本文選題：心靈 + 計(jì)算�。� 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)今主流的認(rèn)知科學(xué)對(duì)人的思維或心靈的理解是一種計(jì)算-表征的方式。經(jīng)典的心靈哲學(xué)理論對(duì)計(jì)算-表征模式的理解是強(qiáng)調(diào)計(jì)算和表征的獨(dú)立性,它對(duì)計(jì)算的理解或觀念被稱為計(jì)算形式觀,即計(jì)算過(guò)程或計(jì)算操作對(duì)被操作項(xiàng)的語(yǔ)義性質(zhì)不敏感,而僅僅敏感于其形式性質(zhì)或句法性質(zhì)。如果我們接受心理過(guò)程是計(jì)算過(guò)程,計(jì)算是形式的,那么計(jì)算形式觀的理論后果是:心理過(guò)程對(duì)心理表征的語(yǔ)義性質(zhì)不敏感,而僅僅敏感于其形式性質(zhì)。從奎因開(kāi)始哲學(xué)家就試圖論證意向性或心理表征的內(nèi)容在嚴(yán)肅的科學(xué)討論中不扮演任何角色。現(xiàn)在越來(lái)越多的哲學(xué)家開(kāi)始反對(duì)這樣一種對(duì)表征-計(jì)算模式的理解,反對(duì)計(jì)算和表征的獨(dú)立性。主要的動(dòng)機(jī)是:(1)對(duì)上述計(jì)算形式觀的理論后果不滿;(2)常識(shí)心理學(xué)認(rèn)為,心理內(nèi)容與心理過(guò)程因果相關(guān);(3)當(dāng)今科學(xué)心理學(xué)認(rèn)為心理內(nèi)容與心理過(guò)程解釋相關(guān)。越來(lái)越多的哲學(xué)家開(kāi)始辯護(hù)另一種對(duì)計(jì)算的理解,即計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀——計(jì)算過(guò)程或計(jì)算操作不僅對(duì)計(jì)算的形式性質(zhì)敏感,而且對(duì)計(jì)算的語(yǔ)義性質(zhì)敏感。本文試圖辯護(hù)一種"標(biāo)準(zhǔn)計(jì)算形式觀"。首先,由于傳統(tǒng)的計(jì)算形式觀的理論表述不一、表達(dá)暖昧,本文將對(duì)計(jì)算形式觀進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格描述,稱該描述為"標(biāo)準(zhǔn)計(jì)算形式觀"。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)計(jì)算形式觀將滿足兩個(gè)條件:"句法規(guī)則"和"自由條件"。其次,本文試圖說(shuō)明計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀者對(duì)計(jì)算形式觀的反駁實(shí)質(zhì)上對(duì)"句法規(guī)則"或"自由條件"的反駁,在此基礎(chǔ)上論證這兩種反駁分別都是不成立的。并且,如果舍棄"句法規(guī)則"或"自由條件",計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀的理論將很難處理所謂的"數(shù)學(xué)問(wèn)題"。然后,本文考察一種新近的、基于認(rèn)知科學(xué)實(shí)踐的計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀理論,它似乎可以解決"數(shù)學(xué)問(wèn)題",成為有希望的替代理論。但是,本文將論證這種計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀無(wú)法規(guī)避"小矮人謬誤"。最后,本文指出,雖然標(biāo)準(zhǔn)計(jì)算形式觀的理論無(wú)法解決"協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題",并且,與奎因等哲學(xué)家的認(rèn)識(shí)相反,當(dāng)前認(rèn)知科學(xué)和科學(xué)心理學(xué)的實(shí)踐偏向于計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀的立場(chǎng),但是,正如文中分析,計(jì)算語(yǔ)義觀距離成為一種成熟的哲學(xué)理論還面臨著諸多困難。本文站在計(jì)算形式觀的立場(chǎng)上。
[Abstract]:The understanding of human mind or mind by mainstream cognitive science is a computational-representation method. The classical philosophical theory of mind emphasizes the independence of computation and representation, and its understanding or concept of computation is called the concept of computational form, that is, the process or operation of calculation is insensitive to the semantic nature of the term being manipulated. Only sensitive to its formal or syntactic nature. If we accept that psychological process is computational process and calculation is formal, the theoretical consequence of computational formal view is that psychological process is not sensitive to the semantic nature of psychological representation, but only sensitive to its formal nature. Since Quinn, philosophers have tried to argue that intentionality or psychological representation does not play any role in serious scientific discussions. Now more and more philosophers are opposed to the understanding of representational-computing model and the independence of computation and representation. The main motivation is: (1) dissatisfied with the theoretical consequences of the above concept of computational form. (2) Common sense psychology holds that psychological content is related to psychological process causality (3) nowadays scientific psychology thinks that psychological content is related to psychological process interpretation. More and more philosophers begin to defend another kind of understanding of computation, that is, computational semantic view-the process or operation of computation is not only sensitive to the formal nature of computation, but also sensitive to the semantic nature of computation. This paper attempts to defend a "standard form of calculation". First of all, due to the different theoretical expression of the traditional concept of computational form, this paper will describe the concept of computational form strictly and call it "the standard view of computational form". Standard computational formalism will satisfy two conditions: syntactic rules and free conditions. Secondly, this paper attempts to explain the refutation of the computational semantic viewer's view of computational form to the "syntactic rules" or "free conditions" in essence. On this basis, it is proved that the two kinds of refutation are respectively untenable. Moreover, if we abandon the syntactic rules or free conditions, the theory of computational semantics will be difficult to deal with the so-called "mathematical problems". Then, this paper examines a new computational semantic theory based on the practice of cognitive science, which seems to solve "mathematical problems" and become a promising alternative theory. However, this paper will demonstrate that this view of computational semantics cannot avoid the "dwarf fallacy". Finally, this paper points out that although the theory of standard computational form can not solve the "coordination problem", and contrary to the understanding of Quinn and other philosophers, the current practice of cognitive science and scientific psychology is biased towards the standpoint of computational semantics. As analyzed in this paper, it is difficult to calculate the distance of semantic view as a mature philosophical theory. This paper stands on the viewpoint of computational form.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：N02
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本文編號(hào)：1898435