【摘要】：經(jīng)營者集中或者說企業(yè)合并,往往限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的效果并存。很多國家的反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)采取附條件批準(zhǔn)經(jīng)營者集中,既扶持經(jīng)營者擴(kuò)大經(jīng)營規(guī)模以充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng),又防止破壞市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)而保持市場(chǎng)的創(chuàng)新活力。經(jīng)營者集中附加限制性條件在美國被稱為‘'Merger Remedies"(合并救濟(jì)),實(shí)質(zhì)上,附加限制性條件是合并救濟(jì)或者說經(jīng)營者集中救濟(jì)的一種形式。對(duì)于利弊兼有的經(jīng)營者集中,附加限制性條件批準(zhǔn)是直接禁止和無條件批準(zhǔn)之間的最佳狀態(tài),需遵循必要性、充分性、有效性、消費(fèi)者福利、與產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的協(xié)調(diào)、透明和可預(yù)期性等六項(xiàng)原則。1976年美國《哈特-斯各特-羅迪諾反壟斷改進(jìn)法》的頒行標(biāo)志經(jīng)營者附加限制性條件制度的確立,之后美國在各方面均有所發(fā)展。中國也在2007年《反壟斷法》第29條中確立了該制度。 美國反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)是美國聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會(huì)和司法部反托拉斯局。中國反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)有三家,商務(wù)部反壟斷局具體負(fù)責(zé)經(jīng)營者集中反壟斷審查。美國的私人原告也有執(zhí)法權(quán),其私人執(zhí)行發(fā)達(dá),中國的私人執(zhí)行欠缺。附加限制性條件分為結(jié)構(gòu)性條件和行為性條件,結(jié)構(gòu)性條件被普遍視為優(yōu)先選擇的條件,美國官方多次表明結(jié)構(gòu)性條件的優(yōu)先性,但近年來也有對(duì)行為性條件的肯定。中國在實(shí)踐中對(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)性條件謹(jǐn)慎選用,而對(duì)行為性條件的適用持相對(duì)開放的態(tài)度。條件具體適用時(shí)需要評(píng)估,在具體評(píng)估時(shí),獲取信息和評(píng)估信息是重要工作,方法多樣,市場(chǎng)測(cè)試是常用的方法�？傮w程序構(gòu)造上,美國是司法化的,而中國是行政化的。具體程序?qū)嵤┥?附加限制性條件實(shí)施前先要把條件確定下來,而條件的確定始于條件建議的提出。限制性條件建議一般由交易當(dāng)事人提出,再由執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行評(píng)估、審查。監(jiān)督受托人的設(shè)置是條件實(shí)施時(shí)必不可少的,監(jiān)督受托人需要具備相應(yīng)的資質(zhì),并履行法定職責(zé)。美國明確了監(jiān)督受托人可以由執(zhí)法部門指定的情形,而中國立法缺少對(duì)指定監(jiān)督受托人的規(guī)定。 中國經(jīng)營者集中附加限制性條件制度的立法、執(zhí)法已經(jīng)取得巨大進(jìn)步,但仍存在不足,可以進(jìn)一步完善。比之美國,中國在經(jīng)營者集中附加限制性條件制度存在的不足有：執(zhí)法主體上的私人執(zhí)行不完善,實(shí)體規(guī)范上的行為性條件立法欠缺,程序規(guī)范上的執(zhí)法信息透明度不高、行政裁決程序容易導(dǎo)致執(zhí)法偏離的問題和對(duì)于監(jiān)督受托人選擇的規(guī)定不完善。針對(duì)以上不足,需要在執(zhí)法主體上完善私人執(zhí)行,實(shí)體規(guī)范上完善行為性條件的立法,程序規(guī)范上增加信息透明度,促進(jìn)司法化程序改革和完善監(jiān)督受托人選擇的立法。
[Abstract]:Concentration of operators or merger of enterprises, often restrict competition and promote the effect of competition co-exist. In many countries, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies adopt conditional approval to centralize the operators, which not only supports the operators to expand the scale of operation in order to compete fully, but also prevents the disruption of market competition and maintains the innovation vitality of the market. The restrictive conditions of concentration of operators are called 'Merger Remedies' in the United States. In essence, the additional restrictive conditions are a form of consolidated relief or centralized relief of operators. For the concentration of operators with both pros and cons, approval with restrictive conditions is the best condition between direct prohibition and unconditional approval, and must follow the necessity, adequacy, effectiveness, consumer welfare, and coordination with industrial policies. Six principles of transparency and predictability. After the establishment of the restrictive conditions system for the issuing mark operators of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Monopoly improvement Act in 1976, the United States has developed in all aspects. China also established the system in Article 29 of the Anti-monopoly Law of 2007. The US antitrust enforcement agency is the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Bureau. There are three anti-monopoly enforcement agencies in China, and the Anti-monopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce is specifically responsible for centralized anti-monopoly review of operators. American private plaintiff also has the right to enforce the law, its private execution is developed, and China's private enforcement is lacking. The additional restrictive conditions are divided into structural conditions and behavioral conditions. Structural conditions are generally regarded as the conditions of preference. American officials have repeatedly indicated the priority of structural conditions, but in recent years there has also been a affirmation of behavioural conditions. In practice, China is cautious about structural conditions and relatively open to the application of behavioral conditions. It is important to obtain information and evaluate information when the conditions are applied. Market testing is a commonly used method, and it is very important to obtain information and evaluate information. Overall procedural structure, the United States is judicial, and China is administrative. In the implementation of the specific procedure, the conditions must be determined before the implementation of the additional restrictive conditions, and the determination of the conditions begins with the proposal of the conditions. Restrictive proposal is generally put forward by the parties to the transaction, and then assessed and reviewed by the law enforcement agency. The establishment of supervision trustees is necessary for the implementation of conditions. Supervision trustees need to have the corresponding qualifications and perform their statutory duties. The United States specifies the circumstances in which supervisory trustees can be designated by law enforcement agencies, while Chinese legislation lacks provisions for appointing supervisory trustees. China's legislation on centralizing restrictive conditions for operators has made great progress in law enforcement, but there are still shortcomings that can be further improved. Compared with the United States, there are some deficiencies in the system of imposing restrictive conditions on the concentration of operators in China: the private execution of the main body of law enforcement is imperfect, the legislation of behavioral conditions on substantive norms is lacking, and the transparency of law enforcement information in procedural norms is not high. The administrative adjudication procedure is easy to lead to the problem of law enforcement deviation and the regulation of supervising trustee selection is not perfect. In view of these shortcomings, it is necessary to perfect the legislation of private execution in the subject of law enforcement, to perfect the legislation of behavior condition in the entity norm, to increase the transparency of information in the procedure norm, to promote the reform of judicial procedure and to perfect the legislation of supervising the choice of trustee.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D971.2;D922.294

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