本文選題：股東分紅權(quán) + 國(guó)有公司��； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：股東分紅權(quán)是公司股東眾多權(quán)利的核心,同時(shí)也是股東投資公司的根本目的。股東分紅權(quán)又稱股東盈余分配請(qǐng)求權(quán)或股利分配請(qǐng)求權(quán),可分為抽象的股東分紅權(quán)和具體股東分紅權(quán)。實(shí)現(xiàn)股東分紅權(quán)應(yīng)當(dāng)具備實(shí)質(zhì)性要件和形式要件。實(shí)質(zhì)要件是指公司分配利潤(rùn)必須要有盈利,體現(xiàn)的是“無(wú)盈則不分”的原則;公司存在盈利并不意味著就可以分配紅利,還要通過(guò)法定程序,由公司有權(quán)機(jī)關(guān)作出分紅決定之后才可以分紅。這即是形式要件。我國(guó)公司法規(guī)定,董事會(huì)有提出分配紅利的權(quán)利,股東會(huì)是分紅的決議機(jī)關(guān),使得董事會(huì)和股東會(huì)構(gòu)成相互制約的機(jī)制,體現(xiàn)了我國(guó)公司法所具備的優(yōu)點(diǎn)。 在我國(guó),無(wú)論國(guó)有公司、上市公司還是一般有限責(zé)任公司都不同程度的存在不分紅或少分紅的現(xiàn)象,從而侵害了股東分紅權(quán)。國(guó)有企業(yè)還在改革階段,經(jīng)過(guò)改制的大多數(shù)國(guó)有企業(yè)多年未向國(guó)家分紅,大量的資金留在國(guó)有公司,從而產(chǎn)生了一系列問(wèn)題,如內(nèi)部人控制、貪污腐敗等現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生,不利于公司的發(fā)展、致使國(guó)家和人民的財(cái)產(chǎn)流失、侵害債權(quán)人的利益。上市公司也存在長(zhǎng)年不分紅的情況,控股股東控制公司,損害中小股東的權(quán)利,在分紅方式上現(xiàn)金股利分配數(shù)量和采取分配現(xiàn)金紅利所占上市公司的比例與發(fā)育成熟的證券市場(chǎng)存在很大差距。對(duì)有限責(zé)任公司而言,則是大股東長(zhǎng)期欺壓中小股東,利用資本多數(shù)決原則控制公司,侵害中小股東的分紅權(quán)。通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)公司分紅現(xiàn)狀的分析,本文認(rèn)為侵害股東分紅權(quán)的原因在立法層面、司法保護(hù)層面以及股東權(quán)利認(rèn)識(shí)層面都存在一些問(wèn)題,這些問(wèn)題包括“資本多數(shù)決”原則的缺陷,持異議股東退股權(quán)實(shí)現(xiàn)困難,股東權(quán)利意識(shí)不強(qiáng)等。當(dāng)股東分紅權(quán)受到侵害的時(shí)候不能有效的通過(guò)司法途徑進(jìn)行保護(hù)股東的權(quán)利,法院礙于司法謹(jǐn)慎干預(yù)的原則,難以作出公正合理的裁判,甚或根本不受理股東申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制分紅之訴。 本文在分析侵害股東分紅權(quán)原因的基礎(chǔ)上提出一系列法律建議。建議修改現(xiàn)行公司法相關(guān)立法,完善股東退股權(quán)的股價(jià)確定機(jī)制,借鑒美國(guó)司法判例中綜合運(yùn)用市場(chǎng)價(jià)值、財(cái)產(chǎn)價(jià)值和收益價(jià)值的方法,從而合理公正地確定退股股價(jià)。建議將我國(guó)《公司法》第75條規(guī)定的退股年限由五年改為三年,或是僅僅規(guī)定最高年限,強(qiáng)制將退股條件寫進(jìn)公司章程,充分保護(hù)股東分紅權(quán)。保護(hù)股東知情權(quán),完善信息披露制度,是保護(hù)股東分紅權(quán)的前提。我們應(yīng)該重視公司會(huì)計(jì)制度,加大違反公司會(huì)計(jì)制度的處罰力度,加強(qiáng)股東的知情權(quán)保護(hù)和公司決議不分紅時(shí)的信息披露義務(wù)。 本文建議建立股東申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制分紅訴訟制度,分析了強(qiáng)制分紅之訴的合理、合法性和必要性。但是申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制分紅之訴不是沒(méi)有條件的,本文認(rèn)為成就股東申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制分紅之訴必須同時(shí)符合窮盡公司內(nèi)部救濟(jì)原則、異議股東明確表示反對(duì)分紅決議以及必須是公司在符合分紅的條件下,而做出不分配紅利或少分配紅利的決議。若公司已經(jīng)做出分配紅利,而怠于行使分配的時(shí)候,可以視為申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制分紅之訴的條件已經(jīng)成熟,股東可以選擇提出債的訴訟或是強(qiáng)制分紅之訴。針對(duì)國(guó)有公司在我國(guó)特殊的法律地位,本文提出了要完善出資人股權(quán)直接訴訟制度和國(guó)有資本經(jīng)營(yíng)預(yù)算制度。至于具體的制度設(shè)計(jì),本文沒(méi)有展開(kāi)討論,是本文研究的不到之處,也是今后應(yīng)當(dāng)研究的一個(gè)重點(diǎn)。另外,結(jié)合劉俊海教授的觀點(diǎn)還提出在國(guó)有參股公司中國(guó)有股應(yīng)當(dāng)界定為無(wú)表決權(quán)的優(yōu)先股。國(guó)有股界定為優(yōu)先股更有利于公司在分配紅利決議時(shí)實(shí)現(xiàn)公司長(zhǎng)期和短期利益的平衡,與現(xiàn)行《公司法》相接軌,并可節(jié)約國(guó)家行使股東權(quán)的成本。 保護(hù)股東分紅權(quán),必須強(qiáng)化違反分紅制度的責(zé)任。股東違法取得紅利必須返還,但是也要保護(hù)善意股東取得的紅利。判斷股東是否善意取得紅利,必須要符合主體和主觀方面兩個(gè)條件。主體必須是中小股東,而主觀方面必須是基于善意取得。要建立大股東損害賠償責(zé)任機(jī)制。大股東以及控股股東利用“資本多數(shù)決”原則、故意規(guī)避退股條件或是違法分紅的,應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)相應(yīng)的賠償責(zé)任。
[Abstract]:The shareholder bonus right is the core of many rights of the shareholders of the company, and it is also the fundamental purpose of the shareholders' investment company. The shareholder bonus right is also called the claim of the shareholder's earnings distribution or the dividend distribution claim, which can be divided into the abstract shareholder bonus right and the specific shareholder bonus right. The essential element is that the company's distribution of profit must be profitable, reflecting the principle of "no profit is not divided"; the company's profit does not mean that it can allocate the dividend, but the company has the authority to make a dividend decision after the company has the authority to make a dividend decision. This is the form of the form. Our company law stipulates that the board of directors has the points put forward. With the right of bonus, the shareholders will be the resolution organ of the dividend, which makes the board of directors and the shareholders meet the mechanism of mutual restriction, which embodies the advantages of the company law of our country.
In our country, no matter the state-owned companies, the listed companies or the general limited liability companies have the phenomenon of the existence of different degrees of dividends or less dividends, and thus infringes the dividend rights of the shareholders. The state-owned enterprises are still in the stage of reform, and most of the state-owned enterprises that have been reformed have not been red to the state for many years, and a large amount of funds have been left in the state-owned companies. A series of problems, such as the insider control, corruption and corruption, are not conducive to the development of the company, the loss of the property of the country and the people and the interests of the creditors. The listed companies also have long years of lack of dividends. The controlling shareholders control the company, damage the rights of the East and the small shares, and the amount of cash dividend distribution and the dividend distribution. There is a big gap between the proportion of the listed companies taking the share of cash dividend and the mature securities market. For the limited liability company, it is the long term bullying the small and medium shareholders by the large shareholders, controlling the company by the majority of the capital, and violating the dividend rights of the small and medium shareholders. There are some problems in the legislative level, the level of judicial protection and the understanding of shareholders' rights. These problems include the defects of the principle of "capital majority", the difficulty of realizing the dissenting shareholders' return to equity and the lack of awareness of shareholders' rights. In the way of protecting the rights of shareholders, the court is hindering the principle of prudent intervention by the judiciary, and it is difficult to make a fair and reasonable judgment, or even do not accept the claim of a shareholder to apply for compulsory dividends.
This paper puts forward a series of legal suggestions on the basis of analyzing the reasons for the infringement of shareholders' dividend rights. It is suggested that the relevant legislation of the current company law should be amended to perfect the stock price determination mechanism of the shareholder's equity withdrawal right, and the method of comprehensive use of market value, property value and income value in the judicial precedents of the United States is used for the rational and fair determination of the stock return share price. It is a prerequisite for the protection of the shareholder's right to share the rights of the shareholders. We should attach importance to the accounting system of the company. It is a prerequisite for the protection of the shareholders' rights to share the right to know and the system of information disclosure. We should pay more attention to the accounting system of the company. We should pay more attention to the accounting system of the company. We should pay more attention to the accounting system of the company and increase the accounting system of the company. We should pay more attention to the accounting system of the seventy-fifth companies. The penalties for violating the company's accounting system are to strengthen the protection of shareholders' right to know and the obligation to disclose information when the company decides not to pay dividends.
This paper recommends the establishment of a shareholder application for compulsory dividends litigation, and analyzes the rationality, legitimacy and necessity of the compulsory dividend claim. However, the application for compulsory dividends is not unconditional. This article holds that the appeal of the achievement shareholders to apply for compulsory dividends must conformed to the internal relief principle of the exhaustive company, and the dissenting shareholders clearly express the opposition dividend. The resolution and the resolution must be made under the condition that the company is in conformity with the dividend, and does not allocate the dividend or the dividend of the dividend. If the company has already made a dividend and is slack for the exercise of the distribution, it can be regarded as the condition of applying for compulsory dividends. The state owned company has a special legal status in our country. This article puts forward to perfect the direct litigation system and the management budget system of the state-owned capital. As for the specific system design, this article has not been discussed. It is not the point of this study, but also a key point to be studied in the future. In addition, the point of view is also combined with Professor Liu Junhai's viewpoint. It is proposed that the shares in China's state-owned shares should be defined as the preferred stock without the right to vote. The definition of the preferred stock of the state-owned shares is more conducive to the company's balance of long-term and short-term interests of the company when the dividend is allocated. It is in line with the current "company law" and saves the state's cost of exercising its shareholders' rights.
To protect the dividend rights of shareholders, it is necessary to strengthen the responsibility of violating the dividend system. Shareholders must return the dividend in violation of the law, but also protect the dividends obtained by the bona fide shareholders. To judge whether the shareholders acquire the bonus in good faith, it must conform to the two conditions of the subject and the subjective. The subject must be small and medium shareholders, and the subjective aspect must be based on good faith. In order to establish the liability mechanism for damages of the large shareholders, the large shareholders and the controlling shareholders should take the corresponding liability for the use of the principle of "capital majority" and deliberately evade the conditions for withdrawal or illegal dividends.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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