本文選題：雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) + 一股一權(quán)��； 參考：《海南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：為了解決國內(nèi)企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人對公司強(qiáng)烈的控制欲望和融資需求之間日益加劇的矛盾,國內(nèi)如百度、京東、阿里巴巴等知名企業(yè)紛紛選擇在美國證券交易所完成IPO,體現(xiàn)了同股同權(quán)已經(jīng)無法滿足我國部分企業(yè)的融資需求。然而雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下存在的復(fù)數(shù)表決權(quán)股與一般表決權(quán)股股東利益失衡問題可能導(dǎo)致股東權(quán)益受損,以及我國有待完善的公司治理配套制度,使得我國引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)面臨困難。本文為研究雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下存在的股東利益失衡問題,通過觀察國外政府和上市公司的應(yīng)對措施,即如何通過限制復(fù)數(shù)表決權(quán)股的發(fā)行方式和流轉(zhuǎn)渠道、為復(fù)數(shù)表決權(quán)股所附著的表決權(quán)設(shè)定最高上限等手段來均衡不同類別股股東的利益,并結(jié)合我國已有法律規(guī)范和證券市場實踐,最終為我國在引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時如何保護(hù)股東權(quán)益提出建議。本文分為四個部分,具體內(nèi)容分述如下:第一部分闡述了雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的含義、特征及常見的表現(xiàn)形式,認(rèn)定其本質(zhì)是公司通過發(fā)行復(fù)數(shù)表決權(quán)股將表決權(quán)集中在特定股東手中,以達(dá)到控制公司的目的的工具。第二部分對我國引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行利弊分析。引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對我國的有益性主要體現(xiàn)為:1.雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠解決股東"異質(zhì)化"現(xiàn)實與一股一權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)之間的供給錯位;2.雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的引入能夠更好的滿足我國企業(yè)的融資需求;3.雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠為企業(yè)家發(fā)揮創(chuàng)新精神保駕護(hù)航。而引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對我國可能造成的不利影響主要來源于該結(jié)構(gòu)本身存在的股東利益失衡問題,主要包括:1.損害了一般表決權(quán)股持有人的表決能力;2.降低了控制股東的表決意愿;3.增加了股東的投資風(fēng)險。第三部分通過觀察雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的域外實踐,陳述了美國、法國、日本和加拿大為保護(hù)股東權(quán)利免受雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)弊端的侵害,通過立法、證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)以及上市公司自身對復(fù)數(shù)表決權(quán)股的發(fā)行、流轉(zhuǎn)和表決權(quán)倍數(shù)進(jìn)行限制,希望對我國的制度建設(shè)有借鑒意義。第四部分闡述了我國引入雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時,應(yīng)以有限授權(quán)為設(shè)計思路,以保護(hù)股東權(quán)益為目的,從制度設(shè)計和完善配套制度建設(shè)這兩個角度對我國構(gòu)建雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)時如何保護(hù)股東權(quán)利提出建議。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the growing contradiction between the strong desire of the founders of domestic enterprises to control the company and the need for financing, domestic companies such as Baidu, JingDong, Alibaba and other well-known enterprises have chosen to complete IPOs on the American Stock Exchange, which shows that the same share and equal rights can no longer meet the financing needs of some enterprises in China. However, the imbalance between the interests of the multiple voting shares and that of the general voting shares under the dual ownership structure may lead to the loss of shareholders' rights and interests, as well as the system of corporate governance that needs to be improved in our country. It is difficult to introduce dual ownership structure into our country. In order to study the unbalance of shareholders' interests under the dual ownership structure, this paper observes the countermeasures of foreign governments and listed companies, that is, how to restrict the issuance and circulation channels of plural voting shares. Setting the highest upper limit for the voting rights attached to the plural voting shares to balance the interests of the shareholders of different classes of shares, and combining the existing legal norms and securities market practices in our country, Finally, the author puts forward some suggestions on how to protect shareholders' rights and interests when introducing dual ownership structure. This paper is divided into four parts, the specific contents are as follows: the first part describes the meaning, characteristics and common forms of dual ownership structure. The essence of it is that the company concentrates its voting rights in the hands of specific shareholders by issuing plural voting shares in order to achieve the purpose of controlling the company. The second part analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of introducing dual ownership structure in China. The beneficial effect of introducing dual ownership structure to our country is as follows: 1. Dual ownership structure can solve the "heterogeneity" reality of shareholders and the supply dislocation between one share and one right structure. The introduction of dual equity structure can better meet the financing needs of Chinese enterprises. Dual ownership structure can protect entrepreneurs to play innovative spirit. The possible adverse effects of the introduction of dual ownership structure on China are mainly due to the imbalance of shareholders' interests in the structure itself, mainly including 1: 1. Damage to the voting ability of the general voting share holders. Reduced the voting willingness of controlling shareholders. Increased investment risk for shareholders. The third part states that the United States, France, Japan and Canada adopt legislation to protect shareholders' rights from the abuse of dual equity structure by observing the extraterritorial practice of dual ownership structure. The securities regulatory bodies and listed companies themselves restrict the issuance, circulation and multiple of voting rights of the plural voting shares, hoping that they can be used for reference in the system construction of our country. The fourth part expounds that when introducing dual ownership structure in our country, we should take limited authorization as the design idea and protect the rights and interests of shareholders. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to protect the rights of shareholders in the construction of dual ownership structure from the two angles of system design and perfect supporting system construction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：海南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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