本文選題：基層紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察　切入點(diǎn)：反腐敗　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：十八大以來(lái),面對(duì)錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的國(guó)際形勢(shì)以及我國(guó)全面深化改革邁入關(guān)鍵階段的新形勢(shì),黨和政府高度重視反腐倡廉工作,各級(jí)紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān)不僅打"老虎",還拍"蒼蠅",持續(xù)強(qiáng)化震懾作用,堅(jiān)決遏制腐敗的蔓延,取得了一定的成效。但反腐斗爭(zhēng)是一場(chǎng)持久戰(zhàn),必須不斷完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī),加大處罰力度,建立長(zhǎng)效監(jiān)督機(jī)制,才能確保反腐敗能夠持續(xù)有效。中央紀(jì)委屢屢公布的各項(xiàng)反腐工作數(shù)據(jù)舉世矚目,但不應(yīng)忽視這些數(shù)據(jù)背后凝聚著大量基層紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察干部的智慧和汗水。要想建立健全反腐機(jī)制,履行好紀(jì)檢機(jī)關(guān)監(jiān)督責(zé)任,就必須走進(jìn)基層紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān),深入分析紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察干部在日常工作遇到的問(wèn)題和困難,并采取科學(xué)合理和操作性強(qiáng)的解決措施。本文通過(guò)查閱資料文獻(xiàn),分析紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān)的基本職責(zé)以及一般工作流程。面對(duì)宏觀(guān)環(huán)境的變化,從國(guó)際國(guó)內(nèi)新形勢(shì)、反腐倡廉新特點(diǎn)、中央紀(jì)委新思路等角度分析十八大以來(lái)反腐廉政的新常態(tài)。通過(guò)分析中央紀(jì)委監(jiān)察部通報(bào)的各項(xiàng)數(shù)據(jù)和典型案例,凸顯了當(dāng)前紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察圍繞著提高群眾滿(mǎn)意度,重點(diǎn)整肅基層干部"四風(fēng)"問(wèn)題,重點(diǎn)查處基層干部違規(guī)違紀(jì)問(wèn)題。通過(guò)實(shí)證分析A縣紀(jì)委監(jiān)察局的機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置及績(jī)效考核等工作情況,可以發(fā)現(xiàn)基層紀(jì)檢部門(mén)的工作重心由抓大案開(kāi)始向抓黨風(fēng)進(jìn)行調(diào)整。但基層紀(jì)檢仍存在較大信訪(fǎng)壓力,群眾工作瑣碎繁雜,以及鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)紀(jì)委監(jiān)督不力等問(wèn)題。信訪(fǎng)工作方面的問(wèn)題,主要表現(xiàn)在舉報(bào)方式傳統(tǒng)、重復(fù)和越級(jí)舉報(bào)高居不下以及信訪(fǎng)成案率不高。鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)紀(jì)檢隊(duì)伍配置薄弱、鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)紀(jì)檢工作缺乏獨(dú)立性、農(nóng)村干部監(jiān)察困難等因素,導(dǎo)致鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察長(zhǎng)期監(jiān)督失位失效。從宏觀(guān)機(jī)制上看,我國(guó)反腐機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置不合理,存在職責(zé)分工不清、缺乏有效協(xié)同合作以及紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察雙重領(lǐng)導(dǎo)等問(wèn)題�；鶎蛹o(jì)檢監(jiān)察機(jī)關(guān)工作任務(wù)繁重,由于職務(wù)晉升通道不暢和工作成就感不高,基層紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察干部的工作幸福感并不高。最后,建議有關(guān)機(jī)關(guān)從合并成立唯一反腐機(jī)構(gòu)、簡(jiǎn)化基層紀(jì)檢工作程序、多舉措強(qiáng)化鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)紀(jì)委的監(jiān)督職責(zé)、全方面打造人民紀(jì)檢衛(wèi)士和完善基層紀(jì)檢隊(duì)伍激勵(lì)等角度,改善基層紀(jì)檢監(jiān)察工作。
[Abstract]:Since the 18 National Congress, the Party and the government have attached great importance to the work of combating corruption and promoting honesty in the face of the complicated international situation and the new situation in which China's comprehensive deepening of reform has entered a critical stage. Discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels not only beat "tigers" but also "flies", continued to strengthen the deterrent role, resolutely curb the spread of corruption, and achieved certain results. But the anti-corruption struggle is a protracted battle, and we must constantly improve relevant laws and regulations. Only by increasing penalties and establishing a long-term supervisory mechanism can we ensure that anti-corruption efforts can be sustained and effective. The data on anti-corruption work published repeatedly by the Central discipline Inspection Commission have attracted worldwide attention. However, we should not ignore the wisdom and sweat of a large number of grass-roots discipline inspection and supervisory cadres behind these data. If we want to establish and improve the anti-corruption mechanism and fulfill the supervisory responsibility of discipline inspection organs, we must go into the grass-roots discipline inspection and supervision organs. The problems and difficulties encountered by discipline inspection and supervision cadres in their daily work are deeply analyzed, and scientific, reasonable and operable solutions are taken. Analyzing the basic duties and general work flow of discipline inspection and supervision organs. In the face of the changes in the macro environment, from the new international and domestic situation, the new features of combating corruption and advocating clean government, The new ideas of the Central Commission for discipline Inspection have analyzed the new normal situation of anti-corruption and clean government since the 18 Congress. Through the analysis of the data and typical cases reported by the Central discipline Inspection and Supervision Department, it is highlighted that the current discipline inspection and supervision work revolves around improving the satisfaction of the masses. Focusing on the "four styles" of eliminating grassroots cadres, focusing on the investigation and handling of violations of discipline by grass-roots cadres. Through an empirical analysis of the institutional setup and performance appraisal of the Supervision Bureau of County A Disciplinary Commission, It can be found that the focus of the work of the grass-roots discipline inspection departments has been adjusted from grasping the major cases to the party style. However, there is still greater pressure on the basic discipline inspection departments to submit letters and visits, and the mass work is trivial and complicated. As well as the lack of supervision by the Township discipline Inspection Commission. The problems in the work of letters and visits are mainly manifested in the traditional way of reporting, repeated and leapfrogging reports, and the low rate of successful cases of letters and visits. The allocation of discipline inspection teams in villages and towns is weak. The lack of independence in the discipline inspection work in villages and towns, the difficulties in the supervision of rural cadres, and other factors lead to the long-term failure of supervision of discipline inspection and supervision in villages and towns. From the macro mechanism point of view, the establishment of anti-corruption institutions in China is unreasonable, and the division of duties and responsibilities is not clear. Lack of effective cooperation and dual leadership in discipline inspection and supervision. The work tasks of the discipline inspection and supervision organs at the grass-roots level are heavy. Due to the lack of channels for promotion and a low sense of job achievement, the work happiness of the grass-roots discipline inspection and supervision cadres is not high. Finally, From the angles of merging and setting up a sole anti-corruption agency, simplifying the procedures of discipline inspection at the grass-roots level, strengthening the supervisory responsibilities of the township discipline inspection committees, building up the people's discipline inspection guards in all aspects, and perfecting the incentives of the discipline inspection team at the grass-roots level, it is suggested that the relevant organs should, We will improve discipline inspection and supervision at the grass-roots level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D262.6

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