【摘要】：第二次世界大戰(zhàn)是人類歷史上規(guī)模最大、損失最慘重的一次戰(zhàn)爭,是一場空前的浩劫。作為代表正義一方的同盟國,在對(duì)軸心國的戰(zhàn)爭中通力合作,浴血奮戰(zhàn),最終取得了反法西斯斗爭的偉大勝利。在這場戰(zhàn)爭中,一些新興的國家迅速崛起,如美蘇,也有一些傳統(tǒng)強(qiáng)國衰落下來,如英法。各國實(shí)力的前后變化導(dǎo)致同盟國之間在團(tuán)結(jié)協(xié)作的同時(shí),產(chǎn)生了一些難以調(diào)和的矛盾。 在這時(shí)期,美國的綜合實(shí)力急劇膨脹,一舉成為資本主義世界頭號(hào)強(qiáng)國,而傳統(tǒng)豪強(qiáng)英法等卻在戰(zhàn)爭中一蹶不振,這為美國走向世界大國行列提供了絕佳的機(jī)遇�？刂茪W洲,進(jìn)而爭霸世界,成為美國未來的目標(biāo)。 而戰(zhàn)爭初期,法國敗亡的速度如此之快讓美國驚訝不已,它開始認(rèn)為法國的大國地位已經(jīng)成為歷史,因此可以趁此扶植一個(gè)順從的法國,進(jìn)而控制整個(gè)歐洲大陸；同時(shí)搶占它的廣大殖民地,為爭霸世界做準(zhǔn)備。然而以戴高樂為首的自由法國的出現(xiàn)妨礙了美國的戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃。隨著戴高樂政權(quán)的不斷發(fā)展壯大,在國內(nèi)外的影響越來越大,美國不得不給予一些有限的支持和承認(rèn)。 美國不愿承認(rèn)戴高樂政權(quán),更確切地說不希望看到一個(gè)崛起的法國。為此,美國在羅斯福的民族自決和反殖民主義外交思想指導(dǎo)下,竭力阻止戴高樂掌權(quán),防止法國的復(fù)興。另外,羅斯福對(duì)戴高樂的個(gè)人看法也在一定程度上影響了美國對(duì)法國的態(tài)度。不過在美國政府內(nèi)部存在不同的意見,有些人認(rèn)為對(duì)法國崛起的承認(rèn)已勢(shì)在必行。因此在他們及英國的極力勸說下,美國默認(rèn)了法國的崛起,并給予了它大國的地位。 在美國對(duì)法國態(tài)度轉(zhuǎn)變的外部因素中,戴高樂及其法國政權(quán)的努力起了主要作用。經(jīng)過自身的努力,法國重新崛起的既成事實(shí)讓美國不得不予以重視；英國的支持也起了關(guān)鍵作用,它力挺法國,并在美國面前歷陳法國的重要性；另外,蘇聯(lián)與法國的“友好”關(guān)系也在一定程度上刺激了美國去改變對(duì)法策略。 隨著戰(zhàn)爭形勢(shì)的明朗化,美蘇兩強(qiáng)爭霸的格局漸已形成,兩國矛盾也逐漸突顯出來。為了增加自己在爭霸中的籌碼,美國完全放棄了原有的對(duì)法態(tài)度,取而代之的是在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、外交等各方面幫助法國復(fù)興的政策。 二戰(zhàn)后期美國對(duì)法國大國的態(tài)度經(jīng)歷了一個(gè)復(fù)雜的演變過程,通過這一過程及影響其轉(zhuǎn)變的因素可以得出一條清晰的線索：外交政策永遠(yuǎn)為國家利益服務(wù)。無論它怎樣變化,也只有一個(gè)目的,就是達(dá)到國家利益的最大化。
[Abstract]:World War II was the largest and most disastrous war in human history. As the allies representing the right side, they cooperated and fought hard in the war against the Axis, and finally won the great victory in the anti-fascist struggle. The war saw the rapid rise of new powers, such as the US and Soviet Union, and the decline of traditional powers, such as Britain and France. The changes in national power led to some irreconcilable contradictions between the allies. During this period, the comprehensive strength of the United States expanded rapidly and became the number one power in the capitalist world, while the traditional great powers, Britain and France, collapsed in the war, which provided an excellent opportunity for the United States to move into the ranks of the world's great powers. To control Europe and then to dominate the world became the future goal of the United States. In the early days of the war, the United States was surprised by the speed at which France had fallen. It began to think that France's status as a great power was a thing of the past, so that it could be used to foster a submissive France and thus control the entire European continent. At the same time to seize its vast colonies, to prepare for the hegemony of the world. But the emergence of a free France, led by Charles de Gaulle, hampered America's strategic plans. With the development of the de Gaulle regime and the growing influence at home and abroad, the United States had to give some limited support and recognition. The United States does not want to recognize the de Gaulle regime or, more precisely, to see a rising France. Therefore, under the guidance of Roosevelt's national self-determination and anti-colonial diplomacy, the United States tried to prevent Charles de Gaulle from taking power and to prevent the revival of France. Roosevelt's personal view of Charles de Gaulle also influenced American attitudes toward France to some extent. But there are disagreements within the administration, with some arguing that recognition of France's rise is imperative. As a result, the United States acquiesced to the rise of France and gave it the status of a great power, under the strong persuasion of them and Britain. Charles de Gaulle and his French regime played a major role in the change in American attitudes towards France. Through its own efforts, the fait accompli of France's re-emergence has compelled the United States to attach importance to it; British support has also played a key role in supporting France and making its importance known to the United States. The "friendly" relations between the Soviet Union and France also stimulated the United States to change its strategy towards France to some extent. With the clarity of the war situation, the pattern of the American and Soviet powers fighting for hegemony has gradually formed, and the contradiction between the two countries has gradually become prominent. In order to increase its leverage in the struggle for hegemony, the United States completely abandoned its original attitude towards France and replaced it with a policy of helping France revive in politics, economy, diplomacy and so on. The attitude of the United States towards the great powers of France experienced a complex process of evolution in the late World War II. Through this process and the factors affecting its transformation, a clear clue can be drawn: foreign policy will always serve the national interests. No matter how it changes, there is only one purpose, which is to maximize the national interest.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：K712.53

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