本文選題：討債博弈 + 鄉(xiāng)村社會　； 參考：《南京農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版)》2017年04期

【摘要】：欠債與討債是鄉(xiāng)村社會中的常見現(xiàn)象,也是洞察熟人之間行為互動模式的重要切入點(diǎn)。文章以博弈論為視角,以討債行為為基本單位,提出了鄉(xiāng)村社會內(nèi)部討債行為中的序貫博弈模型,以及相關(guān)的概念與命題。文章探討了鄉(xiāng)村社會內(nèi)部、熟悉人之間特定的信息結(jié)構(gòu)與社會規(guī)范,以及如何影響和形塑債權(quán)人與債務(wù)人的互動博弈。此后,文章以西南農(nóng)村中發(fā)生的一起建筑業(yè)農(nóng)民工討薪案的資料為基礎(chǔ),闡釋了所提出的分析框架與理論思路。
[Abstract]:Debt and debt collection is a common phenomenon in rural society and an important entry point for insight into the pattern of interaction between acquaintances.From the perspective of game theory and taking debt collection behavior as the basic unit, this paper puts forward the sequential game model of debt collection behavior in rural society, as well as the related concepts and propositions.This paper probes into the specific information structure and social norms among people within the rural society and how to influence and shape the interactive game between creditors and debtors.Then, based on the data of a case of migrant workers asking for pay in the construction industry in southwest rural areas, the paper explains the analysis framework and theoretical thinking.
【作者單位】： 華中農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)社會學(xué)系/農(nóng)村社會建設(shè)與管理研究中心;
【基金】：霍英東教育基金會資助項目“農(nóng)村社會治理中的基層政府行為研究”(151090)
【分類號】：C912.82
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本文編號：1762331