本文關(guān)鍵詞：矩陣的半張量積在網(wǎng)絡(luò)演化博弈中的應(yīng)用與邏輯算子的張量表示　出處：《聊城大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 矩陣的半張量積 偽布爾函數(shù) 進(jìn)化博弈 邏輯算子 張量 雪堆博弈 網(wǎng)絡(luò)演化博弈 合作水平

【摘要】：本文利用矩陣的半張量積理論,研究了進(jìn)化博弈論中的進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略.另外,利用張量與矩陣的乘法法則,將邏輯算子的矩陣表示轉(zhuǎn)化為邏輯算子的張量表示.同時(shí),對(duì)于變異雪堆博弈在網(wǎng)絡(luò)演化博弈中的模型中的動(dòng)態(tài)演化歷程進(jìn)行了研究.此外還研究了基于社會(huì)懲罰的囚徒困境博弈的網(wǎng)絡(luò)演化博弈模型與控制問(wèn)題,加入控制序列來(lái)討論其動(dòng)態(tài)行為.本文做的主要工作有:(一)研究了進(jìn)化博弈中進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略的求解問(wèn)題.利用偽布爾函數(shù)性質(zhì),給出了有限理性下的進(jìn)化博弈基本分析模型中進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略的一種新求法.(二)研究了邏輯算子的張量表示方法.在張量與矩陣的乘法運(yùn)算規(guī)則下,利用邏輯算子的真值表得出相應(yīng)邏輯算子的張量表示.(三)建立了添加回報(bào)機(jī)制的變異雪堆博弈的網(wǎng)絡(luò)演化模型,結(jié)合邏輯動(dòng)態(tài)系統(tǒng),再轉(zhuǎn)成代數(shù)形式,討論其最終合作穩(wěn)定性.(四)研究了具有社會(huì)懲罰的進(jìn)化網(wǎng)絡(luò)博弈,得到了進(jìn)化動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的代數(shù)形式.得到了一個(gè)設(shè)計(jì)自由類控制序列的充要條件使所有局中人合作。
[Abstract]:By using the semi tensor product of matrices theory, study the evolutionary stable strategy in evolutionary game theory. In addition, the rule of tensor and matrix multiplication, matrix representation of logical operators into tensor logic operators. At the same time, the variation in the snowdrift game is studied in the dynamic evolution process of network evolution in the game model.. in addition, the paper studies the model and control of game of prisoner's dilemma game network evolution based on social punishment, adding control sequence to discuss its dynamic behavior. The main works of this paper are: (a) the study of problem solving into evolutionary stable strategy in the game. By using the properties of pseudo Boolean functions, given the evolutionary game Co. the basic reason analysis of a new method for solving the evolutionary stable strategy model. (two) said the tensor method to research logical operator. The tensor and matrix multiplication. Then, using the logic operator truth table that tensor corresponding logic operators. (three) established the evolution model of variation mechanism of the snowdrift game add return network, combined with the logic of dynamic system, then turn into algebra, and discuss its final cooperation stability. (four) studied the evolution of network game social punishment has obtained the algebraic form of evolutionary dynamic game. Get a free class design to control the sequence of necessary and sufficient conditions for all the people in the game.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：聊城大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：O151.21;O183.2

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本文編號(hào)：1403037