本文選題：南宋主力軍 + 地方武力　； 參考：《西北大學》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：南宋初建,重建軍事力量乃為必然之舉。南宋中央在招收潰兵、盜賊及勤王之兵等基礎(chǔ)上,開始軍事重建之路,最終形成幾支較強大的軍事力量,但中央無法進行有效的指揮。故南宋中央軍事主體力量的重建,主要便是將軍隊的領(lǐng)導權(quán)、指揮權(quán)收歸國有,由中央指揮全部的軍隊。 南宋中央主力軍的重建與南宋的政治、對外關(guān)系、國內(nèi)輿論、經(jīng)濟等密不可分,無論哪一方面的轉(zhuǎn)變,都會影響軍事重建的過程與效果。 因之南宋初期種種軍事缺陷,使得接連發(fā)生四件對南宋歷史至關(guān)重要的事件,分別為：明受政變、淮西兵變、第一次“紹興和議”與收兵權(quán)。 南宋中央對這四次危機的處理,愈來愈成熟,并由完全被動逐漸轉(zhuǎn)化成完全主動,顯示中央已具備能力控制境內(nèi)的諸大軍。在對待議和問題上,中央文官層的大部分皆持反對態(tài)度,與武將無異。不過,他們更擔心武將勢力的強大,會形成尾大不掉之勢,威脅到政局穩(wěn)定,故秦檜集團才得以與金簽訂和議。 南宋政府從立國初便注重培養(yǎng)中央所能控制的軍事力量,到紹興十一年收兵權(quán)之時,中央所能控制的軍力已能與諸大將相抗衡,成為收兵權(quán)的保障。南宋中央決策層無日不想收兵權(quán),最終在經(jīng)濟、戰(zhàn)爭進程、國內(nèi)輿論、與金和議的共同作用下,完成收兵權(quán)之舉,實現(xiàn)南宋中央主力軍的重建。
[Abstract]:In the early Southern Song Dynasty, it was necessary to rebuild military power. The Central Committee of the Southern Song Dynasty began the road of military reconstruction on the basis of recruiting troops, thieves and soldiers of the armed forces, and finally formed several more powerful military forces, but the Central Committee could not carry out effective command. Therefore, the reconstruction of the central military mainstay of the Southern Song Dynasty is mainly to nationalize the leadership and command of the army and to direct the whole army by the central government. The reconstruction of the central main force of the Southern Song Dynasty is closely related to the politics, foreign relations, domestic public opinion and economy of the Southern Song Dynasty. No matter which aspect changes, it will affect the process and effect of military reconstruction. As a result of all kinds of military defects in the early Southern Song Dynasty, four important events occurred in succession to the history of the Southern Song Dynasty: the coup d'etat in Ming Dynasty, the mutiny in Huaixi, the first "Shaoxing Peace Conference" and the right to close troops. The handling of the four crises by the Central Committee of the Southern Song Dynasty became more and more mature, and gradually transformed from completely passive to completely active, which showed that the Central Committee had the ability to control the army in its territory. On the issue of peace, most of the civil servants of the Central Committee are opposed to the issue. However, they were even more worried that the power of the armed forces would become unstoppable, threatening political stability, so that the Qin Hui Group was able to sign peace talks with Kim. From the beginning of the Southern Song Dynasty, the government focused on cultivating the military power that the central government could control. By the time Shaoxing received the military power in 11 years, the military power that the central government could control could already compete with the generals and become the guarantee of the right to take up troops. The decision makers of the Central Committee of the Southern Song Dynasty did not want to withdraw troops day after day. Finally, under the joint action of economy, war process, domestic public opinion and Jin Hexian, the central decision-makers of the Southern Song Dynasty completed the act of closing the army and realized the reconstruction of the main force of the central army of the Southern Song Dynasty.
【學位授予單位】：西北大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：K245;E291

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