法律解釋范式下的立法者意圖
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-23 20:20
【摘要】：20世紀(jì)60年代以來,西方哲學(xué)解釋學(xué)的轉(zhuǎn)向也帶來了法律解釋范式由方法論范式向本體論的轉(zhuǎn)向。本體論范式下的法律解釋理論在對傳統(tǒng)方法論范式進(jìn)行批判的同時,突出了法律解釋者的主體性,試圖以詮釋的視角發(fā)現(xiàn)法律文本之意義。但是這種法律解釋范式卻存在著自身不可避免的缺陷,在理論和實(shí)踐之中不斷消融著立法權(quán)與司法權(quán)之間的分權(quán)界限,將法律解釋的概念泛化,模糊了法律解釋與法律續(xù)造的區(qū)別,進(jìn)而動搖了傳統(tǒng)以來人們對立法權(quán)威信仰的基礎(chǔ)。本文就是在這一背景下,以立法者意圖作為切入點(diǎn),窺視在不同范式下法律解釋的目標(biāo)和方法,以期通過理論的建構(gòu)來解決法律權(quán)威性的來源、明確司法權(quán)與立法權(quán)之間關(guān)系以及法律解釋不同方法及目的等問題。本文主要從五個部分進(jìn)行論述： 第一部分主要論述在哲學(xué)詮釋學(xué)影響下法律解釋學(xué)研究范式的歷史發(fā)展。這一部分主要采用文獻(xiàn)研究的方法,就哲學(xué)解釋學(xué)對中西方法理學(xué)領(lǐng)域中的影響做一個脈絡(luò)上的梳理,概括了目前理論界的兩種基本法律解釋學(xué)研究范式,并對這兩種基本范式的思維方式和研究分歧點(diǎn)做了詳細(xì)地論述。 第二部分主要涉及對法律解釋學(xué)的本體論范式的批判性思考。這一部分提出本體論范式下的法律解釋學(xué)在立法與司法領(lǐng)域產(chǎn)生的理論問題,本體論范式下的解釋學(xué)忽視了法律文本本身的權(quán)威性,模糊了立法與司法分立的界限,容易導(dǎo)致主觀主義和相對主義之中。在法律解釋領(lǐng)域?qū)τ谡_性的訴求并不能取代權(quán)威性的存在。因而法律解釋學(xué)應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持在法律文本的意義框架內(nèi)尋找裁判標(biāo)準(zhǔn),以維護(hù)立法者意圖的權(quán)威作為解釋使命。 第三部分著重對立法者意圖的概念進(jìn)行探討。筆者在第三章主要分析了目前理論界對立法意圖的兩種思考路徑即解構(gòu)式路徑和重構(gòu)式路徑。試圖通過對這兩種路徑的分析來明晰“立法者意圖”在法律解釋范式下存在的根本問題。解構(gòu)式的路徑通過將立法者以及立法者的意圖虛無化,將立法者意圖進(jìn)行了解構(gòu)。這種帶有后現(xiàn)代主義色彩的思考方式對法治的確定性、普遍性提出挑戰(zhàn)。重構(gòu)式的路徑在肯定立法者意圖存在的基礎(chǔ)上,對其進(jìn)行了想象性重構(gòu),力圖實(shí)現(xiàn)法律的統(tǒng)一性。但是這一路徑卻并沒有將立法者的意圖放到合適的位置上。針對前面章節(jié)所述的問題,筆者在第四章所對“立法者的意圖”這一概念進(jìn)行了理論的建構(gòu),以歷史上的立法者與權(quán)威的立法者的區(qū)分為理論基點(diǎn),將立法者的意圖視為是立法者希望將現(xiàn)實(shí)的社會關(guān)系調(diào)整到最佳狀態(tài)的意圖。 第四部分則主要論述立法原意在法律解釋范式下的定位及法律解釋方法中存在的問題。立法意圖既與法律解釋的目標(biāo)相關(guān)聯(lián),也與法律解釋的方法問題相關(guān)聯(lián)。由于長期以來學(xué)界缺乏對立法者意圖的清晰定位和詳細(xì)探討,就導(dǎo)致了在法律解釋的方法中出現(xiàn)了解釋目的與解釋手段的混同等問題,這些問題的存在也在某種程度上損害了法律的權(quán)威性。筆者認(rèn)為,法律解釋的目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是追求立法者的意圖,而法律解釋學(xué)的方法論就是圍繞這一目標(biāo)進(jìn)行的為了實(shí)現(xiàn)法治的確定性,維護(hù)法律權(quán)威,法律解釋則必須作為一種方法論的范式。
[Abstract]:Since the 1960s, the shift of Western philosophical hermeneutics has also brought the paradigm shift from the methodology paradigm to the ontology. The theory of legal interpretation under the ontology paradigm criticized the traditional methodology paradigm and highlighted the subjectivity of the legal interpreter, trying to find the meaning of the legal text in an explanatory perspective. However, this kind of legal interpretation paradigm has its own inevitable defects. It dissolves the dividing line between legislative power and judicial power in theory and practice, generalizes the concept of legal interpretation, blurs the difference between legal interpretation and legal continuation, and thus shaken the foundation of the traditional people's belief in the authority of the legislation. In this context, in this context, the purpose and method of legal interpretation under different paradigms is peered out with the intention of legislators to be seen in order to solve the source of legal authority through the construction of the theory, to clarify the relationship between the judicial power and the legislative power, as well as the different methods and aims of the legal interpretation. This article is mainly carried out from five parts. Discuss:
The first part mainly discusses the historical development of the research paradigm of legal hermeneutics under the influence of philosophical hermeneutics. This part mainly uses the method of literature research to sort out the influence of philosophical hermeneutics on the field of Chinese and western jurisprudence, and summarizes the two basic legal hermeneutics paradigms of the current theoretical circles. These two basic paradigms of thinking and research differences are discussed in detail.
The second part mainly involves critical thinking about the ontological paradigm of legal hermeneutics. This part puts forward the theoretical problems arising from the legal hermeneutics in the field of law and Judicature under the paradigm of ontology. The hermeneutics under the paradigm of ontology ignores the authority of the legal text itself, blurs the boundary between legislative and judicial separation and is easy to guide. In the context of subjectivism and relativism, the demand for correctness in the field of legal interpretation does not replace the existence of authority. Therefore, legal hermeneutics should adhere to the standard of judgment in the framework of the meaning of the legal text, and to safeguard the authority of the legislator's intention as a mission of interpretation.
The third part focuses on the discussion of the concept of the intention of the legislator. In the third chapter, the author mainly analyzes the two ways of thinking about the legislative intent, namely, the deconstruction path and the reconstructive path in the current theoretical circle. The author tries to clarify the fundamental problems of the "legislators' intention" in the legal interpretation paradigm through the analysis of the two paths. The path of construction is deconstructed by the nihilism of the legislator and the legislator's intention. The way of thinking with the postmodernism color poses a challenge to the certainty and universality of the rule of law. On the basis of affirming the existence of the legislator, the reconstructive path tries to realize its imagination and try to realize it. However, this path does not put the intention of the legislator in the right position. In view of the problems mentioned in the preceding chapter, the author constructs the concept of "the intention of the legislator" in the fourth chapter, taking the distinction between the legislator and the authority of the legislator as the theoretical basis and the legislator. Intention is seen as the legislator's intention to adjust real social relations to the best possible state.
The fourth part mainly discusses the position of legislative original meaning under the legal interpretation paradigm and the existing problems in the method of legal interpretation. The legislative intention is related to the objective of the legal interpretation, but also related to the method of legal interpretation. In the method of legal interpretation, there are problems of the ambiguity of the interpretation purpose and the means of interpretation. The existence of these problems also damages the authority of the law to some extent. The author thinks that the aim of the legal interpretation should be to pursue the intention of the legislator, and the methodology of legal hermeneutics is to carry out the rule of law around this goal. In order to maintain the authority of law, legal interpretation must be a paradigm of methodology.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D90
本文編號：2140534
[Abstract]:Since the 1960s, the shift of Western philosophical hermeneutics has also brought the paradigm shift from the methodology paradigm to the ontology. The theory of legal interpretation under the ontology paradigm criticized the traditional methodology paradigm and highlighted the subjectivity of the legal interpreter, trying to find the meaning of the legal text in an explanatory perspective. However, this kind of legal interpretation paradigm has its own inevitable defects. It dissolves the dividing line between legislative power and judicial power in theory and practice, generalizes the concept of legal interpretation, blurs the difference between legal interpretation and legal continuation, and thus shaken the foundation of the traditional people's belief in the authority of the legislation. In this context, in this context, the purpose and method of legal interpretation under different paradigms is peered out with the intention of legislators to be seen in order to solve the source of legal authority through the construction of the theory, to clarify the relationship between the judicial power and the legislative power, as well as the different methods and aims of the legal interpretation. This article is mainly carried out from five parts. Discuss:
The first part mainly discusses the historical development of the research paradigm of legal hermeneutics under the influence of philosophical hermeneutics. This part mainly uses the method of literature research to sort out the influence of philosophical hermeneutics on the field of Chinese and western jurisprudence, and summarizes the two basic legal hermeneutics paradigms of the current theoretical circles. These two basic paradigms of thinking and research differences are discussed in detail.
The second part mainly involves critical thinking about the ontological paradigm of legal hermeneutics. This part puts forward the theoretical problems arising from the legal hermeneutics in the field of law and Judicature under the paradigm of ontology. The hermeneutics under the paradigm of ontology ignores the authority of the legal text itself, blurs the boundary between legislative and judicial separation and is easy to guide. In the context of subjectivism and relativism, the demand for correctness in the field of legal interpretation does not replace the existence of authority. Therefore, legal hermeneutics should adhere to the standard of judgment in the framework of the meaning of the legal text, and to safeguard the authority of the legislator's intention as a mission of interpretation.
The third part focuses on the discussion of the concept of the intention of the legislator. In the third chapter, the author mainly analyzes the two ways of thinking about the legislative intent, namely, the deconstruction path and the reconstructive path in the current theoretical circle. The author tries to clarify the fundamental problems of the "legislators' intention" in the legal interpretation paradigm through the analysis of the two paths. The path of construction is deconstructed by the nihilism of the legislator and the legislator's intention. The way of thinking with the postmodernism color poses a challenge to the certainty and universality of the rule of law. On the basis of affirming the existence of the legislator, the reconstructive path tries to realize its imagination and try to realize it. However, this path does not put the intention of the legislator in the right position. In view of the problems mentioned in the preceding chapter, the author constructs the concept of "the intention of the legislator" in the fourth chapter, taking the distinction between the legislator and the authority of the legislator as the theoretical basis and the legislator. Intention is seen as the legislator's intention to adjust real social relations to the best possible state.
The fourth part mainly discusses the position of legislative original meaning under the legal interpretation paradigm and the existing problems in the method of legal interpretation. The legislative intention is related to the objective of the legal interpretation, but also related to the method of legal interpretation. In the method of legal interpretation, there are problems of the ambiguity of the interpretation purpose and the means of interpretation. The existence of these problems also damages the authority of the law to some extent. The author thinks that the aim of the legal interpretation should be to pursue the intention of the legislator, and the methodology of legal hermeneutics is to carry out the rule of law around this goal. In order to maintain the authority of law, legal interpretation must be a paradigm of methodology.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D90
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條
1 雷磊;;再論法律解釋的目標(biāo)——德國主/客觀說之爭的剖析與整合[J];環(huán)球法律評論;2010年06期
2 陳金釗;哲學(xué)解釋學(xué)與法律解釋學(xué)——《真理與方法》對法學(xué)的啟示[J];現(xiàn)代法學(xué);2001年01期
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