本文選題：解放戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)　切入點(diǎn)：劉鄧大軍　出處：《上海師范大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文重點(diǎn)研究劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山的原因、性質(zhì)和效果,闡述了一些與目前中國(guó)學(xué)界和政界主流觀點(diǎn)不同的看法。按照戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的規(guī)律和形勢(shì)的發(fā)展,人民解放軍在解放戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中,由保衛(wèi)解放區(qū)的內(nèi)線作戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)為進(jìn)攻國(guó)民黨統(tǒng)治區(qū)的外線作戰(zhàn),是順理成章的事情。但是這種轉(zhuǎn)變需要具備一定的條件,一般是在雙方力量對(duì)比由敵強(qiáng)我弱轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閿橙跷覐?qiáng)之后,而且一般會(huì)采用漸進(jìn)式推進(jìn)的方式。但1947年8月劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山的時(shí)機(jī)和方式卻是打破常規(guī)的。在粉碎了國(guó)民黨軍對(duì)各解放區(qū)的全面進(jìn)攻之后,處于國(guó)民黨重點(diǎn)進(jìn)攻中的陜北和山東解放區(qū)面臨著巨大的壓力。中共中央在此時(shí)命令劉鄧大軍無(wú)后方千里躍進(jìn)大別山的原因,是為了吸引國(guó)民黨軍隊(duì)回援,用“圍魏救趙”的方式,扯散國(guó)民黨對(duì)陜北的重點(diǎn)進(jìn)攻,從而緩解陜北的經(jīng)濟(jì)困難。陳謝大軍由原定調(diào)入陜北、直接解圍,改為轉(zhuǎn)兵豫西的決策,也是因?yàn)閾?dān)心陜北貧瘠缺糧,無(wú)力支撐陳謝這新的八萬(wàn)大軍。因此劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山并不是國(guó)共雙方力量轉(zhuǎn)換后的戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)攻行為,而是在戰(zhàn)略防御階段,采取以攻代守的戰(zhàn)略反攻行為。從效果來(lái)看,劉鄧大軍進(jìn)入大別山后,事實(shí)上并沒(méi)有調(diào)動(dòng)多少進(jìn)攻解放區(qū)的國(guó)民黨軍隊(duì),反而引來(lái)了白崇禧指揮的桂系精銳部隊(duì)這個(gè)新敵人的大舉進(jìn)攻,預(yù)期調(diào)動(dòng)敵人回援、為陜北解圍的目的沒(méi)有達(dá)到,陜北反而陷入更大的困境。由于遠(yuǎn)離后方作戰(zhàn),面臨許多無(wú)法克服的困難,加上國(guó)民黨不斷調(diào)動(dòng)軍隊(duì)“清剿”,在進(jìn)入大別山僅三個(gè)月后,劉、鄧被迫分兵,留在大別山的部隊(duì)也只能實(shí)行“避戰(zhàn)”政策,用游擊作戰(zhàn)的方式與國(guó)民黨軍周旋,無(wú)法有效組織大規(guī)模殲滅戰(zhàn)。隨后,留在大別山的部隊(duì)也撤出了大別山,并未實(shí)現(xiàn)在大別山“站住腳”、重建根據(jù)地的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。在這個(gè)進(jìn)出大別山的過(guò)程中,劉鄧大軍減員過(guò)半,“元?dú)狻贝髠?由內(nèi)戰(zhàn)初期人數(shù)眾多、“九戰(zhàn)九捷”的一支勁旅,變成一支缺乏攻堅(jiān)能力的弱旅。巨大的代價(jià)換來(lái)并不理想的效果,難免使人對(duì)挺進(jìn)大別山?jīng)Q策的正確性產(chǎn)生質(zhì)疑。 本文分為五章:第一章緒論,介紹本文研究主題和研究意義,研究現(xiàn)狀,方法、創(chuàng)新和結(jié)構(gòu)等。第二章梳理劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山的曲折決策過(guò)程。第三章分析劉鄧大軍千里躍進(jìn)大別山的原因,其中對(duì)陜北經(jīng)濟(jì)困難情況做了較為詳細(xì)的闡述。第四章簡(jiǎn)要概括劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山及撤離大別山的全過(guò)程。第五章結(jié)語(yǔ),簡(jiǎn)要概括全文主要觀點(diǎn),包括分析劉鄧大軍挺進(jìn)大別山的原因、性質(zhì)和效果。
[Abstract]:This paper focuses on the reasons, nature and effect of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains, and expounds some views that are different from the current mainstream views of Chinese academic and political circles. According to the law of the war and the development of the situation, the people's Liberation Army was in the War of Liberation. It is only natural that the internal line operations in the liberated areas should be converted to outside operations in the Kuomintang areas. However, such a change requires certain conditions, generally after the balance of forces between the two sides has changed from a strong enemy to a strong one. But in August 1947, Liu Deng's army moved into the Dabie Mountains in an unconventional way. After crushing the Kuomintang army's all-out attack on the liberated areas, The northern Shaanxi and Shandong liberated areas, which are under the Kuomintang's major offensive, are facing tremendous pressure. The reason why the CPC Central Committee ordered Liu Deng's army to leapfrog into the Dabie Mountains thousands of miles from the rear at this time was to attract the Kuomintang troops to return to the mountains. By "besieging Wei and rescuing Zhao", the Kuomintang's key attack on northern Shaanxi was dispersed, thereby alleviating the economic difficulties in northern Shaanxi. Chen Xie's army was originally transferred to northern Shaanxi to directly rescue the enclave, and instead made the decision to switch troops to the western part of Henan, also because he was worried that the northern part of Shaanxi was barren and short of grain. Unable to support Chen Hsieh's new 80,000 troops. Therefore, Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains is not a strategic offensive act after the transfer of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but a strategic counter-offensive act in the strategic defense phase, which is based on attack instead of defense. From the point of view of the effect, After Liu Deng's army entered the Dabie Mountains, in fact, it did not mobilize many Kuomintang troops attacking the liberated areas. On the contrary, it attracted a large-scale attack by the elite Guizinese troops of the Department of Guangxi under the command of Bai Chongxi, who were expected to mobilize the enemy's return assistance. Instead of achieving the goal of resolving the siege in northern Shaanxi, North Shaanxi is in even greater difficulty. Because it is far from the rear, it faces many insurmountable difficulties, and the Kuomintang has constantly mobilized its troops to "clear and suppress" the encirclement. Only three months after entering the Dabie Mountains, Liu, Deng was forced to split up his troops, and those who remained in the Dabie Mountains were forced to carry out the policy of "avoiding war" and engaged in guerrilla operations against the Kuomintang forces. They were unable to effectively organize a large-scale war of annihilation. Subsequently, the troops remaining in the Dabie Mountains withdrew from the Dabie Mountains, too. The strategic goal of "establishing a foothold" and rebuilding the base area in the Dabie Mountains has not been realized. In the process of entering and leaving the Dabie Mountains, Liu Deng's army has been reduced by more than half, "vitality" has been greatly wounded, and the number of people in the early stage of the civil war has been large, and the "nine wars and nine victories" have been a strong force. To become a weak brigade lacking the ability to attack the key points. The huge cost for the unsatisfactory results inevitably makes people question the correctness of the decision to advance into the Dabie Mountains. This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter is an introduction, which introduces the theme and significance of this study, research status, methods, Chapter two combs the tortuous decision-making process of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains. Chapter three analyzes the reasons why Liu Deng's army leapt into the Dabie Mountains. The fourth chapter briefly summarizes the whole process of Liu Deng's army advancing into the Dabie Mountains and withdrawing from the Dabie Mountains. Chapter five concludes with a brief summary of the main viewpoints of the full text. Including analysis of Liu Deng army into the Dabie Mountain reasons, nature and effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：K266

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