本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為研究　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué) 國有企業(yè)高管 職務(wù)舞弊 心理因素 信息加工流程 實(shí)驗(yàn)方法

【摘要】：國有企業(yè)高管以權(quán)謀私的職務(wù)舞弊行為,不僅造成了國有資產(chǎn)的大量流失,嚴(yán)重制約了國有企業(yè)市場化改革的效率效果,而且由于國有企業(yè)高管的示范效應(yīng),又會對企業(yè)內(nèi)部的其他成員產(chǎn)生系統(tǒng)性的影響,引發(fā)企業(yè)職務(wù)舞弊行為的常態(tài)化發(fā)展。國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為本質(zhì)上可以視為心理因素和外部因素共同作用下的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為,其中,外部因素又可以整合提煉為成本信息、收益信息和概率信息。心理因素是行為發(fā)生的內(nèi)因,對于行為的產(chǎn)生過程會產(chǎn)生系統(tǒng)性的影響,因此要探究國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊的形成機(jī)理,則需要在統(tǒng)一的分析框架下,明確在心理因素的影響下,國有企業(yè)高管處理外部因素的特征和規(guī)律。換言之,要更為合理地解釋國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為則需要滿足兩個條件:第一,將心理因素和外部因素作為一個有機(jī)的整體來解釋國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為;第二,構(gòu)建能將心理因素和外部因素整合在一起的分析框架。行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)與認(rèn)知心理學(xué)相結(jié)合的產(chǎn)物,基于有限理性的假設(shè),將心理因素重新納入到經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的分析框架之中,著重考察心理因素對于經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的作用機(jī)理。從學(xué)科本質(zhì)上看,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的歷史順承和演進(jìn),并未把傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)排除在它的理論體系之外而否定其理論邏輯。行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)仍然將成本收益分析視為基本的邏輯分析方法,以此為基礎(chǔ)分析行為主體的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為,試圖在統(tǒng)一的邏輯框架下,探究影響因素間的綜合作用機(jī)理(條件二)。其次,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)又在外部因素的基礎(chǔ)上,考察了心理因素對于經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的影響,修正和拓展了已有經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理,提高了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型的現(xiàn)實(shí)解釋力(條件一)。通過以上分析可以看出,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)既可以為經(jīng)濟(jì)行為分析提供統(tǒng)一的分析框架,又可以在該框架下探究心理因素與外部因素的綜合作用機(jī)理,因此能夠較為有效地解釋和預(yù)測行為主體的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為。基于以上考慮,本文立足于行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角,探究了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的形成機(jī)理以及相應(yīng)的控制策略。然而,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)并未同傳統(tǒng)博弈論一樣,提供較為可操作性的成本收益分析框架,用于分析國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為以及相關(guān)的影響因素。因此,本文首先依托于認(rèn)知心理學(xué)的信息加工理論,將認(rèn)知心理學(xué)的"信息處理框架"與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的"成本收益框架"相融合,把有限理性下舞弊決策的成本收益分析過程,轉(zhuǎn)化為舞弊決策信息的心理加工過程,即在心理因素的影響下行為主體對于舞弊成本、收益和概率信息的處理過程。利用行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的啟發(fā)式理論、前景理論和時間偏好理論,系統(tǒng)性地分析了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊決策信息的心理加工過程,從而為本文的核心研究問題——"相關(guān)心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理",提供合理的分析框架。其次,基于行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)現(xiàn)有的研究框架,本文提取了對舞弊決策過程具有重要影響的心理因素,分別是過度自信、時間偏好和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好。利用職務(wù)舞弊決策信息的心理加工過程,分析了上述相關(guān)心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理,并基于國有企業(yè)特殊的控制權(quán)安排和激勵契約,構(gòu)建了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊的情景模擬實(shí)驗(yàn),檢驗(yàn)了心理因素作用機(jī)理的有效性。進(jìn)一步,本文構(gòu)建了職務(wù)舞弊的經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量模型,進(jìn)行了心理因素與國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為相關(guān)關(guān)系的穩(wěn)定性檢驗(yàn),并進(jìn)一步探究了在同一行為主體下,心理因素對國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊傾向影響程度的差異性,以及同一心理因素在不同行為主體之間影響程度的差異性,作為國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊控制策略的基礎(chǔ)保證。最后,基于我國經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的內(nèi)在要求和國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)特征,將心理因素的作用機(jī)理嵌入到反舞弊機(jī)制之中,從激勵機(jī)制、監(jiān)督機(jī)制和懲處機(jī)制三個維度,提出了有限理性下的國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊控制策略,使得反舞弊機(jī)制的作用深度拓展至舞弊行為主體決策信息的心理加工層面,利用心理因素的"杠桿乘數(shù)"效應(yīng)有效地抑制國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為。文章的具體章節(jié)設(shè)計(jì)如下:第1章,緒論。主要論述了文章的研究背景、研究意義、研究目標(biāo)、研究內(nèi)容、技術(shù)路線和研究方法;第2章,文獻(xiàn)綜述。按照研究變量的不同,從宏觀——中觀——微觀的視角,理清了高管職務(wù)舞弊的研究現(xiàn)狀。第3章,相關(guān)概念界定及理論基礎(chǔ)。對國有企業(yè)高管、國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊、職務(wù)舞弊信息等概念的內(nèi)涵進(jìn)行了界定,并介紹了信息加工理論、啟發(fā)式理論、前景理論和時間偏好理論的具體內(nèi)容,為后文的理論推導(dǎo)奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的理論基礎(chǔ)。第4章,職務(wù)舞弊決策分析框架的構(gòu)建及相關(guān)心理因素的提取。利用行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的啟發(fā)式理論、前景理論和時間偏好理論,系統(tǒng)性分析了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊決策信息的心理加工過程,以此構(gòu)建了有限理性下的職務(wù)舞弊決策分析框架。進(jìn)一步,基于行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)現(xiàn)有的研究框架,提取了對信息加工過程具有重要影響的關(guān)鍵心理因素。第5章,國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊心理因素的作用機(jī)理研究。利用職務(wù)舞弊決策信息的心理加工過程,分析了心理因素對國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理,并提出了相關(guān)的研究假設(shè)。第6章,國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊心理因素作用機(jī)理的實(shí)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)。設(shè)計(jì)了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊的情景模擬實(shí)驗(yàn),檢驗(yàn)了心理因素職務(wù)舞弊作用機(jī)理的有效性。第7章,國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊心理因素作用機(jī)理的經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量檢驗(yàn)。利用經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量方法,進(jìn)行了心理因素職務(wù)舞弊作用機(jī)理的穩(wěn)定性檢驗(yàn),在此基礎(chǔ)之上,分析了過度自信、時間偏好和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好等心理因素影響程度的差異性。第8章,國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的控制策略研究。基于我國經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的內(nèi)在要求和國有企業(yè)高管的職務(wù)特征,從激勵機(jī)制、監(jiān)督機(jī)制和懲處機(jī)制三個維度,提出了有限理性下的國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊的控制策略。第9章,研究結(jié)論及展望。簡要總結(jié)了本文的研究結(jié)論,并提出了本文研究的不足以及未來可能的研究方向。心理因素舞弊作用機(jī)理的實(shí)驗(yàn)研究部分得出如下結(jié)論:結(jié)論一:過度自信會對職務(wù)舞弊行為產(chǎn)生信息收集約束。過度自信程度高的被試,職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于過度自信程度低的被試;對于過度自信程度高的被試,負(fù)面的預(yù)期后悔情緒會顯著抑制其舞弊決策中的過度自信程度,從而降低其職務(wù)舞弊傾向;對于過度自信程度低的被試,正面的預(yù)期后悔情緒會顯著提高其舞弊決策中的過度自信程度,從而增強(qiáng)其職務(wù)舞弊傾向;與個體決策模式相比,群體決策模式會顯著提高被試的過度自信程度,從而增強(qiáng)其職務(wù)舞弊傾向。結(jié)論二:時間偏好會對職務(wù)舞弊行為產(chǎn)生時間編輯約束。在舞弊成本和舞弊收益存在時間距離的前提下,時間偏好差異程度高的被試,職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于時間偏好差異程度低的被試;時間偏好差異程度相同的被試,舞弊收益與舞弊成本時間距離的不同,會使其職務(wù)舞弊傾向產(chǎn)生顯著性差異。結(jié)論三:風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好會對職務(wù)舞弊行為產(chǎn)生效用評價(jià)約束。在高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀態(tài)下,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度高的被試,職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度低的被試。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與行為主體的人格特質(zhì)存在一定的相關(guān)關(guān)系,不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度的被試,在開放性特質(zhì)和嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)方面存在顯著性差異,而外傾性特質(zhì)、神經(jīng)質(zhì)特質(zhì)和宜人性特質(zhì)并沒有表現(xiàn)出明顯的差異性。進(jìn)一步,高開放性特質(zhì)被試的職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于低開放性特質(zhì)被試,高嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)被試的職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著小于低嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)被試。結(jié)論四:決策框架和決策參照點(diǎn)的不同會改變行為主體的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度,進(jìn)而影響到行為主體的職務(wù)舞弊傾向。對于初始風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度相同的被試,基于參照點(diǎn)相同數(shù)量的狀態(tài)變動,處于損失區(qū)間的被試,其職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于利得區(qū)間的被試;隨著決策參照點(diǎn)的變化,當(dāng)決策框架由利得框架轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閾p失框架時,與決策框架保持恒定的情況相比,即使面對相同的成本收益條件,被試的職務(wù)舞弊傾向也同樣存在顯著性差異。結(jié)論五:決策情緒會影響到行為主體的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好程度,進(jìn)而作用于行為主體的職務(wù)舞弊傾向。憤怒、愉悅情緒狀態(tài)下的被試,其職務(wù)舞弊傾向要顯著大于恐懼情緒狀態(tài)下的被試。而憤怒情緒狀態(tài)下的被試,其職務(wù)舞弊傾向與愉悅狀態(tài)下的被試相比,不存在顯著性差異。心理因素舞弊作用機(jī)理的經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量研究部分得出如下結(jié)論:結(jié)論一:不同心理因素對于同一行為主體職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度存在顯著性差異。本文分別利用了學(xué)生樣本、國有企業(yè)高管樣本和總樣本對心理因素與職務(wù)舞弊傾向的相關(guān)關(guān)系進(jìn)行了回歸分析。三個樣本的回歸結(jié)果均表明:過度自信、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好和宗教信仰與職務(wù)舞弊傾向存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,對于職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度由強(qiáng)到弱依次為:宗教信仰、過度自信和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好。而在人格特質(zhì)方面,五大人格特質(zhì)與職務(wù)舞弊傾向的相關(guān)關(guān)系比較穩(wěn)定,其中,開放性特質(zhì)、嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)與職務(wù)舞弊傾向存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,且嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)與職務(wù)舞弊傾向的相關(guān)關(guān)系要大于開放性特質(zhì),而外傾性特質(zhì)、神經(jīng)質(zhì)特質(zhì)和宜人性特質(zhì)沒有通過顯著性檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)論二:同一心理因素在不同職務(wù)舞弊傾向主體之間,影響程度存在顯著性差異。過度自信和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好對于行為主體舞弊傾向的影響程度,高舞弊傾向主體要顯著大于低舞弊傾向主體。開放性特質(zhì)和嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)對于行為主體職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度,在不同行為主體之間也存在顯著性差異。開放性特質(zhì)對于行為主體職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度,高舞弊傾向主體要大于低舞弊傾向主體,而嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)性特質(zhì)對于行為主體職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度,低舞弊傾向主體要大于高舞弊傾向主體。但是,宗教信仰對于行為主體職務(wù)舞弊傾向的抑制作用在不同舞弊傾向主體之間不存在顯著性差異。結(jié)論三:心理因素與職務(wù)舞弊傾向的相關(guān)關(guān)系,以及心理因素對于職務(wù)舞弊傾向的影響程度,在學(xué)生群體和高管群體之間不存在顯著性差異。這就在一定程度上證明了,在實(shí)驗(yàn)研究階段,運(yùn)用學(xué)生群體去檢驗(yàn)心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊傾向的作用機(jī)理,并不會因?yàn)槿后w屬性的不同而對研究結(jié)論產(chǎn)生系統(tǒng)性的影響。文章的可能創(chuàng)新主要體現(xiàn)在以下三個方面:第一,基于有限理性的成本收益分析框架,探究了心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理。以往有關(guān)國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊心理因素方面的研究,更多的是考慮心理因素對于高管日常企業(yè)經(jīng)營決策的負(fù)面影響,認(rèn)為這種負(fù)面的經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)果最終誘發(fā)了高管的職務(wù)舞弊行為。但是,這種研究思路屬于間接法,無法從本質(zhì)上說明心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理�；诖�,本文在行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角下,通過對職務(wù)舞弊決策信息心理加工過程的分析,構(gòu)建了有限理性下的成本收益分析框架,以此為基礎(chǔ),直接探究心理影響因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為的作用機(jī)理。第二,嘗試性地將實(shí)驗(yàn)方法和經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量方法相結(jié)合,檢驗(yàn)心理因素作用機(jī)理的有效性。開拓性地引入實(shí)驗(yàn)方法,基于國有企業(yè)的制度環(huán)境和國有企業(yè)高管的激勵機(jī)制,構(gòu)建了職務(wù)舞弊情景模擬實(shí)驗(yàn),在情景模擬實(shí)驗(yàn)中獲取一手?jǐn)?shù)據(jù),檢驗(yàn)了心理因素對于國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊行為作用機(jī)理的有效性,克服了傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量方法因經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)誤差所引發(fā)的研究局限性;同時,利用調(diào)查問卷的方法,開展實(shí)地調(diào)研,基于調(diào)查問卷所獲取的一手?jǐn)?shù)據(jù),檢驗(yàn)實(shí)驗(yàn)研究結(jié)論的穩(wěn)定性。通過實(shí)驗(yàn)研究和經(jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量研究的相互作證,保證理論分析的可靠性。第三,探索性地將微觀心理基礎(chǔ)與控制手段相結(jié)合,提出有限理性下的職務(wù)舞弊控制策略。明確了國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊控制策略的微觀心理基礎(chǔ),基于職務(wù)舞弊行為的決策流程即:信息收集階段、信息編輯階段和信息評價(jià)階段,將心理因素與控制手段(激勵機(jī)制、監(jiān)管機(jī)制、懲處機(jī)制)有機(jī)地結(jié)合在一起,嘗試性地提出了有限理性下的國有企業(yè)高管職務(wù)舞弊的控制策略,以此修正了原有制度人性化的缺失。
[Abstract]:Occupational fraud behavior of executives of state-owned enterprises abuse, not only caused a huge loss of state assets, seriously restrict the efficiency of market reform of state-owned enterprises, but also because of the demonstration effect of the state-owned enterprise executives, will affect other members of the internal system of normal development, cause the enterprise occupational fraud behavior. The job frauds of executives in state-owned enterprises can be regarded as economic actions under the joint action of psychological factors and external factors. The external factors can also be integrated into cost information, income information and probability information. Psychological factors are the internal causes of behavior, how to influence the behavior of the process will produce system, thus to explore the formation mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud, is required in a unified framework, clear under the influence of psychological factors, characteristics and rules of state-owned enterprise executives and external factors. In other words, more reasonable explanation of occputational fraud behavior of the state-owned enterprise executives need to meet two conditions: first, the psychological factors and external factors as a whole to explain the position of fraud of executives of state-owned enterprises; second, construct the analysis framework can be psychological factors and external factors together. Behavioral economics is the combination of traditional economics and cognitive psychology. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the psychological factors are incorporated into the analytical framework of economic behavior, focusing on the mechanism of psychological factors on economic behavior. From the point of view of discipline, behavioral economics is the historical continuity and evolution of traditional economics. It does not exclude traditional economics from its theoretical system, but negates its theoretical logic. Behavioral economics still regards cost-benefit analysis as a basic logic analysis method. Based on this, it analyzes the economic behavior of actors, and tries to explore the comprehensive mechanism of influencing factors under the unified logic framework (condition two). Secondly, behavioral economics also investigates the influence of psychological factors on economic behavior on the basis of external factors, revising and expanding the existing principles of economics, and improving the realistic explanatory power of economic models. Through the above analysis we can see that behavioral economics can provide a unified framework for the analysis of economic behavior, but also the comprehensive effect of external factors and psychological factors on under the framework of the mechanism, so it can effectively explain and predict the behavior of the main economic behavior. Based on the above considerations, this paper, based on the perspective of behavioral economics, explores the formation mechanism and corresponding control strategies of the fraudulent behavior of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. However, behavioral economics is not the same as traditional game theory. It provides a more operable cost-benefit analysis framework to analyze job frauds and related influencing factors of executives in state-owned enterprises. Therefore, this paper based on the cognitive psychology and information processing theory, the cognitive psychology of "information processing framework" and "economics cost benefit framework integration, the cost of fraud decision-making under bounded rationality analysis process, into the psychological process of fraud decision-making information, namely in the process under the influence of psychological factors the costs and benefits of fraud behavior and probability information. The use of behavioral economics theory, prospect theory and heuristic time preference theory, systematically analyzes the psychological process of executive positions of fraud decision-making information of state-owned enterprises, which is the core of this research, related psychological factors for mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives service fraud, provide a reasonable analysis framework. Secondly, based on the existing research framework of behavioral economics, this paper extracts psychological factors which have important influence on fraud decision-making process, namely, overconfidence, time preference and risk preference. The use of psychological processing occputational fraud decision-making information, analyzes the mechanism of the psychological factors related to state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud behavior, and based on the special state-owned enterprises control rights arrangement and incentive contract, the construction of state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud scene simulation experiment to test the validity of the mechanism of psychological factors. Further, this paper constructs the econometric model of occupational fraud, the stability tests the correlation between psychological factors and state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud behavior, and further explores the same behavior, psychological factors influence on the tendency of state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud degree difference, and the same psychological factors influence difference in between the different actors, as the basis of state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud control strategy guarantee. Finally, job characteristics inherent requirement of China's economic restructuring and state-owned enterprise executives based on the embedding mechanism of psychological factors to the anti fraud mechanism, from the three dimensions of the incentive mechanism, supervision mechanism and punishment mechanism, the state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud limited rational control strategy, the level of psychological processing depth. To expand the fraud decision-making information anti fraud mechanism, the psychological factors of "leverage multiplier" effect effectively restrain the state-owned enterprise executives occupational fraud behavior. The specific section of the article is designed as follows: the first chapter, the introduction. This paper mainly discusses the research background, research significance, research objectives, research content, technical route and research methods; the second chapter, literature review. According to the different research variables, the research status of executive fraud is clarified from the macro - meso - micro perspective. The third chapter, the definition of related concepts and the theoretical basis. This paper defines the connotation of the concepts such as the executive fraud of the state-owned enterprises, the official fraud of the state-owned enterprises and the information of the job fraud, and introduces the information processing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F069.9;F276.1;F272.91
，

本文編號：1339786