本文選題：督軍制 + 巡閱使制��； 參考：《湖南師范大學(xué)》2011年博士論文

【摘要】：北洋軍閥政治研究在史學(xué)界已有豐碩成果。但該領(lǐng)域依然存在很大研究空間。本課題擬從省區(qū)軍政制度的視角,探討軍閥政治運(yùn)行的制度基礎(chǔ),進(jìn)而探討民國(guó)北京政府時(shí)期西方民主政治制度移植于中國(guó)后所發(fā)生制度蛻變的原因。督軍制與巡閱使制度是中國(guó)軍閥政治形態(tài)的生存基礎(chǔ),也是軍閥實(shí)現(xiàn)其政治統(tǒng)治的最主要途徑和工具。但是,在政治體制方面,軍閥時(shí)期在省區(qū)一級(jí)三權(quán)分立政治結(jié)構(gòu)始終存在。在中央一級(jí),三權(quán)分立政治結(jié)構(gòu)直到1924年北京政變之前也一直存在。因此,軍閥政治從制度上而言,它是一種法外干政的變態(tài)政治體制。它自始至終都無法完全解決自身的合法性與正當(dāng)性問題。也無法解決中央政府權(quán)威及國(guó)家層面政治整合的問題。這也是北洋軍閥政治僅僅十多年便被國(guó)民黨黨政體制取代的根本原因所在。 本文包括緒論、正文、結(jié)語三個(gè)部分。緒論部分對(duì)問題的提出,學(xué)術(shù)界已有研究現(xiàn)狀,中外軍人政治相關(guān)理論對(duì)本課題的指導(dǎo)和啟發(fā),研究計(jì)劃和研究范圍方法等進(jìn)行介紹。 正文五章分別初步探討了民國(guó)北京政府軍閥時(shí)期的督軍制、巡閱使制,都統(tǒng)和護(hù)軍使制的基本情況。在研究省區(qū)主要軍制的同時(shí)對(duì)省區(qū)軍政制度的常態(tài)與逸軌運(yùn)行,督軍巡閱使對(duì)中央政治的干預(yù)和影響機(jī)制進(jìn)行研究初步探討。具體言之,主要包括三個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容。 第一,本文圍繞軍政關(guān)系或軍民分治問題,探討了軍閥時(shí)期省區(qū)(本課題“區(qū)”有兩個(gè)含義。一是指民國(guó)北京政府時(shí)期的熱河、察哈爾和綏遠(yuǎn)三特區(qū),二是指民國(guó)軍閥時(shí)期逐步形成的超省級(jí)的巡閱使區(qū)即準(zhǔn)大軍區(qū)。后文中具體指哪一種含義視語境而定,后文不再一一說明。)軍政關(guān)系的制度規(guī)定及實(shí)際運(yùn)行狀態(tài)。本課題探討研究了民國(guó)北京政府時(shí)期省區(qū)制度的基本史實(shí)。辛亥革命初期一度出現(xiàn)的軍政合一的省區(qū)體制,袁世凱時(shí)代恢復(fù)重建省區(qū)“軍民分治”制度的努力：法定省區(qū)制度為省級(jí)行政機(jī)構(gòu)與軍政機(jī)構(gòu)獨(dú)立設(shè)置,文武職官分軌運(yùn)行。這種制度設(shè)置終北京政府時(shí)期沒有改變。雖然各省行政長(zhǎng)官或由軍政長(zhǎng)官兼任,或聽命于本省軍政長(zhǎng)官,但是,行政公署并沒有淪為軍政機(jī)構(gòu)的附庸,軍政機(jī)構(gòu)也沒有將處理民政的行政公署取而代之。 第二,本課題探討研究了北洋軍閥政治運(yùn)行的制度基礎(chǔ)即省區(qū)軍政制度督軍制及超省級(jí)巡閱使制。督軍制與巡閱使制在所轄省域的共同軍制制度基礎(chǔ)是道與縣域重要軍事要地設(shè)置的鎮(zhèn)守使及其鎮(zhèn)守使制。督軍制是普遍設(shè)立的經(jīng)常制度,巡閱使是臨時(shí)設(shè)置的非常機(jī)構(gòu)。督軍與巡閱使制度的運(yùn)行都是以督軍制為基礎(chǔ)不斷擴(kuò)張法外權(quán)能而實(shí)現(xiàn)的。督軍與巡閱使制度既是是中國(guó)軍閥政治形態(tài)的基本方式,也是軍閥實(shí)現(xiàn)其政治統(tǒng)治的最主要途徑和工具。 第三,熱河、察哈爾、綏遠(yuǎn)三特區(qū)實(shí)施的則是軍政合一的都統(tǒng)政治體制。都統(tǒng)體制也與巡閱使制和鎮(zhèn)守使制互為犄角,共生共存。 從省區(qū)軍政制度對(duì)軍閥政治整體影響來看,本課題通過對(duì)督軍巡閱使橫向干預(yù)省政,縱向干預(yù)國(guó)政過程的研究,得出如下基本結(jié)論： 第一,民國(guó)北京政府時(shí)期的軍閥政治是一種制度外干政的變態(tài)政治。軍閥政治出現(xiàn)的遠(yuǎn)因是殖民地半殖民地中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)社會(huì)矛盾和民族危機(jī)加劇的間接結(jié)果。北洋軍事集團(tuán)將領(lǐng)走向近代中國(guó)政治前臺(tái)的直接原因是辛亥革命后日益尖銳復(fù)雜激烈的國(guó)內(nèi)外社會(huì)矛盾。具體而言是中國(guó)兩千年封建帝制推翻后各個(gè)政治實(shí)力派的國(guó)體與政體之爭(zhēng)以及第一世界大戰(zhàn)參戰(zhàn)與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)善后事務(wù)的處理都使軍事將領(lǐng)及其所轄軍隊(duì)的政治籌碼作用凸顯。 第二,督軍巡閱使對(duì)中央政治的干預(yù)有諸多途徑與方法。軍閥前期和后期也有所不同。軍閥前期主要是以“督軍團(tuán)”集體聯(lián)合干政形式為主。軍閥后期以軍事派系干政形式為主。期間也有督軍巡閱使之間縱橫捭闔的分化組合,但均以派系利益為依歸。督軍巡閱使干政具體途徑之一就是操縱國(guó)會(huì)或立法機(jī)構(gòu)。包括總統(tǒng)副總統(tǒng)選舉等。干政方法之二,就是操縱政府內(nèi)閣人事和內(nèi)閣政策。最終,實(shí)力派軍閥直接建立軍政府,徹底廢棄國(guó)會(huì)機(jī)構(gòu)及民主政體。軍閥時(shí)期軍閥對(duì)司法的干預(yù)可分為制度性干預(yù)模式與非制度性干預(yù)行為。制度性干預(yù)模式體現(xiàn)在軍事司法對(duì)普通司法的侵越和干預(yù),將凡與軍事活動(dòng)相涉的普通公民犯罪行為置于特殊軍法制裁之下。非制度性干預(yù)行為具體體現(xiàn)在軍閥意志左右個(gè)別重大司法案例。 第三,軍閥時(shí)期,督軍巡閱使對(duì)省區(qū)政治干預(yù)的基本途徑和方法有幾個(gè)。一是督軍兼任省長(zhǎng),以督軍身份軍事立場(chǎng)管理省長(zhǎng)事務(wù),以軍事侵越民政事務(wù)。二是督軍巡閱使干預(yù)省議會(huì)事務(wù),包括省議會(huì)議長(zhǎng)人選或省議會(huì)議案,主要是控制該省區(qū)財(cái)政預(yù)算決算大權(quán)。三是督軍巡閱使依靠軍政權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)通過對(duì)所轄區(qū)域重要人士任免權(quán)的干預(yù),間接控制省區(qū)道縣財(cái)政經(jīng)濟(jì)大權(quán)。 第四,軍閥時(shí)期,軍政關(guān)系或文武關(guān)系中軍隊(duì)與軍將對(duì)于文官系統(tǒng)及文官的優(yōu)勢(shì)地位和作用源自早于行政系統(tǒng)的軍制改革及其制度化成果。民初“文武關(guān)系”逆轉(zhuǎn)的原因之一就在于文武科舉制度除后,軍事科層制優(yōu)先于文官制度建立發(fā)展的結(jié)果。軍事科層制的優(yōu)先發(fā)展更深層的原因則是自鴉片戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后尤其是甲午中日戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)后,深重的民族危機(jī)迫使我國(guó)將軍事近代化改革置于其他制度近代化改革之前。
[Abstract]:The political research of Northern Warlords has been fruitful in the history field. But there is still a lot of research space in this field. This subject is to discuss the institutional basis of the political operation of the warlords from the perspective of the provincial and regional military and political system, and then discuss the reasons for the transformation of the system of Western democratic political system in the period of the period of the Republic of China in the Republic of China in Beijing. The system is the basis for the survival of the political form of the Chinese warlords and the most important means and tool for the political rule of the warlords. However, in the political system, the three power separation political structure in the period of the warlords has always existed at the provincial level. At the central level, the structure of the separation of the three powers has been kept until the Beijing coup in 1924. Therefore, the warlords politics is a kind of abnormal political system outside the law. It can not completely solve the problem of its legitimacy and legitimacy from beginning to end. It can not solve the problem of the authority of the central government and the political integration at the national level. This is also the Kuomintang party politics only more than 10 years ago. The fundamental reason for the substitution of the system is.
This article includes three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction of the introduction to the question, the existing research status in the academic circle, the guidance and Inspiration of the Chinese and foreign military political theory to the subject, the research plan and the scope of the research.
The five chapter of the main body of the text has preliminarily discussed the supervision system of the warlords during the period of the Republic of Beijing in the Republic of China, the basic situation of the system of inspecting, the system of inspection, the system of both the capital and the army, the operation of the normal and escaping system of the provincial and regional military and political system at the same time in the study of the main military system in the province, and the study of the intervention and influence mechanism of the central politics by the inspector. It mainly includes three aspects.
First, this paper, focusing on the issue of military and political relations or the division of military and civilian, has discussed two meanings in the period of the warlords. One is the hot river in Beijing, Chahar and Suiyuan in the period of the Republic of China, and the two is the super provincial patrol area, which is a quasi great army area, which is gradually formed during the period of the warlords in the Republic of China. According to the context of justice, the latter no longer explains.) the institutional provisions and actual operating states of the military and political relations. This subject discussed and studied the basic historical facts of the provincial system in the period of the Republic of Beijing in the Republic of China. In the early period of the revolution of 1911 the provincial system of the unity of military and political unity, and the efforts of the Yuan Shikai era to reconstruct the system of "military and civilian division" in the provinces and regions The statutory provincial system has been set up independently by the provincial administrative and military and political institutions and the civilian and military officials are divided into track and operation. This system has not changed during the period of the final Beijing government. Although the chief executive of the provinces or the military and political officers, or the command of the military and political officers of the province, the administrative office has not been reduced to a vassal of military and political institutions, and the military and political institutions are also It was not replaced by the administrative office of civil affairs.
Second, the subject is to study the institutional basis of the political operation of the northern warlords, namely, the system of military and political supervision in the province and the system of ultra provincial inspection. The operation of the supervision and inspection of the system is realized by the continuous expansion of the power and power of the law based on the military system. The supervision and inspection system is the basic way of the political form of the Chinese warlords and the most important means and tools for the warlords to realize their political rule.
Third, the hot river, Chahar and Suiyuan three special areas are implemented by the unified political system of both military and political affairs.
In view of the overall influence of the military and political system on the political system of the warlords, this paper draws the following basic conclusions through the study of the horizontal intervention in the government and the process of the longitudinal intervention in the state.
First, the warlord politics during the period of the government of the Republic of China in the Republic of China is a kind of pervert politics outside the system. The distant cause of the political emergence of the Warlords is the indirect result of the domestic social contradictions in the colonies and semi colonies and the aggravation of the national crisis. The direct cause of the North Japanese military group's generals to the modern Chinese political front is the increasingly sharp after the 1911 Revolution. The complex and intense social contradictions both at home and abroad. In particular, the dispute between the state and the regime of the political power groups after the overthrow of the feudal monarchy in two thousand years in China, and the handling of the good post affairs of the war in the first World War and the good of the war made the military generals and their armed forces the political chips.
Second, there are many ways and means to intervene in the central politics by the inspector inspection. The earlier and later period of the warlords are also different. The early period of the Warlords was mainly based on the collective joint political form of "the Legion corps". One of the concrete ways of the government's administration is to manipulate the Congress or the legislature, including the election of the president vice president. The two of the ways of doing political affairs is to manipulate the government's cabinet personnel and cabinet policies. Finally, the military warlords directly establish the military government, completely discarding the national organization and the democratic regime. Warlords warlords to the judicature. The intervention can be divided into institutional intervention mode and non institutional intervention. The mode of institutional intervention is embodied in the invasion and intervention of military judicature to ordinary judicature, and the ordinary civil offense involved in military activities under special military law sanctions. The non institutional intervention is embodied in the particular importance of the wills of the warlords. Judicial case.
Third, during the warlords period, there were several basic ways and methods to make political intervention in the provinces and regions. First, the governor concurrently served as the governor of the province, managed the provincial governor with the military position of the inspector, and the military administration of the civil affairs. The two was to intervene in the Provincial Council Affairs, including the governor of the province or the provincial council, mainly to control the province. The financial budget of the district is the decisive power. Three is the supervision of the army by the supervision of military and political power to indirectly control Daoxian County's financial and economic power through the intervention of the power of military and political power through the appointment and removal of the important people in the region.
Fourth, in the period of warlords, the dominant position and role of military and military relations in military and political relations or civil and military relations came from the military system reform and its institutionalization results earlier than the administrative system. One of the reasons for the reversal of the "civil and military relations" in the early days of the Republic of China was the establishment of the military bureaucracy system and the establishment of the civil service system. The result of the development is that the deeper reason for the priority development of the military bureaucracy is that after the Opium War, especially after the Sino Japanese War of the Sino Japanese War, the deep national crisis forced the modern reform of the general affairs of our country to be placed before the modern reform of other systems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：K258;D693.2

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