發(fā)布時間：2018-03-14 00:06

  本文選題：定向增發(fā)　切入點：利益輸送　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：中國證監(jiān)會2006年頒布實施的新《公司法》、《證券法》及《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》重新開啟了上市公司封存近一年的股權(quán)再融資,并為我國定向增發(fā)股權(quán)再融資行為打開了制度之窗,定向增發(fā)也因其顯著優(yōu)于其他股權(quán)再融資方式的寬松的發(fā)行條件、快捷的發(fā)行審批流程及相對低廉的成本等特點成為上市公司股權(quán)再融資中的首選,也成為我國資本市場上最主流的再融資模式。 定向增發(fā)作為新型的融資方式,其發(fā)展時間較短,法律法規(guī)也尚未完善,國內(nèi)理論界的理論及實證研究也沒有形成如國外理論界定向增發(fā)領(lǐng)域的成熟體系,本文通過對定向增發(fā)中最為關(guān)鍵的兩個問題利益輸送及公司績效的實證研究,較全面的分析了定向增發(fā)中折價及定向增發(fā)后關(guān)聯(lián)交易、占款現(xiàn)象中的利益輸送行為,并通過更為全面的財務(wù)指標(biāo)體系衡量定向增發(fā)上市公司中長期綜合績效表現(xiàn),以此檢驗我國定向增發(fā)的實施效果。該研究彌補了國內(nèi)對定向增發(fā)關(guān)聯(lián)交易、占款規(guī)模及中長期公司績效的研究不足,具有一定的實用價值和現(xiàn)實意義。 本文研究后發(fā)現(xiàn),定向增發(fā)中折價問題上存在大股東利益輸送的可能,而定向增發(fā)后上市公司異常關(guān)聯(lián)交易及占款規(guī)模的增加也進(jìn)一步證明大股東存在利用其控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移定向增發(fā)募集資源的可能,此外,本文還發(fā)現(xiàn),定向增發(fā)后上市公司的綜合績效并未改善。兩方面實證結(jié)果表明,在我國現(xiàn)有的資本市場機(jī)制及政策制度背景下,定向增發(fā)未能實現(xiàn)其應(yīng)有的積極意義,不僅沒有實現(xiàn)上市公司長期業(yè)績提升,而且存在大股東通過低價認(rèn)購新股及超常的關(guān)聯(lián)交易、直接占款規(guī)模損害上市公司及未參與增發(fā)中小股東的利益的可能。與此同時,本文也發(fā)現(xiàn),外部投資者的引入可以在上市公司與關(guān)聯(lián)方的關(guān)聯(lián)交易及占款行為監(jiān)督中起到一定的積極作用,但是對上市公司中長期業(yè)績的幫助有限�；谇笆鲅芯拷Y(jié)論,本文相應(yīng)提出了防范上市公司定向增發(fā)過程中利益輸送行為及完善上市公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制等方面的建議。
[Abstract]:The new Company Law promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission on 2006, the Securities Law and the measures for the Administration of Securities issuance of listed companies have re-opened the equity refinancing of listed companies that have been sealed for nearly a year. It also opens the window of the system for the refinancing behavior of China's directionally additional equity, which is obviously superior to the loose issuing conditions of other equity refinancing methods. The characteristics of quick issuance approval process and relatively low cost have become the first choice in equity refinancing of listed companies and the most mainstream refinancing mode in the capital market of our country. As a new type of financing method, the development time of directional additional offering is relatively short, the laws and regulations are not perfect, and the theoretical and empirical research of domestic theoretical circle has not formed a mature system such as that in the field of foreign theory. Based on the empirical study of the two most important issues in the process of directional placement, interest transmission and corporate performance, this paper makes a more comprehensive analysis of the behavior of interest transmission in the phenomenon of interest transmission in private placement and related party transactions after private placement. And through a more comprehensive financial index system to measure the comprehensive performance of the listed companies in order to test the implementation effect of China. Lack of research on the scale of funds and medium-and long-term company performance has certain practical value and practical significance. In this paper, it is found that there is the possibility of the transmission of the interests of large shareholders on the issue of discount in directional placement. However, the abnormal related party transactions and the increase in the amount of money taken by listed companies after the private placement further prove that the large shareholders have the possibility of using their control rights to transfer and raise additional resources. In addition, this paper also finds that, Two empirical results show that under the background of the existing capital market mechanism and policy system in our country, the directional placement has not achieved its due positive significance. Not only has the long-term performance of the listed company not been improved, but there is also the possibility that the large shareholders can directly take up money to harm the interests of the listed company and the minority shareholders who are not participating in the additional issuance by subscribing for new shares at a low price and through extraordinary related party transactions. This paper also finds that the introduction of external investors can play a positive role in the related transactions and the behavior supervision of the related parties between listed companies and related parties, but the help to the long-term performance of listed companies is limited. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to prevent the behavior of interest transmission and how to improve the supervision mechanism of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 李文光;我國上市公司定向增發(fā)發(fā)行對象與發(fā)行折價研究[D];西南財經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

2 孟棟;非現(xiàn)金資產(chǎn)注入大股東行為研究[D];山東財經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：1608724