【摘要】：網絡既是網民參與政治、評論是非的重要場所,也是網民通過網媒與政府進行溝通、交流的主流形式。新環(huán)境下的網絡輿情,既涉及了網民自身需求的有效表達,也挑戰(zhàn)著網媒在網民與政府之間的協(xié)調能力,更是考驗著政府的治理能力�；谘莼┺恼搧硌芯烤W絡輿情危機的治理,能夠使我們清晰地了解到:網絡輿情危機中網絡參與主體之間相互博弈的動態(tài)演變過程,進而知道如何選擇最優(yōu)化策略來達到平衡,最終優(yōu)化網絡輿情危機的有效治理。圍繞著演化博弈論來研究網絡輿情危機治理的具體策略。以相關的文獻研究為基礎,針對現實生活中具體的網絡輿情危機事件,分析網絡輿情危機事件中關鍵性博弈主體,對各博弈主體的相關參數與概率作出假設,通過構建各博弈主體之間的演化博弈模型來進行分析。分析認為,網絡輿情危機事件中主要的博弈主體為三個:政府、網媒、網民。在網絡輿情危機事件中,博弈主體可以根據自身或對方的情況進行選擇,政府可以選擇積極治理,消極治理的方式,網媒可以選擇推動,阻滯的方式,網民可以選擇積極參與,消極參與的方式,他們會根據對方的選擇相對應地調整自己的選擇。博弈模型的結果表明:第一,通過減少政府積極治理成本,增加政府積極治理收益,增加網媒選擇推動策略時的罰金收益,增加政府消極治理成本,能提高政府選擇積極治理網絡輿情危機的概率以及治理的效率。第二,通過增加網媒推動網絡輿情危機發(fā)展時的固定成本,增加政府對網媒推動網絡輿情危機發(fā)展的罰金,降低網媒推動網絡輿情危機發(fā)展帶來的收益,降低網媒采取阻滯策略的損失成本,來提高網媒采取阻滯策略的概率。第三,通過減少網民積極參與網絡輿情危機所需要花費的固定成本,減少網民積極參與網絡輿情危機時,獲得信息所需要支付的其它途徑成本,增加網民積極參與網絡輿情危機的自身收益,減少網民消極參與網絡輿情危機的潛在成本,增加網民積極參與網絡輿情危機獲得的收益,來提高網民積極參與網絡輿情危機的概率。最終得出結論:為提高網絡輿情危機治理的有效性,完善網絡輿情危機的治理策略,需要從政府、網媒、網民三個層面進行反思。提出以下若干建議:第一,樹立合理地思維意識。第二,建立科學的治理流程。第三,構建完備的治理保障。第四,端正參與態(tài)度。第五,培養(yǎng)健康的參與素養(yǎng)。第六,維護有序的參與秩序。第七,發(fā)揮網絡大“V”的積極作用。第八,完善教育培訓內容。第九,增強網絡參與能力。
[Abstract]:The Internet is not only an important place for netizens to participate in politics and comment on right and wrong, but also a mainstream form of communication between Internet users and the government. The network public opinion under the new environment not only involves the effective expression of the Internet users' own needs, but also challenges the coordination ability of the network media between the netizens and the government, and also tests the governance ability of the government. To study the governance of network public opinion crisis based on evolutionary game theory can make us understand clearly the dynamic evolution process of the game between network participants in network public opinion crisis. Then we know how to choose the optimal strategy to achieve balance and finally optimize the effective management of network public opinion crisis. Around the evolution game theory to study the network public opinion crisis management specific strategy. On the basis of relevant literature research, this paper analyzes the key players of network public opinion crisis events in real life, and makes assumptions about the relevant parameters and probability of each game subject. The evolutionary game model between the players is constructed to analyze. The analysis shows that there are three main players in the crisis of network public opinion: government, network media and Internet users. In the crisis event of network public opinion, the main body of the game can choose according to their own or the other party's situation, the government can choose the way of positive governance, negative governance, network media can choose to push, block the way, the netizen can choose to participate actively. In the way of negative participation, they adjust their choices according to each other's choices. The results of the game model show that: first, by reducing the cost of active governance of the government, increasing the revenue of the positive governance of the government, increasing the fines when the network media choose the promotion strategy, and increasing the cost of the negative governance of the government. It can improve the probability that the government chooses to manage network public opinion crisis actively and the efficiency of governance. Second, by increasing the fixed cost of the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, increasing the government penalty for the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, reducing the net media to promote the network public opinion crisis development to bring the income. The loss cost of blocking strategy is reduced to increase the probability of adopting blocking strategy. Third, by reducing the fixed cost of Internet users to actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, reduce the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, access to information needs to pay other way costs. Increase the self-income of the Internet public opinion crisis, reduce the potential cost of the negative participation in the network public opinion crisis, increase the income that the netizen actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, To improve the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis probability. Finally the conclusion is drawn: in order to improve the effectiveness of network public opinion crisis governance and improve the governance strategy of network public opinion crisis, it is necessary to reflect on it from three levels: government, network media and Internet users. Put forward the following several suggestions: first, set up reasonable thinking consciousness. Second, establish a scientific governance process. Third, the construction of complete governance protection. Fourth, correct participation attitude. Fifth, cultivate healthy participation literacy. Sixth, to maintain an orderly order of participation. Seventh, give play to the positive role of the network "V". Eighth, improve the content of education and training. Ninth, enhance the ability of network participation.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：C912.63

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