本文選題：克萊 + 美國(guó)對(duì)德政策��； 參考：《華東師范大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：二戰(zhàn)后,美國(guó)對(duì)德政策經(jīng)歷了從嚴(yán)厲到溫和,再到重建與扶植的轉(zhuǎn)變。這個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變的根源是美國(guó)國(guó)家利益與國(guó)際形勢(shì)的變化,但是這一轉(zhuǎn)變?cè)诿绹?guó)決策層的發(fā)生及其對(duì)戰(zhàn)后德國(guó)的影響,都離不開(kāi)美占區(qū)軍事長(zhǎng)官克萊的推動(dòng)。由于克萊在美占區(qū)負(fù)責(zé)軍事政府事宜,所以他對(duì)于占領(lǐng)區(qū)的實(shí)際情況和盟國(guó)管制委員會(huì)中的爭(zhēng)論最為熟悉,也因此成為美國(guó)決策層的情報(bào)員,深得貝爾納斯和馬歇爾等人的信任,并為他們主導(dǎo)制定的對(duì)德政策出謀劃策,甚至是建議和修改。從JCS1067到斯圖加特演說(shuō),再到JCS1779及貨幣改革和馬歇爾計(jì)劃的實(shí)施,這些政策和決定都少不了克萊的作用。 由于占領(lǐng)初期美國(guó)決策層內(nèi)部的意見(jiàn)分歧,以及占領(lǐng)工作面臨的實(shí)際情況不斷變化的原因,美國(guó)政府始終缺少一套穩(wěn)定和持久的對(duì)德政策。這一方面造成美國(guó)對(duì)德政策的不確定性,另一方面也給占領(lǐng)區(qū)軍事長(zhǎng)官留下了較大的自主空問(wèn)。換言之,克萊可以在不違反既定占領(lǐng)法規(guī)的前提下,按照自己的意愿解釋和實(shí)施某些政策,控制對(duì)德改造的實(shí)施過(guò)程。實(shí)際上,無(wú)論是嚴(yán)厲的JCS1067,還是四國(guó)一致難以達(dá)成的波茨坦公告,都沒(méi)能束縛住克萊的手腳�？巳R一邊重建德國(guó)的民主政治,一邊恢復(fù)德國(guó)的生產(chǎn)與貿(mào)易,將更多的權(quán)力轉(zhuǎn)交到德國(guó)人手中,要求德國(guó)人建立對(duì)自己負(fù)責(zé)的政府。為了盡早實(shí)現(xiàn)德國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)上的自給,他提出并實(shí)現(xiàn)了工業(yè)水平計(jì)劃的修改、拆卸計(jì)劃的中止、雙占區(qū)的合并,并在此基礎(chǔ)上推動(dòng)實(shí)施貨幣改革,促成整個(gè)西占區(qū)的聯(lián)合,為迎接馬歇爾計(jì)劃鋪平了道路。當(dāng)柏林危機(jī)發(fā)生時(shí),克萊力主空運(yùn)支援柏林,并成功組織了維持西柏林250萬(wàn)市民日常供給的空運(yùn),為美國(guó)贏得外交優(yōu)勢(shì)。 總之,無(wú)論是戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)對(duì)德政策的制定還是其實(shí)施,克萊都在其中發(fā)揮著舉足輕重的作用。
[Abstract]:After World War II, American policy towards Germany underwent a transformation from severe to moderate, then to reconstruction and support. The root of this change is the change in the national interests of the United States and the changes in the international situation. However, the emergence of this change at the decision-making level in the United States and its impact on postwar Germany can not be separated from the push of Clay, the military commander of the United States occupation region. Since Clay is responsible for military affairs in the occupied areas of the United States, he is most familiar with the actual situation in the occupied territories and the debates in the Allied Control Committee. As a result, he became an intelligence agent at the decision-making level in the United States. He was trusted by Berners and Marshall, and advised, even suggested, and modified the policies they led. From JCS1067 to Stuttgart, to the JCS1779 and the implementation of currency reform and the Marshall Plan, these policies and decisions were not without Clay's role. Due to the differences of opinion within the decision-making circles in the early days of the occupation and the changing reality of the occupation, the United States government has always lacked a stable and lasting policy towards Germany. On the one hand, the uncertainty of US policy towards Germany, on the other hand, left the occupied military commander with a larger independent air question. In other words, Clay could explain and implement certain policies according to his own wishes, and control the implementation of the German transformation without violating the established occupation laws. Indeed, neither the tough JCS 1067 nor the hard-to-reach Potsdam announcement had tied Clay's hands and feet. While rebuilding German democracy, Clay restored German production and trade, transferred more power to the Germans and demanded that the Germans establish a government that was accountable to them. In order to realize Germany's economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible, he proposed and realized the revision of the industrial level plan, the suspension of the demolition plan, the merger of the dual occupation areas, and on this basis promoted the implementation of currency reform and led to the union of the entire Western occupation area. It paved the way for the Marshall Plan. When the Berlin crisis broke out, Clay supported Berlin by air and successfully organized an airlift to maintain the daily supply of 2.5 million people in West Berlin, thus winning a diplomatic advantage for the United States. In short, Clay played an important role in the formulation and implementation of postwar American policy on Germany.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D871.2;K153

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