本文關(guān)鍵詞： 美國 對(duì)德政策 安撫 綏靖 遏制　出處：《首都師范大學(xué)》2001年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 本文從美國的歐洲戰(zhàn)略出發(fā)論述1933—1940年的美國對(duì)德政策。 第一次世界大戰(zhàn)后，美國確立的歐洲戰(zhàn)略是：在孤立主義的大前提下，極力使歐洲 保持和平與穩(wěn)定，以利于美國對(duì)歐洲進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張。美國在1933—1940年間實(shí)行的對(duì)德 政策就是為這一歐洲戰(zhàn)略服務(wù)的。 1933—1940年的美國對(duì)德政策歷經(jīng)三個(gè)階段： 從1933年羅斯福成為美國總統(tǒng)到1938年3月德國吞并奧地利前，美國對(duì)德國奉行 安撫政策。它企圖通過滿足德國修正《凡爾賽條約》不公正對(duì)待的要求來消除德國的不 滿情緒，進(jìn)而使歐洲保持和平與穩(wěn)定。為此，美國默認(rèn)德國重整軍備的舉動(dòng)，并先后推 出富勒使命和韋爾斯計(jì)劃等安撫德國的行動(dòng)與設(shè)想。但是，由于德國的外交目標(biāo)根本不 限于修正《凡爾賽條約》，因此，美國的安撫行動(dòng)和計(jì)劃均告失敗。 從德國吞并奧地利開始到1938年9月簽訂《慕尼黑協(xié)定》為止，美國對(duì)德國實(shí)行 的是綏靖政策。它企圖以犧牲小國的利益來換取歐洲和平的維持。為此，它對(duì)德國吞并 奧地利的舉動(dòng)采取了事實(shí)上承認(rèn)的態(tài)度；在“五月危機(jī)”前后和“慕尼黑危機(jī)”期間， 它也主張滿足德國吞并蘇臺(tái)德區(qū)的愿望，并希望以此來換取歐洲的所謂“和平”。 慕尼黑會(huì)議之后，美國的對(duì)德政策是綏靖與遏制并存。慕尼黑會(huì)議之后，希特勒顯 示出來的無止無盡的侵略野心超過了美國對(duì)德政策所能容忍的限度，因此，美國政策中 開始出現(xiàn)遏制德國的傾向。但與此同時(shí)，美國并沒有放棄綏靖德國的立場(chǎng)。綏靖與遏制 并存的美國對(duì)德政策在羅斯福1939年4月和8月向希特勒發(fā)出的兩次“和平呼吁”和 1940年韋爾斯的歐洲之行中得到了充分體現(xiàn)。但是，美國推行的這一政策沒有取得效果，， 隨著希特勒1940年4月再次發(fā)動(dòng)侵略，美國綏靖與遏制并存的對(duì)德政策宣告失敗。美國 隨后走上了遏制德國的道路，直至最終宣戰(zhàn)。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the American policy towards Germany from 1933 to 1940 from the European strategy of the United States. After the first World War, the European strategy established by the United States was: under the premise of isolationism, the United States made every effort to make Europe. To maintain peace and stability in the interests of America's economic expansion of Europe. Policy serves this European strategy. The American policy towards Germany from 1933 to 1940 went through three stages:. Before Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, before Roosevelt became President of the United States in 1933, the United States committed itself to Germany. A policy of appeasement. It seeks to eliminate Germany's injustice by satisfying Germany's demands to amend the Versailles treaty. The United States acquiesced in Germany's arms rearmament and pushed it one after another. The mission of Fuller and the Welles plan to appease Germany. However, because of Germany's diplomatic goals, it is not at all. Limited to amending the Treaty of Versailles, America's pacification and program failed. From the beginning of Germany's annexation of Austria to the signing of the Munich Agreement on September 1938, the United States imposed on Germany. It was a policy of appeasement. It attempted to sacrifice the interests of small nations in exchange for the maintenance of peace in Europe. For this reason, it annexed Germany. Austria adopted a de facto recognition attitude; before and after the "May crisis" and during the "Munich crisis", It also favours Germany's annexation of Sudeten in exchange for Europe's so-called peace. After the Munich Conference, the American policy towards Germany was appeasement and containment. After the Munich Conference, Hitler showed. The inexhaustible aggressive ambitions that have been shown exceed the limits of American policy towards Germany, and therefore, in American policy, At the same time, the United States did not give up its appeasement position. Appeasement and containment. On April 1939 and August, Roosevelt made two "appeals for peace" to Hitler. Welles' trip to Europe in 1940 was well exemplified. But the policy pursued by the United States did not work. With Hitler's invasion in April 1940, America's policy of appeasement and containment failed. He then embarked on the road of containing Germany until it finally declared war.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2001
【分類號(hào)】：K152;K712.52;K516.44

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 高雅潔;1938年奧地利不抵抗德國原因探微[D];華中師范大學(xué);2011年

本文編號(hào)：1512789