【摘要】：改革開(kāi)放以來(lái),雖然中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)取得了舉世矚目的成就,但是由于驅(qū)動(dòng)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的主要因素是高投資與高儲(chǔ)蓄,而非資源的有效利用和技術(shù)創(chuàng)新。這使得不少學(xué)者對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的持續(xù)性感到擔(dān)憂。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展方式從“要素驅(qū)動(dòng)”向“創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動(dòng)”的轉(zhuǎn)變,中國(guó)在企業(yè)創(chuàng)新方面投入了大量資源,政府也出臺(tái)了不少鼓勵(lì)和支持企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的政策。然而,從微觀企業(yè)層面的數(shù)據(jù)看,雖然近年來(lái)中國(guó)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入不斷增加,但是企業(yè)整體的創(chuàng)新效率仍然不高。那么,是什么原因?qū)е铝酥袊?guó)創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域的低效率呢?一個(gè)值得關(guān)注的現(xiàn)象是,在中國(guó)從傳統(tǒng)計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)向市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的過(guò)程中,民營(yíng)企業(yè)作為中國(guó)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的重要力量,往往擁有比國(guó)有企業(yè)更高的創(chuàng)新效率。然而,在國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)占據(jù)主體的所有制結(jié)構(gòu)下,民營(yíng)企業(yè)在創(chuàng)新過(guò)程中常常面臨基于“所有制”的政策歧視,難以獲取創(chuàng)新中所需的政策資源(例如政府的創(chuàng)新補(bǔ)貼和稅收優(yōu)惠)和創(chuàng)新成果的保護(hù)。不少研究發(fā)現(xiàn),政府與企業(yè)的關(guān)系在中國(guó)創(chuàng)新資源的分配中發(fā)揮著十分重要的作用,擁有良好政府關(guān)系的民營(yíng)企業(yè)可以獲得更多的創(chuàng)新資源和政策支持。同時(shí),在中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程中,由于各類(lèi)制度建設(shè)尚不完善,公平的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境和產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制還較為缺乏,導(dǎo)致各種腐敗與尋租行為盛行。在這種背景下,腐敗可能作為“潤(rùn)滑劑”和“保護(hù)費(fèi)”成為一種非正式的資源配置機(jī)制和產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)機(jī)制,幫助民營(yíng)企業(yè)獲取創(chuàng)新所需的稀缺資源并保護(hù)創(chuàng)新成果免遭侵占,進(jìn)而能夠促進(jìn)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新;但是,腐敗同樣也可能會(huì)因?yàn)榻档土藙?chuàng)新活動(dòng)的邊際生產(chǎn)率和生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)家精神的相對(duì)報(bào)酬,而抑制企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新。那么,在中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的過(guò)程中,腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新究竟產(chǎn)生了何種影響?為了對(duì)這一問(wèn)題進(jìn)行深入的探討,本文結(jié)合中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的特殊制度背景,進(jìn)行了深入的理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),并得出了如下結(jié)論:(1)基于2007-2014年民營(yíng)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),以超額招待差旅費(fèi)作為企業(yè)腐敗支出的替代變量,實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn):對(duì)于進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新的民營(yíng)企業(yè),腐敗對(duì)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響呈倒U型關(guān)系;同時(shí),腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響會(huì)隨著企業(yè)所在地制度環(huán)境的變化而表現(xiàn)出顯著差異,腐敗與民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的倒U型關(guān)系主要出現(xiàn)在制度環(huán)境相對(duì)較差的內(nèi)陸地區(qū);進(jìn)一步考察腐敗影響民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的機(jī)制發(fā)現(xiàn),腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響主要出現(xiàn)在資源約束較為嚴(yán)重和產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)較弱的小規(guī)模民營(yíng)企業(yè)中。這一結(jié)果說(shuō)明腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的正向影響機(jī)制主要來(lái)自于腐敗帶來(lái)的資源效應(yīng)和產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)效應(yīng);(2)基于中國(guó)工業(yè)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)2005-2007年的民營(yíng)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù),以超額管理費(fèi)用作為企業(yè)腐敗支出的替代變量,采用Tobit估計(jì)方法,實(shí)證考察了腐敗對(duì)不同行業(yè)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示:腐敗對(duì)28個(gè)行業(yè)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響分別呈現(xiàn)出顯著的倒U型、正相關(guān)和不相關(guān)三種情況。以上結(jié)果表明,腐敗對(duì)不同行業(yè)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響是不同的。同時(shí),腐敗與民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的關(guān)系會(huì)受企業(yè)所在行業(yè)進(jìn)入壁壘的影響。具體地,腐敗對(duì)多數(shù)高進(jìn)入壁壘行業(yè)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新投入的影響并不顯著;在多數(shù)中等進(jìn)入壁壘行業(yè)中,腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響呈倒U型關(guān)系;而在低進(jìn)入壁壘行業(yè)中,腐敗對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入的影響則表現(xiàn)出多樣化的特征。(3)基于2007-2014年民營(yíng)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),以超額招待差旅費(fèi)作為企業(yè)腐敗支出的替代變量,使用Tobit和Logit的估計(jì)方法,進(jìn)一步考察了腐敗驅(qū)動(dòng)下的創(chuàng)新投入對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績(jī)效的影響。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):雖然腐敗在一定程度上有助于民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入和產(chǎn)出的增加,但是腐敗同時(shí)也弱化了民營(yíng)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新投入轉(zhuǎn)化為創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出的效率,即腐敗是民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新效率的“沙子”;這一結(jié)果表明,腐敗對(duì)創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出的促進(jìn)作用主要是源于腐敗可以幫助企業(yè)獲得了更多的和更低價(jià)的創(chuàng)新資源,進(jìn)而使企業(yè)增加創(chuàng)新投入所導(dǎo)致的創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出的增加,而非企業(yè)創(chuàng)新效率的提升;進(jìn)一步考察腐敗影響民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新效率的機(jī)制發(fā)現(xiàn),腐敗增加了民營(yíng)企業(yè)的過(guò)度創(chuàng)新投資,這些過(guò)度的創(chuàng)新投資不僅不能促進(jìn)發(fā)明專利的形成,并且對(duì)三種專利的形成有顯著的消極影響。即腐敗所引致的過(guò)度創(chuàng)新投資是造成民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新效率降低的重要原因。最后,本文對(duì)全文研究的結(jié)論進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并根據(jù)研究結(jié)論提出了反腐敗和促進(jìn)民營(yíng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)新的政策啟示。此外,文章還分析了本研究中的不足,并在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)未來(lái)進(jìn)一步的研究進(jìn)行了展望。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has made remarkable achievements, but the main factors that drive China's economic growth are high investment and high savings, not the effective utilization of resources and technological innovation. This makes many scholars worried about the sustainable sex of China's economic growth. China has invested a lot of resources in enterprise innovation, and the government has also issued a lot of policies to encourage and support enterprise innovation. However, from the data of micro enterprise level, although the innovation investment of Chinese enterprises is increasing in recent years, the innovation efficiency of the whole enterprise is still not high. What is the cause of the inefficiency in the field of innovation in China? A phenomenon worthy of concern is that in the process of China's transformation from the traditional planned economy to the market economy, the private enterprise, as an important force in the innovation of Chinese enterprises, often has higher innovation efficiency than the state owned enterprise. In the process of innovation, private enterprises are often confronted with policy discrimination based on "ownership". It is difficult to obtain the policy resources needed in innovation (such as the government's innovation subsidies and tax incentives) and the protection of innovative results. Many studies have found that the relationship between government and enterprises plays a very important role in the distribution of Chinese innovative resources. The private enterprises with good government relations can obtain more innovative resources and policy support. At the same time, in the process of China's economic transformation, due to the imperfect system construction, fair market competition environment and the lack of property rights protection mechanism, all kinds of corruption and rent-seeking behavior prevail. In this context, corruption is corrupt. As a "lubricant" and "protection fee", it may become an informal resource allocation mechanism and a property protection mechanism to help private enterprises obtain scarce resources needed for innovation and protect innovation results from encroachment, which can promote innovation of enterprises, but corruption may also reduce the marginal birth of innovation activities. In the process of China's economic transformation, what effect does corruption have on the innovation of private enterprises in the process of China's economic transformation? In order to make an in-depth discussion on this issue, this paper has carried out an in-depth theoretical analysis in connection with the special institutional background of China's economic transformation. And empirical test, and draw the following conclusions: (1) based on the data of private listed companies in 2007-2014 years, taking excess travel travel as an alternative variable of corporate corruption expenditure, empirical research shows that the effect of corruption on enterprise innovation investment is inverted U relationship for innovative private enterprises; meanwhile, corruption will invest in the innovation of private enterprises. The impact of the entry will show significant difference with the change of the institutional environment of the enterprise. The inverted U relationship between corruption and the innovation investment of private enterprises is mainly in the inland areas with relatively poor institutional environment; further investigation of the mechanism of corruption affecting the innovation input of private enterprises, and the influence of corruption on the innovation investment of private enterprises. The result shows that the positive influence mechanism of corruption on private enterprise innovation input is mainly from the resource effect and property protection effect caused by corruption; (2) the private enterprise data based on China's industrial enterprise database for 2005-2007 years, As an alternative variable of the enterprise corruption expenditure, the amount management cost is used to examine the effect of corruption on the innovation input of private enterprises in different industries by using the Tobit estimation method. The empirical results show that the effect of corruption on the innovation input of private enterprises in 28 industries shows a significant inverted U, positive correlation and unrelated three cases. It shows that the influence of corruption on the innovation input of private enterprises in different industries is different. At the same time, the relationship between corruption and private enterprise innovation input will be influenced by the barriers to entry in the industry. In particular, the impact of corruption on the innovation input of private enterprises in most high barriers industry is not significant; in most middle barriers to barriers industry Corruption has an inverted U relationship with the impact of corruption on the innovation investment of private enterprises, while in the low entry barrier industry, the influence of corruption on the innovation input of private enterprises shows a variety of characteristics. (3) based on the data of the private listed companies in 2007-2014 years, the excess travel cost is used as an alternative variable for the enterprise corruption expenditure, and the use of Tobit and Logit is used. The results show that corruption is helpful to the increase of innovation input and output of private enterprises, but corruption also weakens the efficiency of the transformation of innovation input into innovative output, that is, corruption. It is the "sand" of the innovation efficiency of private enterprises. The result shows that corruption promotes the innovation output mainly because corruption can help enterprises obtain more and more low price innovation resources, and then increase the innovation output resulting from the increase of innovation investment, and not improve the efficiency of enterprise innovation. The mechanism of corruption that affects the innovation efficiency of private enterprises has found that corruption increases the excessive innovation investment of private enterprises. These excessive innovation investment not only can not promote the formation of the invention patents, but also have a significant negative impact on the formation of the three kinds of patents. In the end, this paper summarizes the conclusion of the full text research, and puts forward the policy enlightenment of anti-corruption and promoting the innovation of private enterprises according to the conclusions of the research. In addition, the article also analyzes the shortcomings of this study, and on this basis, the future further research is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.5

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