淺析1931-1938胡適的對(duì)日主張
本文選題:胡適 + 求和; 參考:《安徽大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文
【摘要】:1931年9月18日,日本關(guān)東軍突襲沈陽(yáng),由此“九·一八”事變爆發(fā)。隨后六年,中日間打打停停,日本對(duì)中國(guó)內(nèi)陸的滲透也越加嚴(yán)重,國(guó)難也日趨深重。在1937年7月7日,盧溝橋事變爆發(fā)后,經(jīng)廬山會(huì)議,國(guó)民政府決定對(duì)日作戰(zhàn),中日最終走向全面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的道路。在國(guó)難日深之際,國(guó)內(nèi)各界對(duì)如何解決中日問題的討論也愈加激烈。眾多中國(guó)文人都加入到政治討論的隊(duì)伍中來,有的主張與日本決裂,拼死一戰(zhàn),寧為玉碎,不為瓦全。有的則認(rèn)為對(duì)手過于強(qiáng)大,主張與日本談判解決矛盾。論文主要是對(duì)胡適從“九·一八”事變到就任駐美大使初期這段時(shí)間,針對(duì)中日間矛盾所提出的主要觀點(diǎn)、主張以及為解決該矛盾所付出的努力,探究了一個(gè)經(jīng)歷中國(guó)和西方雙重文化教育的文人在國(guó)難到來之際對(duì)日態(tài)度的細(xì)微轉(zhuǎn)變。 作為有過留學(xué)經(jīng)歷,又長(zhǎng)期關(guān)注政治的胡適也有自己的見解!熬拧ひ话恕笔伦儽l(fā)之初,胡適堅(jiān)決主張和談,他認(rèn)為實(shí)力差距過于懸殊是一個(gè)原因,依賴國(guó)聯(lián)則是第二個(gè)原因。其后,日本退出國(guó)聯(lián),華北事變的爆發(fā),使得胡適逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變了態(tài)度,放棄了與日本的直接和談的想法,轉(zhuǎn)而鼓勵(lì)積極備戰(zhàn),以暫時(shí)的妥協(xié)退讓來爭(zhēng)取時(shí)間。最終,在盧溝橋事變爆發(fā),和談希望完全破滅后,胡適積極投身抗戰(zhàn)事業(yè),為抗戰(zhàn)奔走呼號(hào)。 胡適的對(duì)日看法在當(dāng)時(shí)可謂是絕對(duì)的小眾,因此受到很多人的攻擊。胡適的看法究竟是嘩眾取寵還是見解獨(dú)到?是為了呼應(yīng)國(guó)民政府還是真的有獨(dú)立思考?海峽兩岸的學(xué)者已進(jìn)行過許多研究討論,但胡適對(duì)日主和觀點(diǎn)的變化這一問題依然有進(jìn)一步闡釋的空間。論文大量使用胡適的日記、來往書信、政論文章以及同時(shí)期文人的評(píng)價(jià),并結(jié)合前人研究成果,對(duì)胡適在不同時(shí)期的對(duì)日主張進(jìn)行了分析探討,從初期的直接求和,到中期的以和備戰(zhàn),再到最后的撐而待和,每個(gè)和都有他的不同之處,最終得出如下結(jié)論:胡適所主張的和在各時(shí)期是不同的,是逐漸變化的,他的和是一種經(jīng)過深入思考的理性選擇,他的許多建議也符合歷史的發(fā)展,但因?yàn)樗幬恢玫仍?胡適并未能了解國(guó)際關(guān)系中利益紛爭(zhēng)的根本原因即各國(guó)對(duì)自身利益的維護(hù),而是更多的以道德來作為國(guó)際關(guān)系中的標(biāo)尺。然而,當(dāng)胡適逐漸認(rèn)清局勢(shì),積極投身于抗戰(zhàn)事業(yè)之中時(shí),我們又看到了一個(gè)中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)文人身上所具有的愛國(guó)情懷。
[Abstract]:On September 18 th, 1931, Japanese Guandong troops raided Shenyang and the September 18 th incident broke out. Over the next six years, the war between China and Japan stopped, and Japan's infiltration into the interior of China became more and more serious, and the national disaster became more and more serious. After the Lugou Bridge incident broke out on July 7, 1937, after the Lushan Conference, the National Government decided to fight against Japan, and China and Japan finally went to the road of total war. At the time of the national disaster, the discussion of how to solve the problem between China and Japan has become more and more intense. Many Chinese scholars have joined the ranks of political discussions, some advocate breaking with Japan, a war of death, better for jade, not for Waxuan. Some believe that the opposition is too strong, and Japan to negotiate a solution to the conflict. This paper mainly focuses on the main viewpoints, opinions and efforts made by Hu Shi to resolve the contradiction between China and Japan during the period from the September 18 incident to the beginning of his appointment as ambassador to the United States. This paper explores a subtle change of attitude towards Japan by a scholar who has experienced dual cultural education in China and the West at the time of the national disaster. Hu Shi, who has studied abroad and has long been concerned with politics, also has his own views. At the beginning of the September 18 incident, Hu Shi insisted on peace talks, arguing that the disparity in power was one reason, and reliance on the League of Nations was the second. After Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the North China incident broke out, Hu Shi gradually changed his attitude, gave up the idea of direct peace talks with Japan, and instead encouraged active preparations for war and bought time with temporary concessions. Finally, after the Lugou Bridge incident broke out and the hopes of the peace talks were completely dashed, Hu Shi actively devoted himself to the cause of the War of Resistance and campaigned for the War of Resistance against Japan. Hu Shi's view of Japan was an absolute minority and was attacked by many. Is Hu Shi's view sensational or original? Is it to echo the national government or really have independent thinking? Scholars on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have carried out a lot of research and discussion, but Hu Shi still has room for further explanation on the issue of the change of Japanese masters and views. In this paper, Hu Shi's diaries, correspondence, political articles and scholars' comments in the same period are used to analyze and discuss Hu Shi's claims to Japan in different periods, from the initial period of direct summation, and combining with the previous research results, this paper analyzes and discusses Hu Shi's claims to Japan in different periods. In the middle of preparation for war, and then in the end, each and every sum has its own differences. Finally, it is concluded that the sum advocated by Hu Shi is different from that of each period, and is gradually changing. His harmony is a rational choice after deep thinking, and many of his suggestions are in line with the development of history. However, because of his position and other reasons, the Hu Shi has failed to understand the fundamental cause of the conflicts of interest in international relations, that is, the protection of the interests of all countries. It is more moral as a yardstick in international relations. However, when Hu Shi gradually recognized the situation and actively engaged in the cause of Anti-Japanese War, we saw the patriotic feelings of a traditional Chinese literati.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號(hào)】:K263
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