論1956年匈牙利的“中立”
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-10 22:32
【摘要】： 1956年10月爆發(fā)了震驚中外的匈牙利事件,11月1日納吉領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的匈牙利政府在革命走向失敗的最后,宣告退出華沙條約并宣布國家中立,同時,納吉向聯(lián)合國發(fā)出請求包括蘇聯(lián)在內(nèi)的四大國對匈牙利中立的保證,這在蘇聯(lián)為首的社會主義陣營中是前所未有的事情。中立最終在蘇聯(lián)的武力鎮(zhèn)壓下失敗,納吉呈交給聯(lián)合國的請求也不了了之。然而,為什么匈牙利政府會選擇在革命最混亂的時刻提出中立的要求,中立是否是納吉政府最后的選擇?中立對匈牙利人民而言有著怎樣的意義?英法、美、蘇等國家在匈牙利宣布中立的前后各個政府的應(yīng)策變化又如何?我們又如何更客觀的評價這一事件?1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立這一事件在國內(nèi)外的研究著作中多是在論述匈牙利事件的同時,以敘事的方式簡要的論述中立的宣布和失敗的歷程,許多匈牙利革命的研究者評論納吉政府這一舉措是輕率的不理智的,而且是引起蘇聯(lián)第二次出兵干涉的導(dǎo)火索。但隨著近幾年蘇聯(lián)、匈牙利以及美國檔案和相關(guān)資料的陸續(xù)解密,這些觀點都有待商榷。納吉政府宣布中立并非是蘇聯(lián)出兵干涉的原因而是結(jié)果,匈牙利政府之所以在當(dāng)時做此決定是為了挽救革命做出的最后的努力。本文就試圖在前人研究匈牙利事件成就的基礎(chǔ)上,借助新近公開的資料對1956年匈牙利政府的中立這一事件,站在客觀的角度上,更系統(tǒng)、全面的記述和評析1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立這一事件的歷史原因和發(fā)生歷程和結(jié)果,希望能夠?qū)@方面的研究和探討提供一些幫助。 正文分為五個部分: 前言:介紹國內(nèi)外有關(guān)1956年匈牙利政府宣布中立這一事件的研究現(xiàn)狀及選題意義。 第一部分:匈牙利“中立”的由來。簡要介紹了“中立”的涵義和概念,大概論述了匈牙利歷史上相關(guān)中立思想的提出和實施結(jié)果。 第二部分:匈牙利尋求“中立”的內(nèi)外歷史因素。這是本文的重點,主要論證了匈牙利在1956年提出中立并非納吉政府一時的沖動,而是有著深遠的國內(nèi)外因素影響的。就匈牙利本國而言,本民族坎坷歷史經(jīng)歷以及二戰(zhàn)后受蘇聯(lián)模式的困擾,裴多菲俱樂部這個在匈牙利有著廣泛影響的民間愛國組織對自由、民主、獨立的宣傳,以及納吉早就形成了比較成熟的“中立”思想是推動匈牙利走向中立的內(nèi)部因素。而南斯拉夫自治道路的開辟以及奧地利中立模式的成功,加之革命前后自由歐洲電臺的輿論宣傳的煽動對匈牙利人民和納吉政府而言,不止給讓他們看到了追求匈牙利中立的曙光,也更堅定了他們的信心。這部分旨在說明匈牙利人民以及納吉政府對中立的訴求是具有著一定的現(xiàn)實意義。 第三部:論述1956年匈牙利革命前后,匈牙利政府在各種因素的推動下走向“中立”的歷程。 第四部分:大國及聯(lián)合國對匈牙利“中立”的應(yīng)策。這一部分分別分析了蘇聯(lián)以及陣營,英、法、美以及聯(lián)合國會議上在匈牙利宣布中立前后各國政府的應(yīng)策變化。在論述中借助最新材料對一些觀點做了進一步的分析求證,在對這部分內(nèi)容的分析基礎(chǔ)之上指出匈牙利作為冷戰(zhàn)對峙時期的東歐小國家,追求獨立自由的愿望往往是被操縱世界命脈的大國踐踏,抑或淪為被利用來實現(xiàn)本國利益的工具。 第五部分:匈牙利“中立”的結(jié)局及其相關(guān)問題的思考,這部分是在前面的論述的基礎(chǔ)之上,分析了匈牙利人們在宣布中立之后的欣喜,蘇聯(lián)武力鎮(zhèn)壓匈牙利革命帶來的損失以及納吉等人受到的不公平的審判的結(jié)果。重點評述了1956年匈牙利“中立”這一事件,筆者認為中立雖然以失敗告終,但反映了匈牙利人民為追求獨立自由的勇氣和毅力,同時也反映了在冷戰(zhàn)的特殊時期,民族國家命運總是受到美蘇兩個超級大國陣營的復(fù)雜關(guān)系的牽制。納吉政府在革命最后時期提出中立有著一定的現(xiàn)實意義,但是復(fù)雜的國際和國內(nèi)局勢并不具備中立實現(xiàn)的現(xiàn)實條件。同時,卡達爾之所以選擇“背叛”,也許是拯救當(dāng)時匈牙利的最理智的選擇。
[Abstract]:On November 1, 1956, the Hungarian government led by Naji declared its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and declared its national neutrality. At the same time, Naji appealed to the United Nations for the assurance of Hungary's neutrality by the four major powers, including the Soviet Union, which was the socialist front led by the Soviet Union. Camp neutrality is unprecedented. Neutrality ultimately failed under the Soviet repression, and Naji's request to the United Nations was lost. However, why did the Hungarian government choose to ask for neutrality at the most chaotic moment of the revolution? Is neutrality the last choice of the Naji government? What is neutrality for the Hungarian people? What's the significance of this? What are the changes in the policies of the governments before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality in Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union? How can we evaluate this event more objectively? Many Hungarian revolutionary researchers commented on the neutrality's proclamation and failure, and that the Naji government's move was imprudent and irrational, and was the trigger for the Soviet Union's Second Military intervention. The government's declaration of neutrality was not the result of the Soviet Union's military intervention, but was the result of the Hungarian government's final attempt to save the revolution. From an objective point of view, a more systematic and comprehensive account and analysis of the historical causes, the course and the results of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 is made in the hope of providing some help for the study and discussion in this regard.
The text is divided into five parts.
Foreword: This paper introduces the research status and significance of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 at home and abroad.
The first part: the origin of Hungary's neutrality, briefly introduces the meaning and concept of neutrality, and roughly discusses the proposition and implementation results of Hungary's history of neutrality.
The second part: Hungary's internal and external historical factors of seeking "neutrality". This is the focus of this paper. It mainly demonstrates that Hungary's proposal of "neutrality" in 1956 is not a temporary impulse of the Najib government, but has far-reaching domestic and foreign factors. Excuse me, the propaganda of freedom, democracy, independence, and Naji's mature "neutrality" idea by the Podofi Club, a popular patriotic organization in Hungary, are the internal factors that propel Hungary towards neutrality. For the Hungarian people and the Najib government, the public propaganda of Free Europe Radio before and after the revolution not only gave them the dawn of pursuing Hungarian neutrality, but also strengthened their confidence.
Part three: Discusses the course of Hungarian government's neutrality under the impetus of various factors before and after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
Part IV: The response of the great powers and the United Nations to Hungary's neutrality. This part analyzes the changes of the response of the Soviet Union and the governments of the camps, Britain, France, the United States and the United Nations before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality. In the discussion, some viewpoints are further analyzed and verified with the help of the latest materials. On the basis of Rong's analysis, Hungary, as a small country in Eastern Europe during the Cold War confrontation, is often trampled by the great powers that manipulate the lifeblood of the world, or become a tool to realize its own interests.
The fifth part: the conclusion of Hungary's "neutrality" and the thinking of its related problems. This part is based on the previous discussion. It analyzes the delight of Hungarians after the declaration of neutrality, the losses caused by the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Union and the unfair trial of Naji et al. It focuses on the review of 1956. The "neutrality" in Hungary is a failure, but it reflects the courage and perseverance of the Hungarian people in pursuit of independence and freedom. It also reflects that in the special period of the cold war, the fate of the nation-state was always constrained by the complex relationship between the two superpowers camps. However, the complicated international and domestic situation does not have the realistic conditions to realize neutrality. At the same time, Kadar's choice of "betrayal" may be the most rational choice to save Hungary at that time.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：K515.5
本文編號：2176411
[Abstract]:On November 1, 1956, the Hungarian government led by Naji declared its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and declared its national neutrality. At the same time, Naji appealed to the United Nations for the assurance of Hungary's neutrality by the four major powers, including the Soviet Union, which was the socialist front led by the Soviet Union. Camp neutrality is unprecedented. Neutrality ultimately failed under the Soviet repression, and Naji's request to the United Nations was lost. However, why did the Hungarian government choose to ask for neutrality at the most chaotic moment of the revolution? Is neutrality the last choice of the Naji government? What is neutrality for the Hungarian people? What's the significance of this? What are the changes in the policies of the governments before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality in Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union? How can we evaluate this event more objectively? Many Hungarian revolutionary researchers commented on the neutrality's proclamation and failure, and that the Naji government's move was imprudent and irrational, and was the trigger for the Soviet Union's Second Military intervention. The government's declaration of neutrality was not the result of the Soviet Union's military intervention, but was the result of the Hungarian government's final attempt to save the revolution. From an objective point of view, a more systematic and comprehensive account and analysis of the historical causes, the course and the results of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 is made in the hope of providing some help for the study and discussion in this regard.
The text is divided into five parts.
Foreword: This paper introduces the research status and significance of the Hungarian government's declaration of neutrality in 1956 at home and abroad.
The first part: the origin of Hungary's neutrality, briefly introduces the meaning and concept of neutrality, and roughly discusses the proposition and implementation results of Hungary's history of neutrality.
The second part: Hungary's internal and external historical factors of seeking "neutrality". This is the focus of this paper. It mainly demonstrates that Hungary's proposal of "neutrality" in 1956 is not a temporary impulse of the Najib government, but has far-reaching domestic and foreign factors. Excuse me, the propaganda of freedom, democracy, independence, and Naji's mature "neutrality" idea by the Podofi Club, a popular patriotic organization in Hungary, are the internal factors that propel Hungary towards neutrality. For the Hungarian people and the Najib government, the public propaganda of Free Europe Radio before and after the revolution not only gave them the dawn of pursuing Hungarian neutrality, but also strengthened their confidence.
Part three: Discusses the course of Hungarian government's neutrality under the impetus of various factors before and after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
Part IV: The response of the great powers and the United Nations to Hungary's neutrality. This part analyzes the changes of the response of the Soviet Union and the governments of the camps, Britain, France, the United States and the United Nations before and after Hungary's declaration of neutrality. In the discussion, some viewpoints are further analyzed and verified with the help of the latest materials. On the basis of Rong's analysis, Hungary, as a small country in Eastern Europe during the Cold War confrontation, is often trampled by the great powers that manipulate the lifeblood of the world, or become a tool to realize its own interests.
The fifth part: the conclusion of Hungary's "neutrality" and the thinking of its related problems. This part is based on the previous discussion. It analyzes the delight of Hungarians after the declaration of neutrality, the losses caused by the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Union and the unfair trial of Naji et al. It focuses on the review of 1956. The "neutrality" in Hungary is a failure, but it reflects the courage and perseverance of the Hungarian people in pursuit of independence and freedom. It also reflects that in the special period of the cold war, the fate of the nation-state was always constrained by the complex relationship between the two superpowers camps. However, the complicated international and domestic situation does not have the realistic conditions to realize neutrality. At the same time, Kadar's choice of "betrayal" may be the most rational choice to save Hungary at that time.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：K515.5
【參考文獻】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 時殷弘;匈牙利事件和美國的政策[J];南京大學(xué)學(xué)報(哲學(xué).人文科學(xué).社會科學(xué)版);1998年01期
，本文編號：2176411
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