本文選題：道路收費　切入點：可交易電子路票　出處：《北京交通大學》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：在制定交通管理措施以及對其進行效率預估和評價時,需要充分了解出行者對于這些措施的心理反應和潛在的出行行為變化。面對不同的交通管理措施,出行者的態(tài)度和相應的出行選擇行為有著顯著的不同。特別是考慮到人們決策中的非完全理性心理和行為時,尤其如此。本文從行為經濟學角度出發(fā),研究道路收費和可交易電子路票環(huán)境下出行者的非完全理性行為對其路徑選擇的影響,并探討了可交易電子路票在調節(jié)節(jié)假日游客出發(fā)時刻和公私合作修建公共道路等問題中的應用,為交通緩堵措施的制定和應用提供了理論依據(jù)。本論文的主要工作如下:1.基于出行心理預算的道路收費網絡均衡分析。假設每個出行者均會設置一個出行心理賬戶來控制自己的出行支出。根據(jù)心理賬戶理論,不同心理賬戶之間的預算是不能相互轉換和替代的。在道路收費中,如果收費數(shù)額超過了出行者的預算,超出部分對出行者造成的心理影響要遠大于預算內部分的影響。據(jù)此建立模型,研究出行預算對出行者路徑選擇的影響,并分析了高收費道路使用率被高估的原因。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),超預算支出導致的過高的心理感知成本使得心理預算處于中低水平的出行者避免選擇高收費道路出行是造成高收費道路使用率低于預期的重要原因之一。2.基于損失規(guī)避的可交易電子路票網絡均衡分析。根據(jù)行為經濟學理論,人們對于損失和收益的敏感程度是不同的,等量的損失所帶來的痛苦要遠大于等量的收益帶來的快樂。給定可交易電子路票方案,研究了考慮出行者損失規(guī)避心理的出行者路徑選擇問題。文章定義了一個路票成本函數(shù)以刻畫出行者的損失規(guī)避心理,并給出了相應的用戶均衡和市場均衡條件,建立了等價的變分不等式模型。分析表明在考慮出行者損失規(guī)避的情況下,并不總是存在可以達到系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)的可交易電子路票方案,并給出了其存在的充分條件。3.基于框架效應的可交易電子路票網絡均衡分析。在上一章的基礎上,進一步研究了可交易電子路票方案中出行者對于免費獲得的路票的"專款專用"心理對于其出行選擇的影響。由于在可交易電子路票方案中,政府會免費發(fā)放給出行者一定數(shù)量的路票。這部分免費路票對于出行者而言是不勞而獲的意外之財,是一種特殊的交通補貼。給定電子路票方案,出行者這種心理會使得更多人選擇收取較高數(shù)量路票的路徑出行。根據(jù)心理賬戶理論,對收入的不同描述和歸類方式會嚴重影響人們的決策行為。根據(jù)出行者對于電子路票的不同態(tài)度和心理,將出行者分為三類,研究了出行者對于電子路票的不同描述和歸類方式對于其路徑選擇的影響。4.基于可交易電子路票的節(jié)假日瓶頸模型研究。大量游客過于集中的出行時間是造成節(jié)假日期間交通擁堵的主要原因,而旨在"讓利于民"的節(jié)假日高速免費政策使得交通擁堵狀況進一步惡化。因此研究了節(jié)假日期間由城區(qū)到景區(qū)的交通擁堵問題,主要研究問題包括:(1)游客在節(jié)假日期間的旅游出發(fā)時刻選擇問題,即游客如何權衡早/晚出發(fā)成本、交通擁堵排隊成本、景區(qū)擁堵成本;(2)節(jié)假日高速免費政策對于游客出發(fā)時刻選擇的影響;(3)可交易電子路票在調節(jié)節(jié)假日出行問題中的潛在應用。5.基于可交易電子路票的私營融資和交通管理。根據(jù)可交易電子路票的特點,提出一種新的公私合作修建公共道路的模式(BEC),將交通管理與公私合作建設道路相結合。該模式一方面保證了政府擁有道路的運營權和決策權,另一方面避免了政府財政預算不足的問題。同時,私人公司可以在避免公眾抵制的情況下獲取建設利潤。另外,通過針對整個路網的整體管理措施,由全體出行者分擔道路建設和維護成本,可以兼顧效率和公平。針對這一模式建立了雙層規(guī)劃模型,并分別以社會福利最大化和公司利潤最大化為目標分析了相應的BEC模型的性質。
[Abstract]:In the development of traffic management measures and prediction and evaluation of its efficiency, it is necessary to fully understand the traveler psychological reaction to these measures and potential changes in travel behavior. In the face of different traffic management measures, the traveler's attitude and the corresponding travel choice behavior is significantly different. Especially considering people decision in the non rational psychology and behavior. This paper, from the perspective of behavioral economics, effects of road pricing and trading of electronic road ticket under the environment of the traveler's non rational behavior of the path selection, and discusses the application of electronic trading in the regulation of Road Ticket tourists holidays departure time and public-private partnerships to build public roads problems, provide a theoretical basis for the development and application of traffic congestion measures. The main work of this paper are as follows: 1. budget based road travel psychology Analysis of charging network equilibrium. Assuming that each traveler will set up a travel psychological account to control their travel expenses. According to the mental accounting theory, between different mental accounts of the budget is not mutual conversion and substitution. In the road toll charges, if the amount exceeds the traveler's budget, beyond the psychological impact on some the travelers are far greater than the influence in the budget. Based on the model, the research budget of traveler's route choice behavior, and analyzes the high toll road use rate is overvalued. The study found that over budget spending leads to high cost makes the psychological perception of mental budgeting in the low level of travelers to avoid high toll road trip is caused by the high toll road use rate is lower than the.2. one of the important reasons of expected loss aversion can be traded road network equilibrium based on electronic ticket Analysis. According to the theory of behavioral economics, it is different for the sensitive degree of losses and gains, caused by the amounts of the pain of loss is much greater than that of equal income can bring happiness. A given road ticket scheme of electronic trading, the travel path selection problem considering the travelers' loss aversion. This paper presents the definition of a road ticket cost function to describe traveler's loss aversion, and the corresponding user equilibrium and the market equilibrium condition is given, an equivalent variational inequality model. Analysis shows that in consideration of their loss aversion situation does not always exist in electronic trading Road Ticket scheme can achieve the optimal system, and gives the analysis the sufficient conditions for the existence of the.3. framework can effect Road Ticket Network Equilibrium Based on electronic transaction. On the basis of the previous chapter, further study the electronic trading scheme in a road ticket The traveler to get free tickets to the road "earmarking" psychological impact on the travel choice. Due to the transaction of Electronic Road Ticket scheme, the government will give a certain number of free travel tickets. This part of the free road road ticket is unearned windfall for travelers, is a kind of special traffic the electronic ticket subsidies. A given road plan, this will make the traveler psychological more people choose the route to charge higher number of road ticket. According to the theory of mental accounting, will seriously affect the decision-making behavior of people of different income and classified description. According to the travelers for Electronic Road Ticket different attitude and psychology, travelers are divided three kinds of different description for the electronic ticket and Walker road classified impact on the path selection of.4. based on bottleneck model transaction electronic holidays road ticket. A large number of visitors Centralized travel time is caused by traffic congestion during the holidays to the main reason, and to help the people of the high-speed free holiday policy makes the traffic congestion worse. Therefore the study during the holidays by the city to the problem of traffic congestion in scenic area, the main research questions include: (1) tourists during the holidays of tourism time selection problem, namely how to weigh the tourists early / late starting cost, traffic congestion, queuing cost, congestion cost; (2) the influence of the time of high-speed free holiday policy choice for tourists; (3) can be traded electronic ticket private financing and road traffic management based on the potential application of.5. in electronic trading Road Ticket regulation holiday travel in. According to the characteristics of electronic ticket transaction way, put forward a new public-private partnership to build a public road model (BEC), the traffic management and construction of public-private cooperation A road combined. The model on the one hand to ensure the decision-making power and the right to operate government owned road, on the other hand to avoid government budget problems. At the same time, the Private Companies can obtain profits in the construction to avoid public boycott cases. In addition, the overall management measures for the entire road network, by all the travelers share the road construction and maintenance costs, can take into account the efficiency and fairness. The bi level programming model is established for this model, and to maximize the social welfare maximization and corporate profits as the goal to analyze the nature of the BEC model.

【學位授予單位】：北京交通大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：U491

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