本文選題：艾登 + 埃及政策�。� 參考：《浙江師范大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 目前對艾登的埃及政策論述大多偏重于艾登在蘇伊士運河危機和運河戰(zhàn)爭的失敗,而對于運河危機前艾登的埃及政策較少提及,本文將艾登在二戰(zhàn)后擔(dān)任英國外交大臣和英國首相(1951.11—1957.1)期間對埃及的外交活動作為一個完整的過程,分析他的埃及政策得失,通過分析二戰(zhàn)后艾登對埃政策演變揭示英美兩國在五十年代初在中東的合作和沖突以及艾登埃及政策的失敗對二十世紀五十年代初英國在中東殖民體系的影響。 論文擬從六個部分展開:第一部分是緒論,主要介紹艾登戰(zhàn)后埃及政策的研究動態(tài)和這一選題的學(xué)術(shù)價值和現(xiàn)實意義。艾登在戰(zhàn)后的埃及政策主要是與埃及圍繞英國從蘇伊士運河撤軍、組建巴格達組織、解決埃以爭端和蘇伊士運河危機的沖突展開,這些沖突最終導(dǎo)致了艾登在運河戰(zhàn)爭的失敗。他的對埃政策也經(jīng)歷了安撫埃及、限制埃及到敵視埃及的變化,而且伴隨著美國與英國兩國在埃及問題上的合作和沖突。 第二部分主要介紹埃及在艾登的英國中東戰(zhàn)略中的地位,艾登把埃及當(dāng)作英國在中東殖民統(tǒng)治的中心,他堅信只有控制住埃及,才能穩(wěn)定英國在中東的殖民統(tǒng)治。這使得他的對埃政策有三重目標:讓埃及遠離蘇聯(lián),并將埃及納入到英國主導(dǎo)的中東防御體系中;借助美國、法國等西方大國的力量,壓制埃及反對英國的行為,使埃及的民族獨立運動對英國在中東殖民體系的沖擊降到最低;從經(jīng)濟上援助埃及,并向埃及提供少量的武器,讓埃及依賴于英國,從而更好地維持英國在埃及的利益。 第三部分主要介紹艾登任外交大臣期間,主要推行安撫埃及的政策。由于二戰(zhàn)后埃及國內(nèi)不斷高漲的反英浪潮,艾登繼承前勞合·喬治政府和艾德禮政府的埃及政策,一方面艾登極力主張將埃及納入到西方國家的“中東司令部”中,從而變相地維護英國對埃及的控制。另一方面他主張英國從運河基地撤軍來滿足埃及獨立的要求,從而安撫埃及,同時他通過新的蘇伊士運河條約,將英軍重新返回運河的可能和納賽爾允諾在中東發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭時與英國合作的以法律的形式固定下來。以英埃和解為契機,他積極聯(lián)合美國,要求以色列作適當(dāng)?shù)淖尣絹斫鉀Q埃及的現(xiàn)實威脅,推動埃以實現(xiàn)和解。 第四部分是主要介紹艾登如何轉(zhuǎn)向推行敵視埃及的政策。艾登在組建和擴大巴格達組織、約旦問題和援助阿斯旺高壩上,與埃及領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人沖突不斷,1955年底,艾登已將埃及視為英國在中東最大威脅。由于埃及與蘇聯(lián)靠近反對英國殖民統(tǒng)治,艾登在格拉布事件后推行敵視埃及的政策。此刻艾登的對埃政策越來越混亂:艾登使埃及遠離蘇聯(lián)卻由于埃蘇武器協(xié)定使埃及更加靠近蘇聯(lián);他組建巴格達組織目的是聯(lián)合美國限制埃及,卻使美國在維護英國中東殖民統(tǒng)治的路上走得更遠,而且巴格達組織也成為埃及人攻擊的目標;他在經(jīng)濟上援助埃及的目的是換取埃及在中東,特別是在埃及與英國合作,但是阿斯旺高壩貸款卻成為埃及發(fā)動運河危機的導(dǎo)火索。 第五部分主要探討艾登如何從蘇伊士運河危機走向運河戰(zhàn)爭。為了維護英國在埃及的利益,艾登積極爭取美國,以武力為后盾用外交途徑迫使埃及放棄控制運河,但是英美之間的分歧和納賽爾靈活的外交策略,致使艾登在聯(lián)合國的談判顯得蒼白無力,在外交解決運河危機的努力失敗后,他不得不聯(lián)合法國和以色列發(fā)動運河戰(zhàn)爭。 第六部分是對全文的總結(jié)主要分析影響艾登決策和執(zhí)行埃及政策的因素,其中美國對艾登的對埃政策影響最大。艾登對埃政策的主要目的是為了維護英國對埃及的殖民利益,這決定了艾登與納賽爾之間是根本對立的。雖然艾登不斷妥協(xié),并放棄一些英國在埃及的殖民利益以換取埃及方面的合作,但是艾登最終走向運河戰(zhàn)爭。也只有認識這一點,我們才能更好地了解其與前任政府和后任政府的對埃政策既有區(qū)別又有某種連續(xù)性的特性。
[Abstract]:At present, most of Aydin's Egyptian policy discourse focuses on Aydin's failure in the Suez Canal Crisis and the Canal War, while Aydin's Egyptian policy was rarely mentioned before the canal crisis. This article took Aydin as a complete diplomatic activity of the British Foreign Minister and British Prime Minister (1951.11 - 1957.1) after World War II. The process, analysis of his Egyptian policy gains and losses, through the analysis of the evolution of Aydin's policy towards Egypt after World War II to reveal the British and American cooperation and conflict in the Middle East in the early 50s and the failure of Aydin's Egyptian policy on the influence of Britain in the Middle East colonial system at the beginning of the 1950s.
The thesis will be carried out from six parts: the first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the research trends of Aydin's post-war Egyptian policy and the academic value and practical significance of this topic. Aydin's post war Egyptian policy was mainly to withdraw the army from the Suez canal in Britain and to form the Baghdad organization, to solve the dispute between the Egyptians and the Suez canal crisis. The conflict unfolded, which eventually led to the failure of Aydin in the Canal War. His policy towards Egypt also went through appeasing Egypt, restricting Egypt to hostility to Egypt, and accompanied the cooperation and conflict between the United States and Britain on the Egyptian problem.
The second part mainly introduces Egypt's position in Aydin's British Middle East strategy. Aydin regards Egypt as the center of British colonial rule in the Middle East. He firmly believes that only the control of Egypt can stabilize the British colonial rule in the Middle East, which makes his policy towards Egypt three goals: to keep Egypt away from the Soviet Union and to bring Egypt into Britain. In the dominant Middle East defense system, the power of the Western powers such as the United States, France, and other Western powers suppressed Egypt's actions against Britain, made the Egyptian national independence movement to the lowest impact on Britain's colonial system in the Middle East, provided aid to Egypt economically, and provided a small amount of weapons to Egypt, so that Egypt depended on Britain, thus better maintaining the UK. The interests of the country in Egypt.
The third part mainly introduced Aydin's policy of appeasing Egypt during the period of the foreign minister. Because of the rising tide of anti Britain in Egypt after World War II, Aydin inherited the Egyptian policy of the former Lloyd George government and the Attlee government. On the one hand, Aydin strongly advocated the inclusion of Egypt into the "Middle East Command" in the western countries. On the other hand, he advocated Britain's control of Egypt. On the other hand, he advocated the withdrawal of Britain from the canal base to meet Egyptian independence requirements, thus appeasing Egypt, and he passed the new Suez Canal Treaty to return the British army to the canal, and Nasser promised to cooperate with Britain in the form of law in the Middle East during the war. Fixed. Taking the opportunity of Anglo Egyptian reconciliation, he actively united with the United States, demanding that Israel make appropriate concessions to solve the real threat of Egypt and promote reconciliation between Egypt and Israel.
The fourth part was mainly about how Aydin turned to the policy of hostility to Egypt. Aydin was in conflict with the Egyptian leaders in the formation and expansion of Baghdad, the Jordan question and aid to the Aswan high dam. At the end of 1955, Aydin considered Egypt the greatest threat in the Middle East. Aydin pursued a hostile Egyptian policy after the grub incident. At the moment, Aydin's policy towards Egypt became more and more chaotic: Aydin made Egypt far away from the Soviet Union but was closer to the Soviet Union because of the Soviet Union's arms agreement; the purpose of the formation of Baghdad was to unite the United States to restrict Egypt, but to keep the United States on the way of maintaining British colonial rule in the Middle East. Further, and Baghdad was the target of the Egyptian attack; his economic aid to Egypt was to exchange Egypt's cooperation in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, but the Aswan high dam loan became the fuse of Egypt to launch the canal crisis.
The fifth part mainly discusses how Aydin moves from the Suez Canal Crisis to the Canal War. In order to safeguard Britain's interests in Egypt, Aydin actively strives for the United States and forces Egypt to give up the control of the canal by diplomatic means. However, the differences between Britain and the United States and Nasser's diplomatic strategy have led Aydin to negotiate in the United Nations. He looked pale and weak, and after the failure of the diplomatic solution to the canal crisis, he had to unite France and Israel to wage the Canal War.
The sixth part is the summary of the full text of the main analysis of the influence of Aydin decision-making and the implementation of the Egyptian policy factors, of which the United States has the greatest impact on Aydin's policy to Egypt. The main purpose of Aydin's policy is to maintain the British colonial interests of Egypt, which determines the fundamental opposition between Aydin and Nasser. In order to understand the difference and continuity between the former government and the later government, we can better understand the difference between the former government and the later government in order to give up some British colonial interests in Egypt in exchange for cooperation in Egypt, but Aydin finally went to the Canal War.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：K561.5

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 李建美;美國在蘇伊士運河危機中的作用和影響[D];山東師范大學(xué);2012年

2 馬祖杰;蘇伊士運河危機與美蘇對策[D];吉林大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：1892220