本文選題：富人治村　切入點(diǎn)：鄉(xiāng)村場域　出處：《華中科技大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：進(jìn)入后稅費(fèi)時代,“富人治村”已成為鄉(xiāng)村治理中的主流模式,這一權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)變化背后有經(jīng)濟(jì)背景、社會基礎(chǔ)、制度與政策因素的復(fù)雜作用。一方面,稅改后的農(nóng)村基層政治在擺脫了資源汲取的壓力之后開始初步民主化,對選舉的控制逐漸放開；另一方面,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展,鄉(xiāng)村社會出現(xiàn)了劇烈的分化,與此同時國家也在通過大幅下滲公共品資源緩解農(nóng)村的衰頹。在國家的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)投入與地方政府的土地開發(fā)進(jìn)程中,城鎮(zhèn)周邊農(nóng)村的超級地租開始出現(xiàn)。新的時代背景下,順利承接資源、完成土地增值開發(fā)、引導(dǎo)農(nóng)民致富成為農(nóng)村基層工作的中心任務(wù),基層組織建設(shè)中的“雙帶方針”由是興起,農(nóng)村先富能人階層在地方政府基礎(chǔ)性權(quán)力不足的情況下成為基層工作達(dá)致目標(biāo)的支柱力量。 然而,當(dāng)由權(quán)力主導(dǎo)的巨大利益空間出現(xiàn)之后,村兩委選舉及人大代表直選便被財(cái)富所左右,“賄選”進(jìn)入相當(dāng)普遍而難以監(jiān)管的灰色地帶。村莊政治的公共性嚴(yán)重萎縮,占人口大多數(shù)的中下階層被排斥出去,民主決策、民主管理與民主監(jiān)督難以實(shí)現(xiàn),規(guī)范利益分配的各種制度設(shè)計(jì)在權(quán)力實(shí)踐中得不到有效的執(zhí)行。鄉(xiāng)村社會的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)在日益激烈的競爭中趨于寡頭化。 個體的富人出于桑梓情懷回報(bào)家鄉(xiāng)的類慈善行為并不能代表富人階層的參政動機(jī)。作為一個整體,他們的投資遵循“一步領(lǐng)先、步步領(lǐng)先”的競爭邏輯,而且前提是自身獲利更多。雖然他們的投入客觀上能使局部地區(qū)獲得資源,但卻以更多地區(qū)的利益受損為代價(jià),因?yàn)樗麄兯薪拥馁Y源總量是有限的。更為重要的是,橫亙于國家與社會之間的寡頭結(jié)構(gòu)放大了基層場域中權(quán)力-利益網(wǎng)絡(luò)的“結(jié)構(gòu)洞”效應(yīng),從上至下輸入農(nóng)村的資源在流動過程中被大量吸食,且流量愈大吸食愈深,鄉(xiāng)村治理發(fā)生了內(nèi)卷化。這與稅改前發(fā)生的國家政權(quán)內(nèi)卷化如出一轍,只不過資源流向發(fā)生了逆轉(zhuǎn)。所以,如果不能在將鄉(xiāng)村社會加以組織的基礎(chǔ)上設(shè)法以協(xié)商民主的政治過程代替權(quán)力主體的利益博弈,那么權(quán)力-市場的結(jié)盟不僅會使國家下滲資源的戰(zhàn)略意圖落空,還會將經(jīng)濟(jì)社會運(yùn)行帶入“轉(zhuǎn)型陷阱”中,停滯、潰爛。
[Abstract]:In the post-tax era, "the rich people ruling villages" has become the mainstream mode in rural governance, which has the complex effects of economic background, social foundation, system and policy factors behind the change of power structure. After the tax reform, rural grassroots politics began to democratize initially after getting rid of the pressure of absorbing resources, and the control of elections was gradually liberalized. On the other hand, with the rapid development of the economy, the rural society became sharply divided. At the same time, the country is also alleviating the decline of rural areas through the massive infiltration of public goods resources. In the process of investment in national infrastructure construction and land development by local governments, the super-rent in the rural areas around cities and towns has begun to emerge. Under the new background of the times, Undertaking resources smoothly, completing land value-added development, and guiding farmers to become rich become the central task of rural grassroots work. The "double belt policy" in the construction of grass-roots organizations has arisen. Under the condition that the basic power of the local government is insufficient, the rural rich and talented stratum becomes the pillar force to achieve the goal of the grass-roots work. However, after the emergence of a huge interest space dominated by power, the election of the two committees of the village and the direct election of the deputies to the people's Congress were influenced by wealth, and the "bribery election" entered a very common gray area which was difficult to supervise. The public nature of the village politics shrank severely. The middle and lower classes, which make up the majority of the population, are excluded, and democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision are difficult to achieve. The system design of regulating the distribution of benefits cannot be carried out effectively in the practice of power, and the power structure of rural society tends to be oligopolistic in the increasingly fierce competition. The philanthropic behavior of individual rich people in return for their hometown is not representative of the political motivation of the rich class. As a whole, their investments follow the competitive logic of "one step ahead, step by step". And the premise is that they are profiting more. Although their investment can objectively lead to local access to resources, it is at the expense of the interests of more regions, because the total amount of resources they have to undertake is limited. More importantly, The oligarchic structure between the state and the society amplifies the "structural hole" effect of the power-interest network in the grass-roots field. The resources imported from the top to the bottom are sucked in a large amount during the flow process, and the greater the flow is, the deeper the sucking is. Rural governance has been internalized. This is the same as before the tax reform, but the flow of resources has been reversed. If the political process of deliberative democracy can not be used to replace the interests of power subjects on the basis of organizing rural society, then the alliance of power and market will not only frustrate the strategic intention of the state to infiltrate resources. Will also bring the economic and social operation into the "transition trap", stagnation, ulceration.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：C912.82

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 陳訊;婚姻價(jià)值變革：山河鄉(xiāng)離婚現(xiàn)象研究（1978-2012）[D];華中科技大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 陳夢嬌;發(fā)展型社會政策視角下的“富人治村”研究[D];南京大學(xué);2013年

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本文編號：1685476