本文關(guān)鍵詞： 朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭 停戰(zhàn)談判 戰(zhàn)俘遣返　出處：《山西大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 本文從出朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭遣返戰(zhàn)俘問題的談判入手,在閱讀大量檔案文獻(xiàn)和國內(nèi)外學(xué)者論著的基礎(chǔ)上,對戰(zhàn)俘問題談判的經(jīng)過進(jìn)行了完整回顧。同時(shí),本文還聯(lián)系美蘇冷戰(zhàn)的國際格局,將參與談判的各國利益與國際大背景有機(jī)結(jié)合起來,深入探討了導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)俘問題產(chǎn)生、拖延、直至最終解決的根源。 論文的正文除引言和結(jié)論外,共分四個部分。第一章對朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭交戰(zhàn)雙方在戰(zhàn)爭各個階段戰(zhàn)俘產(chǎn)生的情況和雙方戰(zhàn)俘總量失衡的原因進(jìn)行了分析,論述了戰(zhàn)俘問題是如何形成的。第二章主要介紹了戰(zhàn)俘問題的初步交鋒,闡述了交戰(zhàn)雙方對解決戰(zhàn)俘問題的設(shè)想、問題的正式提出直至矛盾無法調(diào)和導(dǎo)致談判中斷。第三章,從談判雙方在談判桌上的針鋒相對著手,分析了受冷戰(zhàn)局勢制約的各國利益取向和由此導(dǎo)致的戰(zhàn)俘問題延宕不絕的根源。第四章,論證了停戰(zhàn)談判得以恢復(fù)的三個重要契機(jī),即美國打破僵局的試探、斯大林逝世后蘇聯(lián)政策的調(diào)整以及中國、北朝鮮的認(rèn)同,使雙方最終在戰(zhàn)俘問題上達(dá)成一致,停戰(zhàn)協(xié)定達(dá)成,朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束。 本文遵循馬列主義唯物史觀的基本原則和唯物辯證法,通過分析,筆者認(rèn)為:戰(zhàn)俘問題談判中雙方談判決策的制定均受蘇美冷戰(zhàn)格局的限約,既要爭取利益的最大實(shí)現(xiàn),又力圖避免談判破裂導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭擴(kuò)大。談判拖延導(dǎo)致朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭又延長了一年半之久,造成了巨大的人力、物力損失,美、蘇、中等參與戰(zhàn)爭的幾大當(dāng)事國均對此負(fù)有不可推卸的責(zé)任。通過對半個多世紀(jì)前這一歷史事件的回顧,可以看到,盡管朝鮮停戰(zhàn)談判在戰(zhàn)俘問題上拖延許久,但戰(zhàn)爭最終還是通過談判的方式得到了解決,說明和平談判是解決國際爭端的有效途徑,戰(zhàn)爭不是不能避免的。另外,板門店談判中運(yùn)用的談判技巧和策略也對當(dāng)今國家間談判有著重要的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:Starting from the negotiations on the repatriation of prisoners of war in the Korean War, this paper, on the basis of reading a large number of archival documents and the works of scholars at home and abroad, reviews the course of the negotiations on the issue of prisoners of war. At the same time, Considering the international situation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, this paper organically combines the interests of the countries involved in the negotiations with the international background, and probes into the root causes that lead to the emergence, delay and final settlement of the issue of prisoners of war. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the main body of the thesis is divided into four parts. The first chapter analyzes the situation of prisoners of war in all stages of the Korean War and the reasons for the imbalance of the total number of prisoners of war between the two sides. This paper discusses how the question of prisoners of war is formed. The second chapter mainly introduces the preliminary confrontation of the question of prisoners of war, and expounds the ideas of the warring parties to solve the problem of prisoners of war. Starting from the tit-for-tat confrontation between the negotiating parties at the negotiating table, this paper analyzes the interests of all countries restricted by the cold war situation and the causes of the endless delay in the prisoner of war problem. Chapter 4th demonstrates three important opportunities for the resumption of the armistice negotiations. That is, the temptation of the United States to break the deadlock, the adjustment of the Soviet policy after Stalin's death, and the recognition of China and North Korea made the two sides finally reach an agreement on the issue of prisoners of war, an armistice agreement and an end to the Korean War. Following the basic principles of Marxism-Leninist historical materialism and materialistic dialectics, the author thinks that the decision-making of negotiation between the two sides in the negotiation of prisoners of war is restricted by the Cold War pattern of the Soviet Union and the United States, and it is necessary to strive for the greatest realization of interests. He also tried to avoid the breakdown of the negotiations leading to the expansion of the war. The delay in the negotiations led to the prolongation of the Korean War for another year and a half, resulting in huge human and material losses, the United States and the Soviet Union. All the major countries involved in the war in the middle bear the unshirkable responsibility for this. Looking back on this historical event more than half a century ago, we can see that despite the prolonged delay in the Korean armistice negotiations on the issue of prisoners of war, However, the war was finally resolved through negotiation, indicating that peace negotiations are an effective way to resolve international disputes, and that war is not inevitable. The negotiation techniques and strategies used in Panmunjom negotiations are also of great significance to the negotiation between countries today.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：K153

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本文編號：1528898