本文選題：限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判 + 軍備控制　； 參考：《東北師范大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 核武器的巨大破壞力量讓人們幾乎在其產(chǎn)生之時(shí)就不得不思考這樣一個(gè)問(wèn)題:如何更好地控制它們。從艾森豪威爾政府開(kāi)始,美國(guó)便開(kāi)始摸索一條限制戰(zhàn)略武器之路,期間經(jīng)過(guò)肯尼迪和約翰遜政府的實(shí)踐,終于在尼克松政府時(shí)期得以確立,限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判正式開(kāi)啟。福特上臺(tái)后,繼續(xù)執(zhí)行對(duì)蘇“緩和”的外交政策,第二階段限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判得以延續(xù)。通過(guò)海參崴與赫爾辛基首腦會(huì)談,美蘇雙方進(jìn)一步縮小分歧,在進(jìn)攻性戰(zhàn)略武器運(yùn)載工具總量以及多彈頭分導(dǎo)重返大氣層運(yùn)載工具總量等問(wèn)題上達(dá)成共識(shí),但雙方在“逆火”式轟炸機(jī)以及巡航導(dǎo)彈等關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域都不肯讓步,致使談判最終沒(méi)有達(dá)成正式協(xié)議,也使這一時(shí)期的限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判以失敗告終。 福特時(shí)期的限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判由于沒(méi)有簽訂重要條約而往往被人忽視。本文利用美國(guó)政府的大量原始解密檔案并借鑒相關(guān)的研究成果,試圖追溯福特政府時(shí)期美蘇限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判的軌跡,進(jìn)而揭示這一時(shí)期限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判失敗的原因及其實(shí)質(zhì)。研究此問(wèn)題,有助于更好地理清談判過(guò)程的全貌,并對(duì)福特政府時(shí)期的美蘇關(guān)系有一個(gè)更清楚的認(rèn)識(shí)。 本文在綜合運(yùn)用國(guó)際關(guān)系理論的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)美國(guó)政府解密文件進(jìn)行了細(xì)致的分析整理,最終試圖說(shuō)明如下問(wèn)題:(1)限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判是美蘇確認(rèn)相互核威懾的結(jié)果;(2)限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判是均勢(shì)的表現(xiàn);(3)福特政府時(shí)期的限制核武器談判一直沒(méi)有取得實(shí)質(zhì)性進(jìn)展,主要原因是雙方都不愿放棄自身的優(yōu)勢(shì)以及美蘇之間的不信任。此外,當(dāng)時(shí)國(guó)際、國(guó)內(nèi)因素也不利于美蘇間的緩和,福特總統(tǒng)的個(gè)人局限性也束縛了談判的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展;(4)雖然談判以失敗告終,但這一時(shí)期的限制戰(zhàn)略武器談判起到了承上啟下的作用,它繼承了尼克松執(zhí)政時(shí)期限制戰(zhàn)略武器的良好勢(shì)頭,又為卡特執(zhí)政時(shí)期達(dá)成第二階段限制戰(zhàn)略武器協(xié)議奠定了重要的基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:The destructive power of nuclear weapons has forced people to think about how to better control them almost immediately.From the Eisenhower Administration, the United States began to explore a way to limit strategic weapons. During the practice of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, it was finally established during the Nixon administration, and the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms were formally opened.After Ford came to power, he continued his foreign policy of "detente" with the Soviet Union, and the second phase of Strategic Arms limitation talks continued.Through the summit talks between Vladivostok and Helsinki, the United States and the Soviet Union further narrowed their differences and reached consensus on such issues as the total number of delivery vehicles for strategic offensive weapons and the total number of multi-warhead sub-guided re-entry vehicles.However, the two sides refused to give ground in key areas such as counter-fire bombers and cruise missiles, resulting in no formal agreement in the negotiations and the failure of strategic arms limitation negotiations during this period.Strategic Arms limitation negotiations during Ford were often ignored because of the absence of an important treaty.Using a large number of original declassified files of the US government and relevant research results, this paper attempts to trace back the track of the US-Soviet strategic arms limitation negotiations during the Ford administration.Then it reveals the reason and essence of the failure of the negotiations on limiting strategic arms in this period.Studying this issue will help us to better understand the whole of the negotiation process and have a clearer understanding of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Ford administration.Based on the comprehensive application of the theory of international relations, this paper makes a detailed analysis and arrangement of the documents declassified by the US government.Finally, I tried to explain the following question: (1) Strategic Arms limitation negotiations are the result of the US and Soviet Union confirming mutual nuclear deterrence. 2) Strategic Arms limitation negotiations are a manifestation of the balance of power. 3) during the Ford administration's negotiations on nuclear arms limitation, there has been no substantial progress.The main reason is the reluctance of both sides to give up their strengths and mistrust between the US and the Soviet Union.In addition, at that time, international and domestic factors were also not conducive to the relaxation between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Ford's personal limitations also constrained the further development of the negotiations.However, the strategic arms limitation negotiations during this period played an important role in connecting the past with the following. It inherited the good momentum of restricting strategic weapons during the Nixon administration.It also laid an important foundation for the conclusion of the second Strategic Arms limitation Agreement under Carter.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：K712.54

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 趙學(xué)功;;核武器與美蘇冷戰(zhàn)[J];浙江學(xué)刊;2006年03期

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本文編號(hào)：1766969