【摘要】：和平話語權(quán)是一個(gè)深刻的政治問題。解放戰(zhàn)爭時(shí)期,毛澤東與蔣介石爭奪和平話語權(quán)對中國當(dāng)時(shí)整個(gè)政局產(chǎn)生了重要的影響。抗戰(zhàn)勝利后,和平成為全國人民的愿望。用和平爭得爭取民心,是毛澤東和蔣介石的必然決策。 抗戰(zhàn)勝利之初,蔣介石主動發(fā)出邀請毛澤東赴渝談判的電報(bào),占據(jù)了和平發(fā)起者的位置。在爭奪和平話語權(quán)的過程中,毛澤東與蔣介石都試圖證明且宣傳己方是和平的擁護(hù)者和捍衛(wèi)者,對方是戰(zhàn)爭的挑起者是和平的破壞者。在和平話語權(quán)上經(jīng)歷此消彼長的歷史過程,從1945年8月到1946年10月是蔣介石在話語權(quán)上的強(qiáng)勢時(shí)期,從1946年10月到1947年10月是毛澤東與蔣介石在話語權(quán)上的相持階段,從1947年10月到南京國民政府的覆亡,屬于毛澤東的強(qiáng)勢時(shí)期。 毛澤東與蔣介石充分利用各種謀略,爭取社會上各種政治力量的支持,來奪取和平話語權(quán)。毛澤東的策略靈活多變,有時(shí)是后發(fā)制人,有時(shí)是主動出擊,使?fàn)幍迷捳Z權(quán)由被動變?yōu)橹鲃?由弱勢變?yōu)閺?qiáng)勢,爭得更多的力量支持。蔣介石思路是利用合法政府領(lǐng)袖的優(yōu)勢,變通較少,由優(yōu)勢變?yōu)榱觿�。最終毛澤東取得了更多力量的支持,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)在和平話語權(quán)爭奪上的完全勝利。 毛澤東與蔣介石屆時(shí)作為國內(nèi)兩大政黨的最高領(lǐng)袖,都宣稱本黨的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是爭取國內(nèi)和平,伴隨著毛澤東領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的軍隊(duì)取得解放戰(zhàn)爭的勝利,到人民共和國建立,和平在中國在最終得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:The right to speak peacefully is a profound political issue. During the War of Liberation, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi fought for the right to speak peacefully, which had an important influence on the whole political situation of China at that time. After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, peace became the wish of the people of the whole country. It is the inevitable decision of Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi to win the hearts of the people with peace. At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, Jiang Jieshi sent out a telegram inviting Mao Zedong to the Chongqing negotiations, occupying the position of initiator of peace. Both Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi tried to prove and advocate that they were advocates and defenders of peace, and that the other was the initiator of the war and the spoiler of peace in the process of fighting for the right to speak for peace, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi both tried to prove and publicize themselves as advocates and defenders of peace. From August 1945 to October 1946, Jiang Jieshi's dominant period in speaking power was from August 1945 to October 1946, and from October 1946 to October 1947, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi were at the same time holding on to each other's right to speak. From October 1947 to the fall of Nanjing National Government, it belongs to Mao Zedong's strong period. Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi made full use of various strategies to win the support of various political forces in society to seize the right to speak peacefully. Mao Tse-tung's strategy is flexible and changeable, sometimes it is late-onset and sometimes active attack, so that the right to gain the right to speak is changed from passive to active, from weak to strong, and more support from strength. Jiang Jieshi's thinking is to take advantage of the advantages of legitimate government leaders, less flexible, from strengths to weaknesses. In the end, Mao gained more support and achieved a complete victory in the contest for peaceful discourse. At that time, Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi, as the supreme leaders of the two major domestic political parties, both declared that the Party's starting point was to strive for domestic peace, and that with Mao Zedong's army winning the war of liberation and establishing the people's Republic, Peace was finally achieved in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西民族大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：K266

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