本文選題：企業(yè)績效 + 股權(quán)激勵��； 參考：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著公司法、證券法的重大修改和《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理試行辦法》等政策的陸續(xù)出臺,上市公司股權(quán)激勵問題逐漸成為理論研究的重點。本文采取了規(guī)范和實證相結(jié)合的研究方法,將研究集中于上市公司經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵之上,在對2009年71家上市公司101個股權(quán)激勵方案數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行處理的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了上市公司股權(quán)激勵的現(xiàn)狀,驗證了各個因素與上市公司股權(quán)激勵之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,并檢驗了上市公司股權(quán)激勵的效果,得出了以下結(jié)論:①從上市公司股權(quán)激勵的整體狀況來看,行業(yè)分布較為廣泛,但制造業(yè)上市公司的比例過半;非國有控制上市公司參與股權(quán)激勵計劃更為積極;進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵計劃的上市公司在整體業(yè)績方面表現(xiàn)良好。從上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃方案特點來看,股權(quán)激勵的規(guī)模較大,但激勵對象的受眾面過窄;激勵方式以股票期權(quán)為主;行權(quán)的業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)體系較為單一,行權(quán)的績效考核指標(biāo)較容易完成。②從理論分析可知,上市公司的經(jīng)營績效是影響上市公司股權(quán)激勵的根本因素;同時,不同規(guī)模上市公司的股權(quán)激勵方案有所不同;不同企業(yè)性質(zhì)的上市公司對于股權(quán)激勵方案選擇的謹(jǐn)慎程度不同,非國有控制上市公司更容易進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵;不同行業(yè)的上市公司在選擇股權(quán)激勵方案時會有所差異。③從實證研究可知,公司績效與股權(quán)激勵之間顯著的正相關(guān);非國有控制上市公司更容易進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵;上市公司股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)規(guī)模虛擬變量負(fù)相關(guān),但并不顯著;上市公司股權(quán)激勵的行業(yè)影響因素并不明顯。④股權(quán)激勵導(dǎo)致了以后年度的凈資產(chǎn)收益率著下降,這說明激勵效果令人堪憂;采用不同激勵方式,激勵效果均為負(fù)向,但差異不大。最后,根據(jù)以上研究的結(jié)果,給出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。由此,豐富了企業(yè)績效激勵理論。
[Abstract]:Along with the company law, the major amendment of the securities law and the "trial measures of Stock incentive Management of listed companies", the issue of equity incentive of listed companies has gradually become the focus of theoretical research. This paper adopts the method of combining normative and empirical research, focuses on the equity incentive of managers of listed companies, and deals with 101 equity incentive schemes of 71 listed companies in 2009. This paper analyzes the current situation of equity incentive of listed companies, verifies the internal relationship between various factors and equity incentive of listed companies, and tests the effect of equity incentive of listed companies. The following conclusions are drawn: 1 from the overall situation of equity incentive of listed companies, the industry distribution is more extensive, but the proportion of manufacturing listed companies is more than half, the non-state-owned controlled listed companies participate in the equity incentive plan more actively. Listed companies that carry out equity incentive plans perform well in terms of overall performance. According to the characteristics of stock incentive plan of listed company, the scale of equity incentive is large, but the object of incentive is too narrow; the incentive mode is mainly stock option; the performance evaluation index system of exercise right is single. From the theoretical analysis, the operating performance of listed companies is the fundamental factor that affects the equity incentive of listed companies, at the same time, the equity incentive schemes of different scale listed companies are different. Different enterprises have different degrees of caution in the choice of equity incentive scheme, non-state-owned controlled listed companies are easier to carry out equity incentive; From the empirical study, we can see that there is a significant positive correlation between corporate performance and equity incentive, and non-state-owned controlled listed companies are easier to carry out equity incentive. The equity incentive of listed company is negatively correlated with fictitious variable of enterprise scale, but it is not significant; the industry influence factor of equity incentive of listed company is not obvious, and the equity incentive of listed company leads to the decline of net assets return rate in the following year. This shows that the incentive effect is worrisome, and the incentive effect is negative, but the difference is not significant. Finally, according to the above research results, the corresponding policy recommendations are given. Therefore, it enriches the theory of enterprise performance incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F272;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 馮群英;;上市公司貨幣薪酬與股權(quán)激勵模式的比較研究[J];會計之友;2013年07期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 張艷林;我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵影響因素研究[D];燕山大學(xué);2012年

2 蘇廣艷;控制權(quán)配置視角下上市公司股權(quán)激勵偏好的財富效應(yīng)研究[D];燕山大學(xué);2012年

3 王冰;上市公司股權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計及實施問題研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué);2013年

4 楊史培;中興通訊股權(quán)激勵方案的分析研究[D];吉林財經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：2070470