本文選題：媒體類型 + 媒體關(guān)注��； 參考：《河南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：由于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的發(fā)展,股份制經(jīng)歷了優(yōu)勝劣汰后成為現(xiàn)今最普遍的公司組織形式。股份制公司的確有比較高的經(jīng)營效率,然而由于所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離產(chǎn)生了管理學(xué)中一個重要的分支——委托代理理論,由此導(dǎo)致的代理問題也成為了學(xué)術(shù)研究的重點(diǎn)關(guān)注領(lǐng)域。如何解決委托代理關(guān)系雙方利益沖突導(dǎo)致的代理成本問題一直是學(xué)者們研究的熱點(diǎn),許多學(xué)者都就優(yōu)化公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、改善對管理者的激勵機(jī)制等方面提出了建議。這些措施有一定的積極效果,但是隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,上市公司的外部生存環(huán)境越來越復(fù)雜,市場競爭愈發(fā)激烈,僅僅通過公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化,無法達(dá)到預(yù)期的治理效果,因此結(jié)合外部治理機(jī)制來共同解決代理問題成為了一個新的思路。在西方國家中,媒體一直被認(rèn)為是是獨(dú)立于司法、立法和行政權(quán)利外的“第四權(quán)”,媒體在外部對公司治理的作用很早就有西方學(xué)者進(jìn)行探究,他們對媒體在市場外部起到的監(jiān)督作用給予了肯定,而且有學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn)在轉(zhuǎn)型國家中,媒體發(fā)揮的積極作用更加明顯。在我國現(xiàn)有的法律環(huán)境下,隨著媒體在曝光公司問題、反腐反貪等方面越來越亮眼的表現(xiàn),媒體發(fā)揮的獨(dú)立的監(jiān)督作用也受到了學(xué)者們的廣泛關(guān)注。媒體通過對信息的挖掘、加工與廣泛傳播,可以降低企業(yè)利益相關(guān)者與經(jīng)營者間的信息不對稱程度,使股東、投資者等獲得更多的信息,做出合理的投資決策。此外,媒體所造成的輿論效果也可以觸發(fā)市場聲譽(yù)機(jī)制,使企業(yè)管理人員減少不當(dāng)行為。媒體還可以通過問題曝光與輿論壓力引起行政監(jiān)督管理部門的介入,使企業(yè)迫于行政壓力改正違規(guī)行為。通過這些機(jī)制,媒體關(guān)注就可以達(dá)到降低公司代理成本的效果,而且由于科技的進(jìn)步與網(wǎng)絡(luò)的普及,媒體的傳播渠道更為完善,類型更加豐富,除了以往對四大傳統(tǒng)媒體的分類外,網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體異軍突起,已經(jīng)成為了現(xiàn)今不可忽視的媒體力量。因此本文對媒體類型進(jìn)行了細(xì)分,把網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體的影響力考慮在內(nèi),將媒體分為網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體、政策導(dǎo)向媒體和市場導(dǎo)向媒體,以期更加深入地了解各類型媒體的影響機(jī)制以及對上市公司代理成本的作用。通過對2010-2013年上海證券交易所主板A股上市的公司進(jìn)行取樣研究,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了媒體關(guān)注度、媒體類型與代理成本之間的關(guān)系。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,媒體關(guān)注對上市公司的代理成本有明顯降低作用。而不同類型的媒體,作用效果確實(shí)各有不同。網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體可以顯著減低全樣本公司的代理成本,但是市場導(dǎo)向媒體和政策導(dǎo)向媒體對于全樣本的代理成本并無明顯影響�？紤]到企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)不同,本研究又針對國有企業(yè)、民營企業(yè)進(jìn)行了分組檢驗(yàn),實(shí)證結(jié)果表明政策導(dǎo)向媒體對國有企業(yè)代理成本有顯著降低作用,市場導(dǎo)向媒體對民營企業(yè)代理成本有顯著降低作用。因此,本文認(rèn)為媒體可以作為公司治理的一種外部手段降低企業(yè)代理成本,并且我們應(yīng)該合理利用不同類型的媒體使之充分發(fā)揮監(jiān)督作用,提升公司的治理效率。
[Abstract]:Due to the development of modern enterprises, the shareholding system has experienced the survival of the fittest and became the most common form of corporate organization. The shareholding company does have a relatively high operating efficiency. However, the separation of ownership and management rights has produced an important branch of management, the principal-agent theory, which has led to the problem of agency. It is the focus of academic research. How to solve the agency cost problem caused by the conflict of interests between principal and agent relationship has always been a hot spot of research by scholars. Many scholars have put forward some suggestions on optimizing the corporate governance structure and improving the incentive mechanism of managers. With the development of the economy, the external living environment of the listed companies is becoming more and more complex and the market competition is becoming more and more intense. Only through the optimization of the internal governance structure of the company, it is unable to achieve the desired effect of governance. Therefore, it becomes a new idea to solve the agency problem jointly with the external governance mechanism. In the western countries, the media have been considered to be the same Independent of the "fourth powers", independent of the judicial, legislative and administrative rights, the role of the media in the external governance of the company has long been explored by western scholars. They affirm the supervisory role of the media in the market, and some scholars have found that the active role of the media is more obvious in the countries in transition. Under the legal environment, as the media has become more and more attractive in exposing the company's problems and anti corruption and anti corruption, the independent supervision of the media has also been widely concerned by the scholars. Through the mining of information, the processing and extensive dissemination of the information can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the stakeholders and the operators. In addition, the public opinion effect caused by the media can also trigger the market reputation mechanism and reduce the improper behavior of the enterprise managers. The media can also expose the pressure of public opinion to the administrative supervision department and make the enterprise under administrative pressure. Through these mechanisms, media attention can achieve the effect of reducing the agency cost of the company, and because of the progress of science and technology and the popularization of the network, the media's communication channel is more perfect and the type is more abundant. In addition to the previous classification of the four traditional media, the network media has become the present cannot be ignored. Therefore, this article subdivides the media type, takes the influence of the network media into consideration, divides the media into the network media, the policy oriented media and the market oriented media, in order to know more deeply about the influence mechanism of various types of media and the role of the agency cost of the listed companies. Through the 2010-2013 year Shanghai A sampling study of A shares listed on the main board of the stock exchange is conducted to examine the relationship between media attention, media type and agency cost. The empirical results show that media attention has a significant reduction in the agency cost of listed companies. The agency cost of the whole Sample Firms is low, but the market oriented media and the policy oriented media have no obvious influence on the agency cost of the whole sample. Considering the different property rights of the enterprises, this study also makes a grouping test for the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. The empirical results show that the policy oriented media has a significant cost to the state-owned enterprises. In this paper, the media can reduce the agency cost of corporate governance as an external means of corporate governance, and we should make use of different types of media to give full play to the supervision and improve the efficiency of corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：G206;F275

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