本文關(guān)鍵詞： 媒體關(guān)注 業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī) 內(nèi)部控制 公司治理　出處：《西北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：無(wú)論是工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)的傳統(tǒng)媒體,還是當(dāng)今移動(dòng)互聯(lián)時(shí)代的網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體,媒體關(guān)注均作為一種外部因素,對(duì)社會(huì)生活帶來(lái)廣泛的影響。媒體關(guān)注依托報(bào)紙、網(wǎng)絡(luò)為主的信息載體,以聲譽(yù)機(jī)制為傳遞渠道,使其具有正面效應(yīng)和負(fù)面效應(yīng),改變了信息不對(duì)稱的現(xiàn)狀。媒體通過(guò)披露上市公司的“好消息”和“壞消息”,警示經(jīng)理人謹(jǐn)慎地進(jìn)行業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告,進(jìn)而改善企業(yè)的治理環(huán)境。那么,業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)作為公司治理的關(guān)鍵要素之一,正、負(fù)面媒體關(guān)注究竟對(duì)其具有怎樣的治理效果?媒體在企業(yè)的內(nèi)部控制環(huán)節(jié)能夠發(fā)揮外部監(jiān)督作用,作為內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制,內(nèi)部控制能否增強(qiáng)媒體關(guān)注對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)的影響?這些問(wèn)題值得深入探討。本文選取2012-2015年我國(guó)應(yīng)進(jìn)行業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告的A股上市公司為研究樣本,從委托代理、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和信號(hào)傳遞等理論出發(fā),分析了媒體關(guān)注、內(nèi)部控制與業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)的關(guān)系。具體采用Logit模型和邏輯回歸的方法,基于內(nèi)部控制的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng),實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)媒體關(guān)注對(duì)上市公司業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)的影響。并且,通過(guò)分組回歸的比較分析法驗(yàn)證正、負(fù)面媒體關(guān)注所發(fā)揮的不同治理作用,以及媒體關(guān)注對(duì)兩種類(lèi)型的業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)所產(chǎn)生的不同治理效果,強(qiáng)調(diào)了企業(yè)謹(jǐn)慎進(jìn)行業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告的重要性。研究結(jié)果顯示:(1)媒體關(guān)注能夠抑制上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)行為;(2)內(nèi)部控制越完善,媒體關(guān)注對(duì)上市公司業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)行為的抑制作用越顯著;(3)相對(duì)于正面媒體關(guān)注而言,負(fù)面媒體關(guān)注對(duì)上市公司業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)的抑制作用更強(qiáng);(4)與“好消息”型業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)相比,媒體關(guān)注對(duì)“壞消息”型業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)告違規(guī)行為的抑制作用更為顯著。本文從媒體關(guān)注的角度出發(fā),為監(jiān)管部門(mén)制度建設(shè)與執(zhí)行提供了新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù),同時(shí)敦促企業(yè)努力完善內(nèi)部控制體系、提高公司治理的水平。
[Abstract]:Whether it is the traditional media of industrial economy or the network media in the era of mobile interconnection, media attention, as an external factor, has a wide impact on social life. Media concern depends on newspapers. The network based information carrier takes reputation mechanism as the transmission channel, makes it have positive and negative effects, and changes the status quo of information asymmetry. The media disclose the "good news" and "bad news" of listed companies. Warning managers to carefully carry out performance forecasting, and then improve the corporate governance environment. Then, as one of the key elements of corporate governance, performance forecasting violations are positive. What is the governance effect of negative media attention? Media in the internal control of enterprises can play an external oversight role, as an internal governance mechanism, internal control can enhance media attention to the impact of performance notice violations? These problems are worthy of further discussion. This paper selects the A-share listed companies which should carry on the performance forecast from 2012-2015 as the research sample, starts from the principal-agent, reputation mechanism and signal transmission theory. This paper analyzes the relationship between media concern, internal control and performance forecast violation. It uses Logit model and logical regression method, based on the internal control regulation effect. Empirical test of the media concern on the performance of listed companies reported violations of the impact. And through the comparative analysis of group regression to verify the positive and negative media concerns play different governance roles. As well as the media attention to the two types of performance notice violations of the different governance effects. The research results show that the media attention can restrain the behavior of the listed companies. (2) the more perfect the internal control, the more significant the restraining effect of media attention to the listed company's performance forecast violation; Compared with the positive media attention, the negative media attention has a stronger restraining effect on the listed companies' performance forecast violation; Compared with the "good news" type performance forecast violation, the media concern has a more significant inhibitory effect on the "bad news" type performance forecast violation behavior. This article starts from the media concern angle. It provides new empirical evidence for the construction and implementation of regulatory system and urges enterprises to improve the internal control system and improve the level of corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：G206;F832.51;F275
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本文編號(hào)：1459348