(jiān)事、高級(jí)管理人員的法律責(zé)任[J];社科縱橫;2009年08期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王威武;國(guó)企改革中國(guó)有資產(chǎn)流失監(jiān)管法律問題研究[D];哈爾濱工程大學(xué);2005年

，

本文編號(hào)：2143037