發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-22 10:33

  本文選題：公司收購 + 目標(biāo)公司　； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來，隨著我國資本市場的不斷發(fā)展壯大，公司之間的收購合并變得日益頻繁。2005年以前上市公司并購交易規(guī)模在全部交易中占比不足20%，2006年至2010年平均占比為48%。2011年則攀升至67%。2012年，中國并購市場交易整體趨于活躍，China Venture投中集團(tuán)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2012年1至11月中國并購市場宣布交易案例數(shù)量3379起，披露交易規(guī)模2660.7億美元，較2011年全年上升18%。 公司收購，不僅可以促進(jìn)資源重組，保證市場優(yōu)勝劣汰的競爭法則，還可以推動(dòng)公司朝著集團(tuán)化規(guī)�；姆较虬l(fā)展。然而，我們?cè)陉P(guān)注公司收購所帶來益處的同時(shí)，還應(yīng)該時(shí)刻謹(jǐn)記其中存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。目標(biāo)公司董事對(duì)收購所采取的態(tài)度，以及提出的收購建議，將直接或間接地影響公司的決策和股東的選擇。如果收購相關(guān)主體，特別是目標(biāo)公司董事，不遵守法律規(guī)定的義務(wù)，公司和股東利益均面臨受損的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 如何有效地規(guī)制目標(biāo)公司董事的行為已經(jīng)成為學(xué)界關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)課題。雖然，《公司法》和《證券法》等法律對(duì)目標(biāo)公司董事義務(wù)有所規(guī)定，也制定了具有參考性的條文，但其中大多數(shù)條文偏于原則性，不足以規(guī)制某些董事行為。因此，筆者認(rèn)為，梳理現(xiàn)行立法體系，并將之予以完善實(shí)屬當(dāng)務(wù)之急。 本文的主要內(nèi)容可以分為三個(gè)部分，遵循著提出問題、分析問題和解決問題的思路。 第一部分以目標(biāo)公司董事義務(wù)的法理分析為切入點(diǎn)，第一章除了介紹當(dāng)前并購市場的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)和并購趨勢外，還闡述了董事在公司收購中所發(fā)揮的作用。在上述分析的基礎(chǔ)上，本文進(jìn)一步指出了目標(biāo)公司中董事行為受到規(guī)制的必要性。 第二部分以分析我國立法為切入點(diǎn)�，F(xiàn)行立法中對(duì)董事義務(wù)的規(guī)定主要集中在《公司法》、《證券法》和《上市公司收購管理辦法》中。本文系統(tǒng)地分析上述法律條文存在的不足，以及這些不足所引發(fā)了的問題。由于缺乏規(guī)制，所引起的問題主要可以分為三個(gè)方面，即董事隨意提起反收購措施，損害股東利益；董事利用管理層收購，侵占公司資產(chǎn)；以及董事未謹(jǐn)慎判斷收購條件，損害公司利益。 第三部分從完善的角度闡述了如何構(gòu)建公司收購中目標(biāo)公司的董事義務(wù)。該章是本文的重點(diǎn)內(nèi)容，主要分為兩個(gè)部分論述。第一部分，重點(diǎn)討論了如何細(xì)化目標(biāo)公司董事的忠實(shí)義務(wù)，本文建議從兩個(gè)方面予以展開，包括反收購之合法性審查，以及管理層收購中利益沖突的規(guī)范。第二部分，重點(diǎn)討論了如何細(xì)化目標(biāo)公司董事的勤勉義務(wù)，本文也同樣建議從兩個(gè)方面入手，包括盡職調(diào)查和披露收購信息，以及爭取最優(yōu)的被收購條件。在談及如何完善具體的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和相應(yīng)規(guī)則時(shí)，，本文還借鑒了美國和中國司法實(shí)踐中的經(jīng)典案例。每個(gè)義務(wù)分析的過程中都以案例為切入點(diǎn)，直觀地予以分析。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of China's capital market, Mergers and acquisitions between companies are becoming more frequent. Before 2005, the size of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies accounted for less than 20 percent of all transactions. The average share between 2006 and 2010 was 48.2011, which climbed to 67.2012. The overall trend of M & A deals in China has turned active, according to statistics from the China Venture capitalization group, showing 3379 deals announced in the Chinese market between January and November 2012, with $266.07 billion in disclosed transactions, up 18 percent from the full year of 2011. Corporate acquisition can not only promote the reorganization of resources, guarantee the competition law of survival of the fittest in the market, but also promote the development of the company in the direction of collectivization. However, we should always keep in mind the risks involved as we look at the benefits of corporate acquisitions. The attitude taken by the directors of the target company towards the acquisition and the takeover proposal will directly or indirectly affect the decision of the company and the choice of shareholders. If the relevant subjects, especially the directors of the target company, fail to comply with their legal obligations, the interests of both the company and the shareholders are at risk. How to effectively regulate the behavior of the directors of target companies has become the focus of academic attention. Although the company law and the securities law have some provisions on the directors' obligations of the target company, and also have some reference provisions, most of the provisions are not enough to regulate some directors' behavior because of their principled nature. Therefore, the author thinks that it is urgent to sort out the current legislative system and perfect it. The main content of this paper can be divided into three parts, following the thinking of problem raising, problem analysis and problem solving. The first part is based on the legal analysis of the directors' obligations of the target company. The first chapter not only introduces the relevant data of the current M & A market and the trend of M & A, but also expounds the role played by the directors in the corporate acquisition. On the basis of the above analysis, this paper further points out the necessity of the regulation of the director's behavior in the target company. The second part analyzes the legislation of our country as the breakthrough point. The current legislation mainly focuses on the company law, the securities law and the measures for the management of the acquisition of listed companies. This paper systematically analyzes the shortcomings of the above-mentioned legal provisions and the problems caused by these deficiencies. Due to the lack of regulation, the problems can be divided into three aspects, namely, the directors put forward anti-takeover measures at will to harm the interests of shareholders, the directors use the MBO to occupy the assets of the company, and the directors do not judge the acquisition conditions carefully. To harm the interests of the company. The third part expounds how to construct the director's obligation of the target company from the angle of perfection. This chapter is the main content of this paper, mainly divided into two parts. The first part focuses on how to refine the duty of loyalty of the directors of the target company. This paper proposes to carry out it from two aspects, including the legality review of anti-takeover and the regulation of conflict of interest in MBO. The second part focuses on how to refine the diligent duty of the directors of the target company. This paper also suggests two aspects, including due diligence and disclosure of acquisition information, and striving for the best conditions of being acquired. When talking about how to perfect the concrete judgment standard and the corresponding rules, this paper also draws lessons from the classic cases in the judicial practice of the United States and China. Each obligation analysis process takes the case as the breakthrough point, intuitively gives the analysis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91;D922.287

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本文編號(hào)：1786857