【摘要】：隨著金融市場不斷向縱深發(fā)展,證券期貨違法行為的數(shù)量趨于增多,復(fù)雜程度逐漸提高,但是監(jiān)管執(zhí)法資源很難保持同比例增長。從長期來看,監(jiān)管資源的有限性將是制約監(jiān)管執(zhí)法有效性的重要因素之一。為破解這一難題,美國《多德-弗蘭克法案》引入了向合格舉報者提供10~30%罰沒所得的激勵機(jī)制,建立了"公私協(xié)同,罰沒款分成"的違法查處模式,將大量市場主體轉(zhuǎn)化成私人監(jiān)督者,顯著提高了違法成本,體現(xiàn)了監(jiān)管執(zhí)法的巧實力和杠桿化趨勢,達(dá)到監(jiān)管效能倍增的效果。目前我國監(jiān)管執(zhí)法的有效性與市場規(guī)范運(yùn)行的需要還存在差距,有必要學(xué)習(xí)和借鑒這一思路。
[Abstract]:With the further development of financial market, the number of illegal activities of securities and futures tends to increase, and the complexity increases gradually, but it is difficult to maintain the same proportion of regulatory and law enforcement resources. In the long run, the limitation of regulatory resources will be one of the important factors restricting the effectiveness of regulatory law enforcement. In order to solve this problem, the Dodd-Frank Act of the United States introduced an incentive mechanism to provide 1030% of the confiscated income to eligible whistleblowers, and established an illegal investigation and punishment model of "public and private cooperation, sharing of fines". The transformation of a large number of market subjects into private supervisors has significantly increased the illegal cost, reflected the skillful strength and the trend of leverage of supervision and law enforcement, and achieved the effect of multiplying the effectiveness of supervision. At present, there is still a gap between the effectiveness of supervision and law enforcement and the need of market norm operation in China, so it is necessary to study and learn from this train of thought.
【作者單位】： 中國金融期貨交易所;
【分類號】：D971.2;DD912.28
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本文編號：2180974