本文選題：聯(lián)邦德國 + 北約同盟　； 參考：《華中師范大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：聯(lián)邦德國作為戰(zhàn)敗國,被解除了武裝、喪失了主權(quán)。因此西德戰(zhàn)后的主要目標(biāo)為保障領(lǐng)土安全和恢復(fù)平等地位。為此,西德選擇了通過參與核事務(wù)來擁有核武器的策略,這樣既可以加強(qiáng)自身防御力量,又可把核武器作為籌碼來提高自身政治地位。 第一章主要敘述了戰(zhàn)后聯(lián)邦德國的重新武裝之路。阿登納擔(dān)任聯(lián)邦總理后奉行的是向西方靠攏的政策。他認(rèn)為西德的主要威脅來自于東方,所以必須把西德的安全與北約綁定起來。而隨著冷戰(zhàn)的加劇,重新武裝西德逐漸成為了盟國的現(xiàn)實(shí)需要。但由于歐洲國家對二戰(zhàn)的心理陰影及法國大國政策,重新武裝之路可謂一波三折。在歐洲防務(wù)體系建立失敗后,由于英美向法國強(qiáng)力施壓,《倫敦-巴黎協(xié)定》終獲通過,西德正式成為北約一員。 第二章著重介紹了聯(lián)邦德國初期的核政策。阿登納首次成為聯(lián)邦總理后,因?yàn)槠渌鼑覍ξ鞯氯源嬗泻艽蠼湫?所以他沒有選擇把發(fā)展核武器作為首要的政治目標(biāo)。而且由于盟國對西德的核排擠,客觀上造成西德對核武器的政治作用認(rèn)識不足。但五十年代中期以后,“全權(quán)代理”軍事演習(xí),雷福德事件,英法獨(dú)立發(fā)展核武器的決心等眾多事件使阿登納轉(zhuǎn)變了觀念,逐漸開始重視核武器的影響。但因?yàn)槊藝念檻],西德選擇了“核分享”作為發(fā)展策略,這正好又與美國控制歐洲的想法合拍,西德開始進(jìn)一步考慮參與聯(lián)盟中的核決策以增強(qiáng)話語權(quán)。 第三章論述了聯(lián)邦德國對“靈活反應(yīng)”戰(zhàn)略的政策。面對來自東方的威脅,西德的戰(zhàn)略思想是與敵人進(jìn)行一場限制在常規(guī)范圍內(nèi)的有限戰(zhàn)爭。當(dāng)常規(guī)戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)后,這個過程越短越好,美國的核武器能夠盡快使用,以起到震懾作用,避免戰(zhàn)爭進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大。這與美國主張剛開始只用常規(guī)武器反擊的策略是背道而馳的。而且西德對美國要求盟國優(yōu)先發(fā)展常規(guī)武器的做法十分不滿�！按笪餮笾髁x者”艾哈德上臺后逐漸調(diào)整了戰(zhàn)略,美國也作出一定讓步,最終二者達(dá)成了妥協(xié)。 第四章討論的內(nèi)容是進(jìn)入六十年代后,英法獨(dú)立發(fā)展核力量的意愿更加強(qiáng)烈。美國擔(dān)心這會刺激到聯(lián)邦德國與其它西歐國家擁有核武器的欲望,因此提出了“多邊核力量”計(jì)劃,目的是把核武器掌控在自己手中讓盟國分享,防止核擴(kuò)散。在其它歐洲盟國的態(tài)度都不積極的情形下,聯(lián)邦德國顯得非常熱心,希望能借此機(jī)會在聯(lián)盟中參與控制核武器。但由于英法的堅(jiān)決反對和國際形勢的發(fā)展,美國對西德的態(tài)度從支持逐漸轉(zhuǎn)向中立,“多邊核力量”計(jì)劃最終走向失敗,西德分享核武器的計(jì)劃也因此落空。 結(jié)語部分對西德在這一時期核政策的成敗得失做了總結(jié)與評價。
[Abstract]:As a defeated country, Federal Germany was disarmed and lost its sovereignty. Therefore, the main goal of West Germany was to safeguard territorial security and restore equal status. Therefore, West Germany chose the strategy of possessing nuclear weapons by participating in nuclear affairs, which could enhance both its own defense capacity and the nuclear weapons as a chip to improve its own administration. Status of treatment.
The first chapter mainly narrated the re armed route of the post-war Federal Germany. After Adenauer served as the prime minister, he pursued a policy towards the West. He believed that the main threat from West Germany came from the East, so the security of West Germany must be bound to NATO. But because of the European countries' psychological shadow of World War II and the French policy of great powers, the road to re armed is a twists and turns. After the failure of the European defense system, the West Germany officially became a member of NATO owing to the strong pressure from Britain and the United States to the London Paris agreement.
The second chapter focuses on the introduction of the early nuclear policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. After Adenauer became the Prime Minister for the first time, he had no choice to develop nuclear weapons as the primary political goal because other countries still had great vigilance on West Germany, and the political role of western Germany in the nuclear weapons was objectively recognized by the Allies' nuclear exclusion to West Germany. But after the mid 50s, the "full agency" military exercises, the ruford incident, the determination of the independent development of nuclear weapons by Britain and France and many other events made Adenauer change his ideas and gradually began to attach importance to the impact of nuclear weapons. The idea of making Europe is in step, and West Germany began to consider further the nuclear decision-making in the alliance to enhance its voice.
The third chapter discusses the policy of the Federal Germany on the "flexible response" strategy. Facing the threat from the East, the strategic thought of West Germany is a limited war restricted to the enemy in the conventional scope. When the conventional war breaks out, the shorter the better the better, the nuclear weapons in the United States can be used as soon as possible to avoid the war. The struggle was further expanded. This was contrary to the strategy that the United States had just begun to fight only with conventional weapons. And West Germany was dissatisfied with the way the United States asked the allies to give priority to the development of conventional weapons. "The the Atlantic doctrine" Erhard gradually adjusted its strategy and the United States made a concession, and the two finally reached a compromise.
The fourth chapter talks about the stronger willingness of Britain and France to develop nuclear power independently after 60s. The United States is worried that it will stimulate the desire of the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western European countries to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, the "multilateral nuclear power" program is proposed, with the aim of controlling nuclear weapons in their own hands to share and prevent nuclear proliferation in their own hands. When the attitudes of other European allies were not active, the Federal Germany looked very enthusiastic and hoped to take this opportunity to participate in the control of nuclear weapons in the alliance. However, owing to the strong opposition of Britain and France and the development of the international situation, the attitude of the United States to West Germany was gradually shifted from support to neutrality, and the "multilateral nuclear power" program eventually failed. Germany's plans to share nuclear weapons have also fallen out.
The conclusion sums up the success and failure of West Germany's nuclear policy in this period.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：K518

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