中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的制度影響研究
[Abstract]:In a country with high concentration of equity, the agency problem between the middle and small shareholders and the controlling shareholders is very serious. The principle of "capital majority" has pushed the small and medium shareholders into the unfavorable situation. The phenomenon of the controlling shareholders depriving the small and medium-sized shareholders is common and very serious. The interests of the small and medium shareholders have become an indisputable fact. As a Chinese securities market The long-term damage of the interests of small and medium shareholders will affect the stable development of China's capital market and even the national economy. It has become a common understanding of how to protect the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders and strengthen the protection of the system.
Based on the system, this paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) how does the system (Law and reputation) affect the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders? (2) what is the level of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China? Does the current system (Law and reputation) have achieved the due effect on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China (3) How to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in the system is how to protect the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. First, it analyzes how the system affects the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. It analyzes the special protection system of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders along the two paths of the formal system represented by the law and the informal system represented by the reputation. On the basis of the analysis of the present situation of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis of the effect of the system on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China: (1) establishing the role model of the legal system on the protection level of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders, and the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders from the whole country. Two levels of legislation and law enforcement are put forward. (2) a model of the effect of reputation mechanism on the protection level of small and medium shareholders is set up, and the hypothesis is put forward from different levels of reputation.
This study uses the data of listed companies, uses STATA 10 software to deal with the data, and uses descriptive statistical analysis, principal component analysis, t test and panel random effect model to test the research hypothesis. The conclusions show that: (1) the protection level of minority shareholders in China is low and the level of dividend gain is low, which leads to the low level of dividend income in China. Capital gains are still the source of profit for small and medium shareholders, small shareholders take a huge risk. (2) the law has a significant positive effect on the protection level of small and medium shareholders. (3) reputation has a significant positive effect on the protection of small and medium shareholders' rights and interests. (4) although the law and sound reputation have played a role, but relative to the lower middle of our country The protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests is not enough. We need to further improve legislation, strengthen law enforcement and play a reputation role.
The main work and contribution of this paper are as follows:
1, the existing research is to analyze the system from the perspective of the controlling shareholders, and the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders not only comes from the restriction on the deprivation of the controlling shareholders, but also comes from the incentive to the active rights of the small and medium shareholders. While the holding shareholders inevitably appear, the positive behavior of the small shareholders is protected by the small and medium shareholders. The other way of shareholders' rights and interests. From the behavior of small and medium shareholders, this paper analyzes how the system can affect the choice of small shareholders' rights and interests by changing the cost and income, and thus leads to the difference in the protection of small and medium stockholders' rights and interests. The design of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders should reduce the cost of small and medium shareholders and reduce the cost of small and medium shareholders. Externality, strengthen the direction of positive behavior of small and medium shareholders.
2, from the two paths of law and reputation, this paper analyzes the supply of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in our country. Although the legal system of the stock market is perfected in our country, the supply of the legal system of our country is still present in terms of the dispersion of the small and medium shareholders, the large number of people, the small income and the higher exercise of the rights. The voting mechanism and the relief mechanism are the most important contents in the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders. The cumulative voting system of the company law and the legal and economic analysis of the shareholder representative litigation system are analyzed, and the deficiencies in the equity and efficiency are pointed out. The impact of the protection indicates that the reputation mechanism of our controlling shareholders has not played a role because the government's reputation has intervened.
3, empirical test on the supply effect of the protection system of small and medium shareholders in China. From the angle of the right of asset income, the principle of principal component analysis is used to measure the protection level of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders. The effect of the empirical test system of panel random effect and t test on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China. The result shows that the legal harmony of our country Reputation has a positive impact on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. However, relative to the low level of dividend gain and the high risk of capital gains, the current law and reputation of our country are still not enough.
4, how to reduce the cost of small and medium stockholders' supervision and rights protection, based on the nature of the weak group of small and medium shareholders, collective action is an inevitable choice. Corresponding to the existing cumulative voting system and shareholder representative litigation system, the realization of equity and shareholder group litigation system to the realization of equity and efficiency is analyzed by law and economics. First of all, we should establish the system of the collection of stock agency and the system of shareholder group litigation. Secondly, we should give full play to the reputation mechanism, in order to make up for the lack of law and the weak legal enforcement. The joint role of law and reputation improves the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders.
This study reveals the true panorama of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China from two aspects of theory and demonstration, as well as the role of our system on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders, providing a practical basis for the establishment and implementation of the relevant system for protecting the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號】:F276.6;F832.51;F224
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