本文關鍵詞： 制度 改革 軍力 建設 國策 權變 腓特列 大王 大戰(zhàn)略　出處：《中國人民大學》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】： 普魯士國王腓特烈二世(又稱腓特烈大王)是18世紀歐洲杰出的大戰(zhàn)略決策者。他結合啟蒙思想、霍亨索倫王朝傳統(tǒng)與普魯士國情,創(chuàng)造出了一套自成體系的大戰(zhàn)略思想,其根本原則是“純粹國家利益至上”,并大致可歸納為制度改革、軍力建設與國策權變?nèi)齻�方面。其中制度改革旨在通過立法、行政管理等手段保護生產(chǎn)、促進法治、施行宗教寬容,為國家注入開明、公正的新精神;軍力建設則是秉承其先王傳統(tǒng),進一步加強軍隊紀律、提高戰(zhàn)斗力,并想方設法減少軍隊給經(jīng)濟造成的負擔;國策權變基于他對歐洲國際格局的宏觀把握,認為國家間關系是一種現(xiàn)實利益糾葛,強調(diào)普魯士利用此種關系對外擴張的必要和可能,要求果斷地運用軍隊實現(xiàn)擴張目標。 基于這套思想,腓特烈大王在1740年到1786年當政期間進行了長久的大戰(zhàn)略實踐。在頭六年中,他的內(nèi)外政策取得輝煌成果,既推行了制度改革,又利用奧地利皇位繼承糾紛奪占了西里西亞,使歐洲震驚。但此后他未能準確把握自身擴張在歐洲各國激發(fā)的敵意,也沒有采取恰當?shù)耐饨皇侄斡枰詰獙?導致1756年在空前孤立的情勢下被迫投入“七年戰(zhàn)爭”,經(jīng)艱苦奮戰(zhàn)、承受巨大犧牲,終靠杰出的戰(zhàn)術才能和驚人的運氣方得慘勝。往后二十年,他吸取教訓、勵精圖治,對內(nèi)全面促進生產(chǎn)、推行改革,對外以平和、多元、有效的外交大大改善了國際環(huán)境。到他去世時,普魯士的歐洲強國地位業(yè)已穩(wěn)固。 腓特烈大王的大戰(zhàn)略給后世以頗多教益。他的成功來自一套明晰的大戰(zhàn)略體系,其基礎是對“國家利益”的強調(diào)和對國際格局的現(xiàn)實主義認識,其戰(zhàn)略目標定位于國內(nèi)改革與對外有限擴張,既合理、集中,又互相協(xié)調(diào)。他成功地使戰(zhàn)略手段與目標相融合,無論是立法還是作戰(zhàn)都有明確目的,且從不因為局部勝利而盲目冒進。他的失敗則主要在于對自身行為的戰(zhàn)略后果的誤判,以及由此導致的應對手段的貧乏、無力。另外,他繼承先王傳統(tǒng)、將軍隊這一政策工具抬高為戰(zhàn)略目標之一,違背了大戰(zhàn)略的根本原則,埋下了普魯士窮兵黷武的禍根。腓特烈的大戰(zhàn)略飽含類似的成敗經(jīng)驗,國內(nèi)至今尚無人專文論述這些史實與道理,本文試在此領域有所創(chuàng)新。
[Abstract]:Frederick II, King of Prussia (also known as King Frederick), was an outstanding European strategic decision-maker in 18th century. He combined the enlightenment thought, the tradition of Hohensorun dynasty and the national conditions of Prussia. It has created a set of big strategic thought of its own system, its fundamental principle is "pure national interest first", and can be roughly summed up as system reform. The system reform aims to protect production, promote the rule of law, carry out religious tolerance, and inject the new spirit of openness and justice into the country by means of legislation and administration. On the other hand, the construction of military strength is to carry on the tradition of the former king, to further strengthen the discipline of the army, to improve the combat effectiveness, and to find ways to reduce the burden caused by the army to the economy. Based on his macroscopic grasp of the European international structure, the state policy contingency thought that the inter-state relationship was a kind of realistic interest dispute, and emphasized the necessity and possibility for Prussia to make use of this kind of relationship to expand abroad. A decisive use of the army to achieve expansion goals is required. Based on this set of ideas, King Frederick carried out a long period of great strategic practice during his reign from 1740 to 1786. In the first six years, his internal and external policies achieved brilliant results, and he carried out the reform of the system. He also used the Austrian succession dispute to seize Silicia, which shocked Europe, but he failed to grasp the enmity aroused by his own expansion in European countries, nor did he take appropriate diplomatic measures to deal with it. In 1756, he was forced into the "seven-year war" in an unprecedented isolation. After hard work and great sacrifice, he was finally defeated by outstanding tactical skill and amazing luck. He learned from the lessons, worked hard to promote production at home, carried out reforms, and greatly improved the international environment with a peaceful, pluralistic and effective diplomacy. By the time of his death. Prussia is a strong European power. The great strategy of King Frederick has taught many lessons for later generations. His success comes from a set of clear strategic system, which is based on the emphasis on "national interests" and realistic understanding of the international structure. His strategic goal is aimed at domestic reform and limited expansion of foreign countries, which is both reasonable, centralized, and coordinated with each other. He has succeeded in integrating strategic means and objectives, both in legislation and in war. His failure was mainly due to the misjudgment of the strategic consequences of his own behavior, and the resulting meagre and feeble coping measures. In addition, he inherited the tradition of his ancestors. Elevating the army as a policy tool as one of the strategic objectives violated the fundamental principles of the grand strategy and buried the root of Prussian militarism. Frederick's grand strategy contained similar experience of success or failure. There is no one at home to discuss these historical facts and truth, this paper tries to innovate in this field.
【學位授予單位】：中國人民大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：K516.33

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