太平洋戰(zhàn)爭前美國遠(yuǎn)東政策中的蘇聯(lián)因素（1931-1941）
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-17 11:55
【摘要】：在遠(yuǎn)東國際政治格局和美國遠(yuǎn)東政策的演進(jìn)過程中,蘇聯(lián)因素?zé)o疑產(chǎn)生了不可忽視的重要影響。蘇聯(lián)作為一個遠(yuǎn)東大國,它的一舉一動不僅攸關(guān)遠(yuǎn)東國際關(guān)系全局,也是美國政府的決策層理解遠(yuǎn)東局勢、制定遠(yuǎn)東政策的重要依據(jù)。本文擬通過考察太平洋戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前十年美國對蘇聯(lián)遠(yuǎn)東動向的觀察與反應(yīng),系統(tǒng)地梳理蘇聯(lián)因素在這一時期美國遠(yuǎn)東政策各階段中的作用。本文的基本觀點是,從排斥蘇聯(lián)到援助蘇聯(lián),太平洋戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前十年美國遠(yuǎn)東政策每一個階段的發(fā)展變化都打下了蘇聯(lián)因素的烙印。 除導(dǎo)論和結(jié)論部分以外,論文共分為六章。第一章作為背景部分,主要說明從美國遠(yuǎn)東政策形成之初,俄國因素就一直在其中發(fā)揮著重要作用。十九世紀(jì)末,俄國、日本、美國三國長期向遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)的擴(kuò)張終于迎頭相撞,三者互為競爭關(guān)系。對于美國而言,俄國既是競爭者,也可能成為在對付日本時的合作伙伴。美國的最大利益在于保持俄國與日本之間的力量均衡,從而使它們的任何一方都無法取得在遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)的主導(dǎo)地位。因此,每當(dāng)俄、日之間的力量對比發(fā)生變化,都會引起美國政府的極大關(guān)注,并試圖居間施加影響。美國的遠(yuǎn)東政策從傳統(tǒng)上看實質(zhì)上是一種均勢政策。在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)以后,美、蘇、日三國關(guān)系又增添了一個新的因素,即意識形態(tài)因素�！熬鶆萃饨弧崩碚摵鸵庾R形態(tài)上對蘇聯(lián)的敵視作為一種傳統(tǒng),為三十年代美國政府所承繼,對后來美國遠(yuǎn)東政策的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了很大的影響。 第二章旨在論述“九一八”事變中蘇聯(lián)因素對美國遠(yuǎn)東政策的影響,以及事變中美國對蘇聯(lián)認(rèn)識的轉(zhuǎn)變。在事變初期,美國依然受到敵視蘇聯(lián)的傳統(tǒng)政策的影響,不愿蘇聯(lián)介入到中日沖突中來；而且,意識形態(tài)的偏見阻礙了美國政府內(nèi)的部分人士認(rèn)清日本發(fā)動九一八事變的真實性質(zhì)和危害,反而將日本視為防范共產(chǎn)主義滲透的防波堤,這一定程度上推動了美國政府對日本的侵略擴(kuò)張持放任態(tài)度。美國政府希望日本能自行回歸華盛頓體系的軌道上來。而日本最終占領(lǐng)了中國東北三省全境,有力地打破了美國的迷夢。但與此同時,美國也密切關(guān)注著蘇聯(lián)的反應(yīng)及其與日本關(guān)系的進(jìn)展。在觀察中,美國再次確認(rèn)了蘇日矛盾根深蒂固的判斷。隨著遠(yuǎn)東局勢的逐步惡化,美國政府開始重新認(rèn)識到蘇聯(lián)在遠(yuǎn)東國際格局中的重要作用,1933年底,新上任的羅斯福政府主動改變了十幾年來的僵化政策,承認(rèn)了蘇聯(lián),邁出了美蘇兩國在制約日本擴(kuò)張問題上合作的第一步。 第三章著力探討1934-1937年美國在遠(yuǎn)東采取的靜觀政策與蘇聯(lián)因素之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。首先,這一時期正是蘇日對峙最為緊張的階段,蘇日戰(zhàn)爭的傳聞不絕于耳,美國政府本身也高度懷疑蘇聯(lián)遠(yuǎn)東外交的動機(jī),不愿意為蘇聯(lián)火中取栗,因此,自然在對日政策上小心謹(jǐn)慎,避免被推向?qū)谷毡镜那芭_。其次,美國政府也期待蘇聯(lián)在遠(yuǎn)東的國防實力的增長,希望蘇聯(lián)增強了的國力能夠自發(fā)地起到約束日本的作用,這也促使它在遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)采取靜觀姿態(tài),而不主動刺激局勢。1935年以后,美國政府注意到蘇聯(lián)在遠(yuǎn)東的國防能力逐漸增強,蘇聯(lián)與英法等國的關(guān)系逐漸改善,蘇日戰(zhàn)爭的危險局面暫時緩和,這進(jìn)一步印證了靜觀政策的可行性。此外,美蘇關(guān)系惡化影響了美國和蘇聯(lián)在合作制日上的進(jìn)一步合作,這種互信和合作計劃的缺失也阻撓了美國政府采取更主動的態(tài)度來對付日本。 第四章意在闡述蘇聯(lián)因素在1938-1939年美國遠(yuǎn)東政策的調(diào)整時發(fā)揮的作用。隨著中日戰(zhàn)事的進(jìn)行,日本的行動越來越危及美國在遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)的利益和在全球的安全。在這種形勢下,美國的遠(yuǎn)東政策勢必調(diào)整,美國勢必站到對抗日本的前臺來。但是,蘇聯(lián)因素仍然沒有退席。首先,正是由于看到蘇聯(lián)與日本存在著根深蒂固的矛盾,而且蘇聯(lián)在遠(yuǎn)東的政治軍事實力沒有受到“大清洗”的太大沖擊,美國政府才能夠得以較少顧忌地對日本實施威懾策略.其次,蘇聯(lián)援華可能造成的政治影響,也促使美國政府加大了援助中國的力度,力圖保持對中國未來政局的影響力。美國政府提供對華桐油貸款、中止《美日通商航海條約》的政策就是在這樣的背景下制定的。 第五章詳述了在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)以后美國對蘇日關(guān)系、蘇德關(guān)系發(fā)展中的重要事件的觀察。經(jīng)過一段時間的細(xì)致觀察,美國政府基本上可以認(rèn)定：《蘇德互不侵犯條約》對遠(yuǎn)東局勢而言反而有利,蘇聯(lián)也未從根本上改變自己的對日對華政策,蘇日關(guān)系難以真正改善。而且,蘇聯(lián)并未完全倒向軸心國一邊。在法國敗降以后,蘇德矛盾的趨勢更是日益明顯,蘇德戰(zhàn)爭的可能性驟然增加。因此,在這一時期,美國政府抵制了國內(nèi)部分官員提出的“為防止蘇日妥協(xié)而綏靖日本”的主張,依然沿襲著既定的遠(yuǎn)東政策,繼續(xù)堅持對日本施加逐漸加重的壓力,《蘇日中立條約》的訂立也沒有使之有所動搖。 第六章說明了蘇德戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)后美、蘇、日三國關(guān)系發(fā)生的根本性變化。蘇德戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)后,蘇聯(lián)與美國結(jié)成了正式的同盟關(guān)系,而日本成為了美蘇共同的敵人。由于蘇聯(lián)忙于抗擊德國,這就可能使遠(yuǎn)東地區(qū)的力量對比失衡,美國必須更主動地介入到遠(yuǎn)東事務(wù)中來,更堅決地對日本施加更大壓力：首先,美國政府需要保證蘇聯(lián)在對德作戰(zhàn)中不受日本北進(jìn)的威脅。其次,蘇德戰(zhàn)場的壓力也使得中國戰(zhàn)場的存在顯得尤為重要,美國必須加強對中國抗戰(zhàn)的支持,在與日本談判交涉中也不敢輕易犧牲中國與日本妥協(xié)。再次,美國援助蘇聯(lián)更直接刺激了美日關(guān)系,也是美日談判達(dá)成妥協(xié)的一個重大障礙。此外,蘇聯(lián)與美英結(jié)盟,并且抵擋住了德國的強烈攻勢,這更增強了美國政府對日本實行威懾策略的信心和決心。美國積極在太平洋進(jìn)行軍事部署,在菲律賓部署空軍戰(zhàn)略部隊,建立遠(yuǎn)程轟炸基地,并且設(shè)想利用蘇聯(lián)在符拉迪沃斯托克的空軍基地等等,都與蘇聯(lián)在歐洲方面成為制約德國重要戰(zhàn)場的問題有明顯的關(guān)聯(lián)。
[Abstract]:The Soviet Union, as a great power in the Far East, has exerted an important influence on the international political pattern in the Far East and the evolution of American policies in the Far East. This paper aims to systematically review the role of Soviet factors in the various stages of American Far East policy during the period of the Pacific War by investigating the observation and reaction of the United States to the Soviet Union's Far East trend ten years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. All the changes have taken the branding of Soviet factors.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the background part, mainly explaining that the Russian factors have been playing an important role in the formation of the American Far East policy since the early days. For the United States, Russia is both a competitor and a possible partner in dealing with Japan. The greatest interest of the United States is to maintain a balance of power between Russia and Japan, so that neither of them can gain a dominant position in the Far East. The Far East policy of the United States has traditionally been a policy of balance of power. After the First World War, the relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan have added a new factor, namely, the ideological factor. The tradition was inherited by the American government in the 1930s and exerted a great influence on the development of American Far East policy.
The second chapter is to discuss the Soviet Union's influence on American Far East policy in the September 18th Incident and the change of American understanding of the Soviet Union in the Incident. Some people recognize the real nature and harm of the September 18th Incident in Japan, but regard Japan as a breakwater against Communist infiltration, which to some extent impels the U.S. government to take a laissez-faire attitude towards Japan's aggression and expansion. The U.S. government wants Japan to return to the track of the Washington system on its own. But at the same time, the United States also closely watched the reaction of the Soviet Union and the progress of its relations with Japan. During the observation, the United States again confirmed the deep-rooted judgment of the Soviet-Japanese contradiction. At the end of 1933, the new Roosevelt administration took the initiative to change the rigid policy for more than a decade, recognized the Soviet Union, and took the first step in the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting Japan's expansion.
The third chapter focuses on the relationship between the US policy of meditation in the Far East in 1934-1937 and the Soviet Union's factors. Second, the U.S. government expects the Soviet Union's defense strength in the Far East to grow, and hopes that the Soviet Union's strengthened national strength will act spontaneously as a restraint on Japan, which also prompts it to take a posture of quiet observation in the Far East without actively stimulating the situation. The U.S. government noted that the Soviet Union's defense capability in the Far East was gradually strengthened, the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and France were gradually improved, and the dangerous situation of the Soviet-Japanese War was temporarily eased, which further confirmed the feasibility of the "sit-by" policy. The lack of planning also obstructed the US government from taking a more proactive approach to Japan.
The fourth chapter is intended to elaborate the role played by the Soviet Union in the adjustment of American Far East policy in 1938-1939. As the Sino-Japanese war progressed, Japan's actions increasingly endangered the interests of the United States in the Far East and global security. However, the Soviet Union has not yet withdrawn. First of all, it is precisely because of the deep-rooted contradictions between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the fact that the Soviet Union's political and military strength in the Far East has not been greatly impacted by the "big purge", that the United States government is able to implement a deterrent strategy against Japan with less scruple. Second, the possible result of Soviet aid to China. Political influence has also prompted the U.S. government to increase its aid to China in an effort to maintain its influence on China's future political situation.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the observation of the important events in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Soviet-German relations after the outbreak of the Second World War. After a period of careful observation, the US government can basically conclude that the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty is beneficial to the situation in the Far East, and the Soviet Union has not fundamentally changed its relations with Japan. After the defeat of France, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Germany became more and more obvious, and the possibility of the Soviet-German war suddenly increased. Therefore, during this period, the U.S. government boycotted the "Pacification Day for Preventing the Soviet-Japanese Compromise" proposed by some domestic officials. Ben's proposition still follows the established Far East policy and continues to exert increasing pressure on Japan. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty did not shake it.
After the Soviet-German War, the Soviet Union formed a formal alliance with the United States, and Japan became a common enemy of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the U.S. government needs to ensure that the Soviet Union is not threatened by Japan's northward advance in the war against Germany. Second, the pressure on the Soviet-German battlefield makes the existence of the Chinese battlefield particularly important. The U.S. must strengthen its support for China's anti-Japanese war and negotiate with Japan. Again, U.S. aid to the Soviet Union directly stimulated U.S. -Japanese relations and was a major obstacle to the negotiation of a compromise between the United States and Japan. China's active military deployment in the Pacific, the deployment of strategic air forces in the Philippines, the establishment of long-range bombing bases, and the use of Soviet air bases in Vladivostok are all obviously related to the fact that the Soviet Union has become an important battlefield restricting Germany in Europe.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：K712.52
本文編號：2245829
[Abstract]:The Soviet Union, as a great power in the Far East, has exerted an important influence on the international political pattern in the Far East and the evolution of American policies in the Far East. This paper aims to systematically review the role of Soviet factors in the various stages of American Far East policy during the period of the Pacific War by investigating the observation and reaction of the United States to the Soviet Union's Far East trend ten years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. All the changes have taken the branding of Soviet factors.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the background part, mainly explaining that the Russian factors have been playing an important role in the formation of the American Far East policy since the early days. For the United States, Russia is both a competitor and a possible partner in dealing with Japan. The greatest interest of the United States is to maintain a balance of power between Russia and Japan, so that neither of them can gain a dominant position in the Far East. The Far East policy of the United States has traditionally been a policy of balance of power. After the First World War, the relations among the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan have added a new factor, namely, the ideological factor. The tradition was inherited by the American government in the 1930s and exerted a great influence on the development of American Far East policy.
The second chapter is to discuss the Soviet Union's influence on American Far East policy in the September 18th Incident and the change of American understanding of the Soviet Union in the Incident. Some people recognize the real nature and harm of the September 18th Incident in Japan, but regard Japan as a breakwater against Communist infiltration, which to some extent impels the U.S. government to take a laissez-faire attitude towards Japan's aggression and expansion. The U.S. government wants Japan to return to the track of the Washington system on its own. But at the same time, the United States also closely watched the reaction of the Soviet Union and the progress of its relations with Japan. During the observation, the United States again confirmed the deep-rooted judgment of the Soviet-Japanese contradiction. At the end of 1933, the new Roosevelt administration took the initiative to change the rigid policy for more than a decade, recognized the Soviet Union, and took the first step in the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting Japan's expansion.
The third chapter focuses on the relationship between the US policy of meditation in the Far East in 1934-1937 and the Soviet Union's factors. Second, the U.S. government expects the Soviet Union's defense strength in the Far East to grow, and hopes that the Soviet Union's strengthened national strength will act spontaneously as a restraint on Japan, which also prompts it to take a posture of quiet observation in the Far East without actively stimulating the situation. The U.S. government noted that the Soviet Union's defense capability in the Far East was gradually strengthened, the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and France were gradually improved, and the dangerous situation of the Soviet-Japanese War was temporarily eased, which further confirmed the feasibility of the "sit-by" policy. The lack of planning also obstructed the US government from taking a more proactive approach to Japan.
The fourth chapter is intended to elaborate the role played by the Soviet Union in the adjustment of American Far East policy in 1938-1939. As the Sino-Japanese war progressed, Japan's actions increasingly endangered the interests of the United States in the Far East and global security. However, the Soviet Union has not yet withdrawn. First of all, it is precisely because of the deep-rooted contradictions between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the fact that the Soviet Union's political and military strength in the Far East has not been greatly impacted by the "big purge", that the United States government is able to implement a deterrent strategy against Japan with less scruple. Second, the possible result of Soviet aid to China. Political influence has also prompted the U.S. government to increase its aid to China in an effort to maintain its influence on China's future political situation.
The fifth chapter elaborates on the observation of the important events in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Soviet-German relations after the outbreak of the Second World War. After a period of careful observation, the US government can basically conclude that the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty is beneficial to the situation in the Far East, and the Soviet Union has not fundamentally changed its relations with Japan. After the defeat of France, the contradiction between the Soviet Union and Germany became more and more obvious, and the possibility of the Soviet-German war suddenly increased. Therefore, during this period, the U.S. government boycotted the "Pacification Day for Preventing the Soviet-Japanese Compromise" proposed by some domestic officials. Ben's proposition still follows the established Far East policy and continues to exert increasing pressure on Japan. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty did not shake it.
After the Soviet-German War, the Soviet Union formed a formal alliance with the United States, and Japan became a common enemy of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the U.S. government needs to ensure that the Soviet Union is not threatened by Japan's northward advance in the war against Germany. Second, the pressure on the Soviet-German battlefield makes the existence of the Chinese battlefield particularly important. The U.S. must strengthen its support for China's anti-Japanese war and negotiate with Japan. Again, U.S. aid to the Soviet Union directly stimulated U.S. -Japanese relations and was a major obstacle to the negotiation of a compromise between the United States and Japan. China's active military deployment in the Pacific, the deployment of strategic air forces in the Philippines, the establishment of long-range bombing bases, and the use of Soviet air bases in Vladivostok are all obviously related to the fact that the Soviet Union has become an important battlefield restricting Germany in Europe.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：K712.52
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 朱衛(wèi)斌;羅斯福的以日制俄政策與中國東北的“完整”——以日俄戰(zhàn)爭為中心的探討[J];東北師大學(xué)報;2005年04期
，本文編號：2245829
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